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THESIS SUMMARY 
 
ASTON UNIVERSITY 
DETERMINING THE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF COST AND TIME OVERRUN 
ARISING FROM DIFFERENT CONTRACTOR SELECTION STRATEGIES IN 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS. 
Gerald Ukeje Enyinwa Eke 
Doctor of Philosophy 
2017 
Failing to adequately select the winning contractor can lead to problems in the project delivery phase 
such as bad quality and project delay; which ultimately results in cost overruns. There are two 
strategies involved with selecting contractors: one is the lowest tender, the other is called best value. 
Selecting the lowest tender is straightforward; the latter strategy would involve scoring the 
contractors' tenders on price and quality and ranking them.  
The aim of this research is to provide a model of determining the probability distributions of cost and 
time arising from choosing different contractor selection strategies: lowest tender or best value tender. 
The research presents an approach by which a what-if scenario can be analyzed using educational 
facilities projects in the UK. A Monte Carlo Simulation model was developed to allow the evaluation 
of the probability distributions of cost, and duration arising from the different strategies; these are 
presented as probability curves. 
The results show that the lowest tenderer would likely overrun in cost but the cost will be below the 
price of the best value tenderer. However, there is a higher probability that the lowest tender will 
exceed the clients’ expected duration, perhaps by a significant amount.  
The first contribution of the thesis is the development of a novel model of determining the probability 
distributions of cost and time involved with the different contractor selection strategies by using 
Monte Carlo simulation. The second contribution is a fresh way of looking at cost overruns. It is 
proposed that contractors’ cost overrun for a project should be compared to the price of the next 
highest tender to gauge its real impact. 
Keywords: Contractor selection, lowest price, best value tender, Monte Carlo Simulation. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
 
The selection of a contractor is one of the most important issues in construction projects; it can 
be argued that the success level of any construction projects largely depends on selecting the 
most appropriate contractor (El-Abbasy et al., 2013). Iyer and Jha (2005) suggested wrong 
contractor selection as one of the factors contributing to poor project performance. In Olaniran 
(2015) study on construction project performance in Brunei, Australia, 11 out of 22 reasons for 
poor project performance were linked to wrong contractor selection. Wrong contractor selection 
can lead to disputes, lengthy dispute resolution, project or contractor termination, low quality 
products and defects. Improper selection of the winning contractor may result to problems in 
the project delivery phase such as bad quality and delay in the expected project duration; which 
then ultimately results in cost overruns. Overruns: both time and cost are prevalent in the 
construction industry; most construction projects overrun their budgets and estimates. For 
example, Love et al. (2014), in their research of Australian projects found that construction 
projects overran by up to 70% more than their initial estimates. While the Western Australian 
Auditor General’s Report (2012) found that the total cost of 20 projects were 114% more than 
the initial budget estimates. Furthermore, it reported that the New Children Hospital in Perth, 
Australia was 365% over-budget (A$207 million to A$962 million). The fact that the 
construction industry is a large industry with different types and sizes of projects, one would 
assume that these cost overruns happen in only certain types of projects; perhaps in larger 
projects. However, Love et al. (2014) points out that overruns occur irrespective of the size and 
type of the project.  
There are further examples of overruns in the industry: the London’s Wembley Stadium 
(Richardson et al., 2006), The Channel Tunnel Project (Veditz 1993), Boston’s Central Artery 
(Gelinas 2007), Edinburg’s tram project (City of Edinburg Council 2014) etc. These are major 
examples of cost and duration exceeding its initial estimates. The Glenigan UK Industry 
Performance Report (2016) show that only 56% of construction project met or bettered the cost 
figure agreed at the start of the construction phase in 2015 (Figure 1.1). Furthermore, that only 
48% of construction projects in 2015 met or bettered the length of time agreed at the start of 
the construction phase (Figure 1.2).   
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Figure 1.1: Percentage of projects completed within cost estimates 
 
Source: Glenigan UK Industry Performance Report 2016 
Figure 1.2: Percentage of projects completed within time estimates 
 
Source: Glenigan UK Industry Performance Report 2016 
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Now it will be naive to claim that selecting the most appropriate contractor guarantees that the 
project runs on time and on budget, however, it does have an important role to play. Hence, the 
reason why there have been an influx of different multi-criterion methods to go with the lowest 
tender method in determining the best contractor. These multi-criterion methods have now been 
termed as awarding on “best value.” In the United States (US hereafter), this is known as best 
value technically acceptable, in the United Kingdom (UK hereafter), the Most Economically 
Advantageous Tender (MEAT hereafter), and across Europe, the Economically Most 
Advantageous Tender (EMAT hereafter).  
 
To further illustrate the importance of selecting the most appropriate contractor, the UK 
introduced new procurement methods: Cost-led, Two-stage open book, and Insurance 
procurement methods to innovate from the problematic Traditional procurement method, as 
well as the Management and Design and Build methods; which were more of a slight 
improvement to the Traditional method. The Traditional procurement method has long been 
considered problematic due to the fact that price had been the major factor in selecting 
contractors (Merna and Smith, 1990; Holt et al. 1995; Lahdenpera, 2013). Furthermore, this 
method separated the design stage from the construction stage, meaning that contractors had no 
part to play in the designing stage of the project and bore the majority of the risk in the 
construction of the project (Oztas and Okmen, 2004; ICE, 2016). While the client had to 
essentially get the designing flawless or else risk incurring huge costs if there were variations 
or significant changes required once the contractor has been appointed and design stage is 
complete.  This results in an adversarial relationship between the client and the selected 
contractor that ultimately resulted in cost and time overruns. Therefore, more collaborative 
procurement methods were introduced to tackle the deficiencies in the conventional 
procurement methods.  
 
With the influx of new procurement methods, brings more complexity in selecting the most 
appropriate contractor, different organisations have different method of doing so; there is no 
universal way to do it, and it is not as simple as awarding the contract to the lowest tender. It is 
due to the lack of simplicity that the industry has found it difficult to accept the idea; according 
to the UK National Contract Law and Survey (NBS, 2015) the Traditional procurement method 
is still the most used procurement method in the country; which indicates that the lowest tender 
method is still used more often. What this also indicates is that irrespective of new procurement 
methods, there will still be a tendency to award contracts to the lowest tenderer unless there is 
more evidence to make them choose otherwise.  The lack of substantial evidence is not of a 
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lack of trying; indeed, academics have combined different multi-criterion methods with 
different cost estimation software such as genetic algorithm and fuzzy logic, to name a few, to 
try and develop a significant evidence as to why awarding to the lowest tenderer may not 
usually be the best decision (Abdelrahman et al., 2008). However, there is still a lack of 
evidence to suggest what value these multi-criterion methods add over the lowest tender 
method. 
 
This research is not advocating the universal use of best value rather it is questioning its value; 
essentially by asking ‘is it always worth it?’ The research would help clients understand the 
impact of their contractor selection strategy and how it influences construction and the overall 
outcomes of the project: Final Cost and Duration.  
 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
Selecting the wrong contractor can lead to problems such as bad quality and project delay; 
which ultimately results in cost overruns. There are two strategies involved with selecting 
contractors: one is the lowest tender, the other is called best value. Selecting the lowest tender 
is still the most popular strategy as it is relatively straightforward, objective and transparent 
(Holt et al., 1994; Plebankiewicz, 2010; Huang, 2011; NBS, 2015). However, the criticism to 
it is that it usually fails to guarantee a contractor’s quality performance. The best value strategy 
would involve the client scoring the contractors' tenders on price and its criteria for quality and 
ranking them. And, there is no set way to do this, there are different formulas for this, and the 
literature is rich with models developed to assign the best value contractor. But, with all these 
formulas and developed models, we are still none the wiser as to whether they will actually lead 
to a successful contractor performance and subsequently a successful project outcome. Project 
outcomes for this research is limited to cost and duration; a successful project outcome is when 
the contractor delivers the project within the expected cost and duration. There are various 
models developed to help with selecting the best value contractor (these models will be 
examined in Chapter 2), however only a handful of these models have substantially investigated 
the link between contractor selection strategy and project outcomes. So how can we justify to 
the client to go with the best value contractor who has a higher price? Is choosing the best value 
contractor with a higher price always worth it? Of course, there are situations where the best 
value contractor also has the lowest price. But in cases where they are different it needs 
justification. Justification in terms of how it will affect project’s cost and duration and not just 
theoretical reasons why the best value strategy is better than the lowest tender strategy. 
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Therefore, if a client decides to use the best value strategy to select a contractor, and it turns 
out that the best value contractor does not have the lowest price, the proposed model would 
develop a what-if scenario analysis to investigate how the lowest tenderer would have likely 
fared in terms of cost and duration had it been awarded the contract instead. In doing so, the 
model also addresses another problem; usually clients are unable to identify a justifiably low 
tender. The proposed model would enable clients determine the probability distributions of 
outcomes associated with acceptance of the lowest tender. 
 
This research does not advocate any specific contractor selection strategy; rather which strategy 
works where. There are cases where awarding to the lowest tendered contractor would not make 
sense, as it might cost the client even more money. While, there are other cases where awarding 
the contract to the MEAT might not make much of a difference; therefore, this thesis would 
provide a decision support tool to make decision makers more aware of the benefits and 
drawbacks of a decision and its ramifications in terms of cost and duration. Again, urging clients 
to select the best value tender, especially when the best value tender is not the lowest tender, 
needs justification. Justification in terms of how it will affect project outcomes: cost and 
duration, and not just theoretical reasons of why the best value strategy is better than the lowest 
tender strategy.  
 
1.2 AIM, OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 
 
The aim of this study is: 
To provide a model of determining the probability distributions of cost and time arising from 
choosing different contractor selection strategies. 
To achieve this, a model will be developed that shows how the lowest tenderer would have 
likely fared in a project (in terms of Final Cost and Duration) that has been awarded to the best 
value contractor whose price is not the lowest price.  
To achieve the aim, the objectives are to: 
a) Identify and collect a reliable dataset of past projects: 
that were all awarded to the lowest tender, and are all in the same sector. 
b) Investigate the probability distribution of final costs and duration for construction 
projects: 
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by modelling the tenders to determine the total outcome cost and duration of projects 
arising from selecting contractors on lowest tender strategy. 
c) Validate the model on recent project cases: 
the model will then be validated on recent same sector projects that used the lowest 
tender strategy. The outcomes of these projects would have to fall within the envelope 
of outcomes predicted by the model. 
d) Apply the model on best value selected tender projects: 
the model can then be applied on same sector projects that used the best value strategy, 
where the best value contractor has a higher price. Applying the model in these projects 
would be able to show how the lowest tenderer would have likely fared in terms of cost 
and duration had it been awarded the contract instead. 
 
An initial analysis of the literature review and methodology has led to these research questions that will 
guide the research in achieving its main aim. 
1. What are the sources of overruns stated in the existing literature? 
2. Is there a relationship between contractor selection strategy and project outcomes? 
3. What are the current procurement and tendering methods in the UK construction 
industry? 
4. To what extent do these methods affect the contractor selection strategy? 
5. Is Monte Carlo simulation the appropriate method of investigating the relationship 
between contractor selection and project outcomes? 
 
The research is essentially investigating the link between the contractor selection strategy and project 
outcomes: cost and duration. Overruns are a huge problem in construction, therefore, it is important to 
know what the sources of overruns given in the literature are. This enables us to know that there are 
other reasons why a project may overrun that had little or nothing to do with the contractor. That way 
the appropriate relationship between the contractor selection strategy and project outcomes can be 
established; this affected the kind of projects used for this research. Then we know that a contractor 
selection strategy in construction is part of a wider procurement and tendering structure. Therefore, it 
is important to know what these are and how the affect the contractor selection strategy used. Finally, 
in Question 5, it is important to know whether Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS hereafter) is the 
appropriate method to execute the aim and objectives; this was answered in Chapter 3. 
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1.3 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
When deciding on the research approach, it is important to consider the type of problem that is 
under study and how best to answer the research question sufficiently. The research adopted, 
for the most part, a quantitative approach. While critiquing and exploring existing literature it 
was clear the there is little work on the actual probability distributions of either total costs 
incurred or project time. There are two ways these distributions can be determined; a review of 
all projects comparing the probability distributions of actual cost outcomes, or a MCS of the 
same project under different contractor selection strategy. The problem with a review of historic 
project outcomes is that no two construction projects are the same. However, by deriving 
statistics from the historic events, MCS will allow for the repeated simulation of hundreds of 
tenders for exactly the same project and produce probability distributions of the outcome.  
Chapter 1 provided the background of the research, which included the definition of the 
research’s main aim and objectives, as well as research questions. Then in Chapter 2, a review 
and critique of existing literature followed; which included various theories on the sources of 
cost overruns and the evaluation of tenders. Next, the simulation approach was designed in 
Chapter 3 and the results were presented and discussed (Chapter 4) before drawing conclusion 
and offering recommendations (Chapter 5). Chapter 3 will contain a more in-depth discussion 
of the research methodology and design. 
 
1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The thesis is organised in five chapters as illustrated in Figure 1.5.1. 
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Figure 1.4.1: Thesis Structure 
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1.4.1 Chapter 1- Introduction 
 
The chapter sets out the background and context of the research, introducing the problem statement. 
The aim and objectives of the research alongside the research questions are outlined. 
 
1.4.2 Chapter 2- Selecting the best tender 
 
The chapter first begins by examining the sources of overruns; critically evaluating the explanations 
for overruns to ascertain the effect a contractor plays in it. Then the research presents the different 
procurement and tendering methods that are used in construction projects, and how it affects the 
strategy by which a contractor is selected. Furthermore, the chapter critically evaluates models that 
have been developed in aiding to select the best value tender seeing that the lowest tender strategy is 
straightforward to execute. 
1.4.3 Chapter 3-Research Methodology and Design 
 
The chapter presents the consideration for adopting the research approach as well as the framework 
that will guide the modelling aspects of the research. Then alternatives tool to MCS are briefly 
presented. Finally, the background, applications, strengths and weakness of MCS are evaluated.  
1.4.4 Chapter 4-Presenting the model 
 
The model is developed and presented in this chapter. The model is developed using Dataset 1 of 120 
UK educational facilities projects all of which selected the lowest tender from the Building Cost 
Information Service (BCIS). The model is then tested on a further 10 similar project that selected the 
lowest tender. Then it is validated with Dataset 2 of 20 recent project cases from an industry partner 
all of which selected the lowest tender. Before being applied on best value selected tender whose price 
is not the lowest price. The aim here is to provide a model capable of investigating how the lowest 
tender would likely fare in a project that selects the best value tender whose price is not the lowest 
price. 
1.4.5 Chapter 5-Conclusions 
 
In the final chapter, conclusions are made based on the findings from the literature review and model 
chapters. The aim and objectives that were set out in the opening chapter is revisited to see how far 
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they have been achieved. Finally, the theoretical and practical contributions of the research are 
summarised; together with recommendations to further research.  
1.4.6 References  
 
The list of work cited in the thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
19 
 
 
 
1.5 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
 
The contribution of this research is to the field of construction projects; specifically, at its earlier 
stage of selecting the contractor, as has been described previously. Although, we are at the 
beginning of the thesis, stating the contributions in advance is not only showing the reader what 
this thesis is aspiring to accomplish, but also showing the reader what to expect. The 
contributions are summarised as:  
 
 A novel model of determining the probability distributions of cost and time 
involved with the different contractor selection strategies. This is done with the 
combination of MCS simulation and probability distribution. The MCS technique is 
not new, it allows people to account for risk in quantitative analysis and decision 
making; giving decision makers a probability distribution of possible outcomes. 
Probability distribution is the most basic type of statistical analysis that simply tallies 
or counts how frequently each value of a variable occurs among a set of measured 
objects. This sort of research is usually used to understand the differences in 
population, for example in classrooms. Nevertheless, using MCS and probability 
distribution to explore the effects of a contractor selection strategy on the overall cost 
and duration of the project is rare. The model will enable clients to decide whether it is 
worth selecting a best value contractor who has a higher price over the lowest tendered 
contractor. Another thrust of the research is in its ability to show clients when a 
strategy: in this case the lowest tender strategy can go horribly wrong and the likelihood 
of it happening. 
 
 Providing a new understanding of construction cost overruns. Construction cost 
and overruns is a research area that has been investigated in the past and is sure to be 
investigated in the future. However, the bulk of current research has been replicative; 
offering theoretical reasons for the causes of overruns and lacking the necessary 
innovation in advancing the knowledge area. The contribution of this thesis is a fresh 
way of understanding cost overruns; it is proposed that contractors’ cost overrun for a 
project should be compared to the price of the next highest tender to gauge its real 
impact. 
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Chapter 2: SELECTING THE BEST TENDER 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Selecting the most appropriate contractor is an important step in a project, as the decisions made 
during the early stages of the construction project has a significant bearing on the outcome of 
the project. However, it is not entirely responsible for a successful project. Nevertheless, 
Nureize and Watada (2011) say that contractor selection is a critical decision that has a 
significant influence on the project’s success, hence, decision makers should consider using 
multiple criteria to award contract. Despite this fact, there is little to no research that shows a 
direct relationship between the selection strategy and the outcome of the construction project. 
Furthermore, the fact that contractor selection criteria are uncertain, as it varies depending on 
the type of projects, has resulted in many different attempts being developed to include 
economic and technical criteria in the contractor selection process (Abdelrahman et al., 2008). 
This section will first investigate how project performance is measured in construction projects 
and how contractor selection affects it. As the thesis aims to offer a new understanding of cost 
overruns, it is important to understand the sources of cost overruns but also project delay. By 
doing so in this chapter, one will understand that though selecting the most appropriate 
contractor has an influence in the project’s success, it is by no means the only reason. There are 
other reasons for overruns, and claiming appropriate contractor selection as the remedy for it 
will be naive; while ignoring the other reasons for it will only serve as the recipe for future 
overruns. 
Therefore, though the research is specifically looking at the relationship between the evaluation 
of tenders and the project outcome, this chapter will discuss the various theoretical explanations 
of the overrun phenomenon. By doing so, it will then be able to discuss how tenders are 
currently evaluated. However, to discuss this the reader will first have to understand the 
procurement and tendering methods in the UK, as it plays an important role on how tenders 
will be evaluated. Then the conclusion points out the gap in the literature, acting as a link to the 
next chapters that presents a conceptual model of determining the probability distributions of 
cost and time arising from the different contractor selection strategies in construction projects. 
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2.1 CAUSES OF OVERRUNS 
 
Wrong contractor selection strategy leads to all sorts of problems: disputes, lengthy dispute 
resolution, project or contractor termination, low quality products and defects. However, cost 
and time overruns are the most prominent problem in the construction industry. The 
construction industry sees many sorts of projects from housing, infrastructure, industrial, and 
commercial; whether it is to build, refurbish, or maintain. Some of these projects are simple, 
while others are more complicated; some are small, others are large, and some are scheduled to 
be completed under a year, while others may go on for multiple years. Basically, no matter the 
size of the project, they all have a chance of overrunning on their budget and estimates due to 
risk and uncertainty associated with executing a construction project. Sadly, construction 
projects make the headlines for the wrong reasons; mostly because of overrunning their budget 
and estimates.  
Cost overrun refers to budget increase, cost increase, or cost growth (Love et al., 2013). The 
reasons for it are vast; one being failure to effectively manage risk and uncertainty (Okmen and 
Oztas, 2010) as alluded to earlier. While another might be due to the unrealistic cost targets and 
misguided trade-offs set by all parties involved between project scope, time and cost (Ahiaga-
Dagbui and Smith, 2014). Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) study on the cost performance of 258 
transportation projects in 20 nations worth US$90 billion found that nine out of ten projects in 
their sample outran their cost. The researchers grouped the sources of cost overruns into three 
groups: technical, psychological, and political-economic. There are a plethora of reasons giving 
in the literature as to why overruns may occur; the aim of this section is to critically evaluate 
the ones that come up the most in the existing literature.  Below are tables that summarise the 
reasons for cost overruns from Flyvbjerg (2008) and Cantarelli et al. (2010).  
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Table 2.1.1: Causes of Cost Overruns Group and Explanations 
 
Group Explanations 
Technical  Inaccurate and unreliable data. Technical 
complications in project leading to increased 
costs. 
Psychological Optimism bias; being overly-optimistic about 
the implementation of the project. 
Political-
economic 
Strategic misrepresentation; overestimate 
benefits and underestimate costs. 
Source: Flyvbjerg (2008). Adapted by researcher  
Table 2.1.2: Causes of Cost Overruns Group and Examples 
Group Examples 
Technical  Incomplete estimates, poor project design, scope 
changes, uncertainty, inappropriate 
organizational structure, inadequate decision-
making process etc.  
Psychological Optimism bias among local officials, cognitive 
bias of people, cautious attitudes toward risk. 
Political Deliberate cost underestimation, manipulation of 
forecasts, private information.  
Economical Lack of incentives, lack of resources, inefficient 
use of resources, inadequate contract 
management etc. 
Source: Cantarelli et al. (2010). Adapted by researcher 
2.1.1 Risk and Uncertainty (Technical) 
 
It is important to understand that risk and uncertainty are two different things, regardless of 
whether they are used simultaneously. The fact that they are used simultaneously is because the 
term “uncertainty” is used in most scientific literature concerning risk management 
(Ustinovicius et al., 2007). Vice-versa, uncertainty management is concerned as managing 
perceived threats and opportunities; including their risk implications, as well as managing the 
various sources of uncertainty which give rise to and shape risk, threat and opportunity 
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(Chapman and Ward, 2003; Ustinovicius et al., 2007). The fact remains that they are two 
different things: uncertainty is simply not knowing; in other words, the lack of certainty 
involving the likelihood of event. Smith (2003) rightly points out that risk arise from 
uncertainty, but later suggests that risk is often viewed as factors which have an adverse effect 
on achieving project success. However, the notion of risk is not always negative as Ross and 
Williams (2013) describes risk as “the threat or possibility that an action or event will adversely 
or beneficially affect an organisation's ability to achieve its objective.” However, they seem to 
contradict themselves by implying that risk “the consequence of a hazard, measured as the 
likelihood of the hazard and its severity”, should that hazard occur. The term “hazard” and 
“severity” makes the term “risk” come across as entirely danger, which might not always be 
the case. 
Every construction project is different, with its own dynamics; Eden et al. (2005) points out 
that failure to understand the systemic and dynamic nature of projects leads to overruns. All 
construction projects (are likely to) experience unexpected situations and uncertainties, whether 
it is scope creep or design changes, or bad weather, or disputes. Therefore, risk and uncertainty 
are not the issue; failure to adequately manage and plan for them is the main issue. Cantarelli 
et al. (2010) rightly cites inadequate decision-making and planning process as technical 
explanations for overruns. This is supported by the technical explanation of Flyvbjerg’s (2008) 
reasons for overruns which refers to cost overruns being due to inaccurate and unreliable data; 
including other technical complications that arise in the project which leads to increased costs. 
Failure to plan for perceived risk leads to project failure, not the risk itself. There are some risks 
that cannot be avoided as Migilinskas and Ustinovicius (2006) and Chapman and Ward (2003) 
explains the three basic sources of risk and uncertainty: 
 Known-unknowns: these are the events that have been identified as having the potential 
to happen and could uncertain significant events. But by knowing of the potential 
problems, it allows for contingency plans. For example, inflation, strike when a labour 
contract expires or adverse weather in winter (Ustinovicius et al., 2007).  
 Unknown-unknowns: these are the events that arrive unexpectedly and the main 
contingency to this is relying on the manager’s experience. 
 Bias: these are estimation errors which have severe consequences. 
As alluded to earlier, known-unknowns can be adequately prepared for to prevent cost and time 
overruns despite the fact that it is dynamic and has an impact on the project. Migilinskas and 
Ustinovicius (2006) say that uncertainties often rise due to the lack of qualification and 
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competence from the project manager’s team; this is not entirely true as with the unknown-
unknown situations, this should be deemed as an unfortunate circumstance since it could not 
be avoided. There are also situations whereby cost overruns should simply be viewed as cost 
escalation, two different phenomena as Love et al. (2013) explains that cost overruns should be 
distinguished for cost escalation; that escalation is an anticipated growth in budgeted cost due 
to factors such as inflation. Therefore, cost escalation can also apply to known-unknowns as 
there are situations whereby cost will have to increase; if it was anticipated it would be cost 
escalation, but if it was cited as a potential event at the initial stages of the project but not 
prepared for then this should be viewed as cost overrun. Finally, the third source, bias, as 
Migilinskas and Ustinovicius (2006) explains is a static risk that will remain consistent during 
its period of existence. This supports Flyvbjerg’s (2008) work on optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation as reasons for cost overruns, which will be discussed in the next section.   
2.1.2 Optimism Bias (Psychological) 
 
Flyvbjerg (2008) offers optimism bias as a psychological explanation for cost overruns; this 
theory is primarily from behavioural studies and it is to do with the inclination for people to be 
overly positive when making predictions about the outcomes of future planned actions 
(Siemiatycki, 2010). Thus, in the context of construction projects, underestimating cost and 
overestimating benefits; including delivery days. One reason for optimism bias could be due to 
lack of information or information exchange between project participants to base realistic 
estimates. As Nicholas (2004) suggests that estimators usually should rely heavily on their own 
experience and historical information when preparing initial estimates.  Which also explains 
why Flyvbjerg (2009) refers to optimism bias as delusion in the following way:  
"Delusion accounts for the cost underestimation and benefit overestimation that occurs 
when people generate predictions using the inside view. Executives adopt an inside 
view of the problem by focusing tightly on the case at hand, by considering the plan 
and the obstacles to its completion, by constructing scenarios of future progress, and 
by extrapolating current trends. In other words, by using typical bottom-up decision-
making techniques, they think about a problem by bringing to bear all they know about 
it, with special attention to its unique details. There are two cognitive delusions the 
inside view facilitates: the planning fallacy and a heuristic rule-of-thumb called 
anchoring and adjustment."  
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) study of more than 200 transport mega projects in 20 countries on five 
continents found that development costs were on average 28% higher than forecasted. While 
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recently in a project in Australia that rose from A$160 million to A$550 million at its 
completion, the Auditor General released a statement alluding to the fact that unrealistic 
estimates were made due to a lack of understanding of project needs (Auditor General, 2010). 
This again shows that one of the reasons for optimism bias is a lack of understanding of the 
project at hand. There are other cases, particularly with larger projects, where political and 
institutional factors create a situation where few project participants have a direct interest in 
avoiding unrealistic evaluations during the decision-making process (Siemiatycki, 2010; 
Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004). This is supported by Flyvbjerg 
(2007) study which suggests culture of rewarding estimators for accurate forecasting to 
alleviate the practice of being overly optimistic.  
Rewarding estimators for accurate forecast however, is almost impossible as forecasts are often 
incorrect. Thus, other researchers such as: Love et al. (2012; 2013; 2014), Osland and Strand 
(2010) and Gil and Lundrigan (2012) challenge Flyvbjerg’s (2008) explanations for cost 
overruns. They imply that the reasons for cost overruns are simple; project evolves and with 
that comes increase in costs. There is no doubt that, whether it is changes in scope or design, or 
changes in contractual arrangements, or contractor’s cash flow, these all carry huge financial 
complications. However, implying that the only reason for cost overrun is project changing is 
naive. Projects changes may ultimately result to cost escalation; which should be distinguished 
from cost overrun as alluded to earlier. But it cannot be the only reason, construction projects 
are dynamic, it contains a level of risk and uncertainty; failure to manage them leads to cost 
and time overrun. Furthermore, the construction industry has long been known for its 
adversarial relationships between project participants (Boardman, 2004). This results in lack of 
information exchange as each participant tries to minimise its own risk; therefore, conflicts are 
bound to arise which will ultimately threaten the success of the project. The culture that 
seemingly exist in construction projects of participants fighting for their own self-interest 
supports Flyvbjerg’s (2008) strategic misrepresentation reason for cost overruns which is 
discussed in the next section.  
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2.1.3 Strategic Misrepresentation (Political-Economic) 
 
Strategic misrepresentation alludes to suspicion of foul play and corruption (Flyvbjerg 2008; 
Flyvbjerg, 2009). This is a situation where forecasters and planners knowingly overestimate 
benefits and underestimate costs to win projects or get funding approval; this refers to its 
political-economic explanations. Flyvberg (2009) refers to this as deception which is described 
in the following way:  
“Deception accounts for flawed planning in decision making in terms of politics and 
agency issues. The political and organizational pressures in executive decision making 
involve: the principal agent problem and the sources of strategic deception." 
In Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) study on the cost performance of 258 transportation projects, it found 
that cost overruns were not randomly distributed in their sample but were rather systematic. 
This then led them to controversially assume foul play and corruption. This assumption has 
been refuted by Love et al. (2012) which implies that the industry should accept the fact that 
cost escalation is likely. Furthermore, Osland and Strand (2010) were critical of theoretical and 
methodological validity of Flyvbjerg work, and that is fair to do as it is difficult to use statistical 
analysis to know the difference between deliberate deception, technical error, and delusion. But 
strategic misrepresentation does exist, and one can argue that this works together with optimism 
bias; though optimism bias does not come with the motive of deceiving, it leads to 
underestimating costs. The UK government for example offered a Green Book supplementary 
guidance on optimism bias, recommending forecasters to add explicit adjustments to their 
estimated capital costs (HM Treasury, 2013). As alluded to earlier, with the construction 
industry lacking collaboration between project participants, optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation is entirely possible. Love et al. (2012) study rightly claim that negative events 
that occur before the project delivery stage leads to cost overruns. However, is it impossible to 
imagine an optimism bias client that wants to effectively complete its dream project at the 
lowest cost possible, falling for a contractor who has excessively underestimated costs to win 
the project? There is every chance of this happening; they both go hand-in-hand. 
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Source: European Commission (Adapted by Researcher) 
Figure 2.1.1 (above) by the European Commission outlines factors that lead to cost and time 
overruns in their funded projects. The poor project management factor has an effect in all stages 
of the construction process that according to the European Commission leads to: 
 a lack of planning and coordination; 
 poor communication between members of the project team and the project sponsor; 
 failure to identify problems and institute necessary design and programming changes; 
 a lack of control over time and cost inputs. 
The European Commission even go on to state in the report that a poor project with a good 
project management structure/contractor will be completed satisfactorily. This links back to 
Ustinovicius (2006) and Chapman and Ward (2003) (p.23) second explanation of the three basic 
sources of risk and uncertainty: Unknown-Unknowns; that there are events that arrive 
unexpectedly and the main contingency for these events is a good project manager/contractor. 
Thus, a good contractor may also be able to navigate through difficult situations such as the 
force majeure factor; which is also an unknown-unknowns risk uncertainty that includes: 
revolution, war, riot, extreme weather, earthquake, landslip, fire, and political and economic 
instability. Though contractors usually insure against such events happening (European 
Commission).   
Project Delay or Variation 
in Original Cost Estimate 
Unexpected 
Ground Conditions 
Design 
Changes
Poor Project 
Management
Land Acquisition 
Costs 
Inflation/Relative 
Price Changes 
Force 
Majeur
Shortages of 
Material and Plant 
Funding 
Problems 
Exchange 
Rate
Inappropriate 
Contractors 
Figure 2.1.1: Overrun Factors 
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Factors such as Inflation and Exchange Rates can be considered a known-unknowns as this 
usually have the potential to happen and allows for contingency plans. The Design Changes 
factor also supports Cantarelli et al. (2010) (Table 2.1.2) technical causes of overruns which 
include poor project design and scope changes. While the shortages of material and plant 
supports Cantarelli et al. (2010) economical causes of overruns which highlights inefficient use 
or lack of resources as a factor for overruns. 
The unexpected ground conditions factor is interesting as usually the ground conditions can be 
assessed by a desk-based review, however, the actual site conditions for the full extent of a 
project are not usually determined until construction begins (European Commission). Thus, it 
is possible that difficult review is overlooked by initial review and that may result in an 
unknown-unknowns event arising in which the main contingency for it will be a good project 
manager/contractor.  
The funding problem and land acquisition costs factors for cost overruns will usually surface 
in public contracts; though it is entirely plausible with private clients. In the funding problems 
factor, the overall lack of finance to complete a project, or the delays in the payment for services 
by the project sponsor can lead to significant problems arising that will ultimately delay project 
duration (European Commission). Problems in this factor can also arise if funds allocated to 
one project have been diverted to other project within a programme or development and if the 
payment of invoices is slow. The contractor may then commit less resources to a project or 
even cease to work altogether (European Commission). The land acquisition costs factor is a 
situation where the land on which a project will be built is not always owned by the project 
sponsor, highly unlikely with a private client, but not surprising with public contracts. In this 
case, local government authorities can usually purchase the land in accordance with legal 
statutes. The statutes usually require the land (and any properties on it) are valued and that 
compensation is paid to the owner based on the valuations. Negotiating a compensation is not 
always straightforward and can ultimately lead to a delay in project duration.  Compensations 
are usually agreed until the end of the projects and in many cases, it is greater than the original 
estimate by the project sponsor (European Commission). This factor supports Cantarelli et al. 
(2010) and Flyvbjerg’s (2008) psychological causes of overruns which include optimism bias 
among local officials; project sponsor in this case, being optimistic in this case about the cost 
of the land in question, only to find out it costs more at the end of the project.  
In the inappropriate contractors’ factor, the European Commission states:  
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“Contractors are selected on the basis of price, experience in undertaking particular types of 
project and their track record in producing high quality work within budget and on time.  
Problems may arise where there is a high level of development activity being undertaken in a 
particular region and the better contractors are not available to bid for the work at that time. 
Alternatively, the tender review process may not have been undertaken by the personnel with 
the best understanding of the services required. As a consequence, firms which are not the most 
experienced in that field of activity are chosen, often with implications for the quality and cost 
of a project. In most cases there is a trade-off between price, experience and track record but 
the desire to accept the lowest tender does not always lead to a project that is completed within 
time and budget. There are cases of contractors and sub-contractors who go into liquidation 
during the construction period. This can lead to significant delays and extra costs arising as 
the project sponsor has to re-tender the remaining work. Identifying a new contractor to 
complete another contractor’s work is difficult because of the possible liabilities that the new 
contractor would have to accept for another company’s work.” 
It is interesting that the European Commission does not highlight the under-estimation of costs 
to win the project as part of the description of an inappropriate contractor but instead states it 
as “Other Factors”: 
“Other Factors 
In addition to all the categories listed above, experience shows that problems also arise from 
premeditated under-estimation of initial costs simply to obtain initial approval for a project. 
This can lead to major projects being approved, and started, in the knowledge that actual costs 
will be very much higher than the “agreed” estimate. Once started, a high profile infrastructure 
project is often politically difficult to stop. So, when the true costs do become apparent, it is 
difficult for authorities to refuse the additional funding required to complete the project.” 
This of course supports Cantarelli et al. (2010) and Flyvbjerg’s (2008) political-economic 
causes of overruns, which include: strategic misrepresentation, manipulation of forecasts, 
overestimate benefits and underestimate costs. However, this same question is asked again, is 
it not plausible to imagine an optimism bias client that wants to effectively complete its dream 
project at the lowest cost possible, falling for a contractor who has excessively underestimated 
costs to win the project? It is possible. Furthermore, though cost is an important factor that 
gauges whether a project is successful or not, it is not the only factor.  
The project duration is another important factor; and the causes of delay can also be seen in 
Cantarelli et al. (2010) and Flyvbjerg’s (2008) study and the European Commissions outlined 
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factors. For example, Cantarelli et al. (2010) poor design reason for cost overruns does not only 
affect the cost but also the completion time. In the traditional procurement method that will be 
explained fully in Section 2.2, contractors are not allowed at the design stage of the project. 
The procurement method insinuates that the design and drawings will be perfect by the time it 
reaches the contractor which is obviously rare. Therefore, when the project delay is caused by 
poor design, this is no fault of the contractor.  
Another reason for time overrun which is not directly related to the contractor is delay in 
progress payment. When there is a delay in payment this is the fault of the client; Sambasivan 
and Soon (2007) and Frimpong et al. (2003) pointed out that delay in payment by the client 
would eventually cause cash flow problem and financial difficulties to the contractor. However, 
it is also the responsibility of the client to evaluate and ensure the financial competence of the 
contractor before awarding the contract; instead of just awarding to the lowest priced contractor. 
Contractors should have enough cash before they undertake any project. Mulla and Waghmare 
(2015) in their study of the factors influencing cost and time overruns in India, found delay in 
payment as the most important factor influencing time and cost overruns. In Olaniran (2015) 
study on construction project performance, project delay was the most important issue 
stemming from awarding contracts on price alone. This was previously stated in Assaf and Al-
Heijj (2006) study of projects in Saudi-Arabia, which indicated that awarding contracts on price 
alone caused delays in construction projects.  
According to Mulla and Waghmare (2015), the two main reasons for delay that is attributed to 
the contractor are poor site management and poor planning. Sambasivan and Soon (2007) also 
point out that lack of contractors’ experience can delay a project; including the lack of 
coordination between contractors and their sub-contractors. Walker (1995) in a survey 
conducted with Australian project representative found contractors’ planning capability as an 
important factor influencing time overrun. Kumaraswamy and Chan (1998) study on time 
delays in Hong Kong projects found poor site management, and unforeseen ground conditions 
as the main reasons for time overruns. Al-Khalil and Al-Ghafly (1999) study on public utility 
projects in Saudi Arabia found ineffective planning by the contractor as a significant delay 
factor. Material shortages can also be attributed to poor planning by the contractor. This is when 
contractor and its suppliers fail to anticipate demand. Material shortages can also be due to 
extenuating circumstances where there are road traffic jams or severe weather conditions that 
affects the transportation of materials on site.  
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2.1.4 Link between contractor selection and overruns 
 
Olaniran (2015) study on construction project performance in Brunei, Australia, found that 11 
out of 22 reasons for poor project performance were linked to wrong contractor selection. 
Furthermore 8 out of those 11 reasons were ranked in its top ten reasons for poor project 
performance (see Table 2.1.3). Their number 1 ranked reason is reduced profit margin for the 
contractor and Chao and Liou (2007) specifically say that selecting contractors on price alone 
increases the risk of profit reduction and often leaves the contractors with a loss.  
Table 2.1.3: Contractor’s related reasons for poor project performance 
Reasons for project performance problems Rank 
Contractor’s inadequate understanding of project 
scope 
9 
Reduced profit margin for the contractor 1 
Contractor’s poor project monitoring and 
controlling 
2 
Contractor is not competent  3 
Contractor’s lack of project communication 
skills 
4 
Contractor’s error in cost estimates and schedules 5 
Contractor’s low commitment to the project 7 
Contractor’s lack of stakeholders’ management 
skills 
8 
Contractor’s poor risk and liability assessment  11 
Contractor’s lack of project 
administration/management skills  
13 
Contractor’s lack of necessary technology 19 
Source: Olaniran 2015 (Adapted by researcher) 
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Furthermore, in Flyvbjerg (2008) and Cantarelli et al. (2010) reasons for overruns given in 
Table 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, wrong contractor selection is hidden in the Psychological and Political-
Economic factors that lead to overruns. It is important to note that the one responsible for wrong 
contractor selection is the client and not the contractor. Causes such as ill/death or weather 
conditions are unforeseen negative events that may lead to overruns and is no fault of the 
contractor. Also delay in payment, design and scope changes, which depending on the 
procurement method (discussed in Section 2.3), is no fault of the contractor. However 
economical causes of overruns, given in Table 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 are because of wrong contractor 
selection, it starts with the client and has a domino effect. A lack of incentive and resources 
results in inadequate planning. There is a lack of incentive for forecasters to provide accurate 
estimates and as a result underestimation forecast is done for their own self-interest; 
underestimating costs also increases the chance of winning the contract and getting the project 
started (Cantarelli et al. 2010). This adversarial relationship is fuelled by the traditional 
procurement method, which is examined in the next section, but the fact remains that having 
the wrong basis for contractor selection has a domino effect that results in contractors 
underestimating costs and overestimating profits. In other words, clients’ overemphasis on cost 
when selecting contractors leads to an unhealthy competition of seeing who can underestimate 
the most costs to look more attractive and win the contract. Table 2.1.4 summarises some of 
the studies considered that lead to Crantelli et al. (2010) analysis of overruns’ causes and 
explanation.  
Table 2.1.4: Previous research on causes of overruns 
Group Study 
Technical  Morris (1990), Nijkamp and Ubels (1999), Lee (2008), Wachs (1982), 
Fouracre et al. (1990), Kaliba et al. (2008) 
Economical Pickrell (1992), Wachs (1989), Odeck (2004), Hall (1980), Mansfield et al. 
(1994), Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Bruzelius et al. (2002), Arvan and 
Leite (1990) 
Political Arvan and Leite (1990), Wachs (1987), Nijkamp and Ubels (1999) 
Psychological Bruzelius et al. (2002), Arvan and Leite (1990), Kahneman and Lovallo 
(1993), Fouracre et al. (1990), Mackie and Preston (1998) 
Source: Cantarelli et al. (2010). Adapted by researcher 
The next section looks at the procurement methods in the UK construction industry, as stated 
earlier, adverse relationships are fuelled by the procurement methods. However, the main 
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reason for looking at them in the next section is because contractor selection happens within 
this context.   
2.2 UK PROCUREMENT AND TENDERING METHODS  
 
The definition of procurement will always be different depending on the sector in question; for 
example, procurement in construction is applied differently to agriculture or manufacturing. In 
other sectors, it is the process of purchasing goods or services, while in construction 
procurement is the entire structure by which a building is procured. A more recent definition 
by Udom (2012) gives a simplistic but balanced depiction of procurement; which is that it is a 
series of processes and activities that operates to secure the construction of a predefined built 
structure. While Van Weele (2010) gives an all-around depiction of what the processes are: 
determining the specifications; selecting the contractor/supplier(s); contracting; ordering; 
project delivery, and evaluation.  
This section will begin by giving a brief description of the UK procurement and tendering 
methods according to the Institute of Civil Engineers (ICE, 2016) and Government 
Construction Strategy (2012). The two widely recognised procurement methods: traditional and 
design-build, are considered enablers for adversarial relationships between clients and 
contractors; particularly the traditional method. For example, a survey conducted by the 
Chartered Institute of Building (CIOB, 2010) found that in 59% of projects that overran in cost, 
and in 60% of projects that overran in time, the traditional procurement method was used. 
Furthermore over 50% of respondents believed that the procurement method directly 
contributed to the projects incurring overruns. And according to NBS (2015) these two methods 
are still the most used in the industry (see Table 2.2.1). The basis for discussing new methods 
in the UK, is because it has been introduced by the government to revamp cons and solve the 
problems associated with previous methods. However, the main reason for presenting these 
methods (as stated earlier) is because contractor selection happens within this context.  
 
 
 
 
     
34 
 
 
 
Table 2.2.1: The procurement method most frequently used in projects  
Procurement 
method 
Clients, 
Consultants, 
and 
Contractors 
% 
Traditional  47 
Design & 
Build 
39 
Other 14 
Source: NBS 2015 (Adapted by researcher) 
2.2.1 Procurement Methods 
 
The traditional procurement method, sometimes referred to as 'design bid build' (or 'bid build' 
by contractors) remains the most commonly used method of procuring building works (Cooke 
and Williams, 2009); this has long been the standard practice in the construction industry (NBS 
2015). In this method, the client first appoints consultants to design the project in detail, and 
then prepare tender documentation, including drawings, work schedules and bills of quantities. 
The contractor on the other hand is not responsible for the design, other than temporary works, 
although some traditional contracts do provide for the contractor to design specific parts of the 
works. But for the most part, the contractor is appointed only once the design is complete, they 
are not able to help improve the buildability and packaging of proposals as they develop 
(Lupton et al. 2009). It is a low risk method of contracting for the client, as the contractor takes 
the financial risk for construction. However, if design information is incomplete at tender, or if 
significant variations are required after the contractor has been appointed, the cost to the client 
can be significant. Because of this, and because of the separation of design and construction, 
traditional procurement is adversarial. (ICE, 2016). 
Management contracting is a procurement route in which the works are constructed by many 
different work contractors, who are contracted to a management contractor. The management 
contractor is generally appointed by the client early in the design process so that their 
experience can be used to improve the cost and buildability of proposals as they develop, as 
well as to advise on packaging (and the risks of interfaces). The contractor is paid based on the 
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scheduled services, prime costs and management fee (Lupton et al. 2009). It also enables some 
works contracts to be tendered earlier than others, and sometimes, even before the design is 
completed (for example piling might commence whilst the detailed design of above ground 
works continues). This can shorten the time taken to complete the project, but does mean that 
there will be price uncertainty until the design is complete and all contracts have been let. (ICE, 
2016) 
Design and build is a generic term describing a procurement route in which the main contractor 
is appointed to design and construct the works, as opposed to a traditional contract, where the 
client appoints consultants to design the development and then a contractor is appointed to 
construct the works (Ashworth, 2012). It can appeal to clients as it gives a single point of 
responsibility for delivering the entire project. (ICE, 2016). 
The Private Finance Initiative method (PFI) a single integrated supply team is appointed with 
design, construction and facilities management expertise to design and build a development and 
then to operate it for a period of time. A special purpose vehicle (SPV), of which the integrated 
supply team is part, finances the project and leases it to the government for an agreed period 
(perhaps 30 years) after which the development reverts to government ownership. This method 
is only suitable for large scale projects such as infrastructure projects, hospitals, and schools. 
(ICE, 2016). This procurement method is usually used for long term project, or when a client 
has a series of projects to be carried out over a period of time; therefore, a framework agreement 
is usually needed with this method. A framework is an agreement with contractors/suppliers to 
establish terms governing contracts that may be awarded during the life of the agreement; this 
will help reduce procurement timescales, transaction costs and foster continuous improvement 
within long term relationships (Constructing Excellence, 2016). 
The UK government then developed three new procurement methods in 2012 to cultivate early 
contractor involvement, transparency and integration; hoping to eliminate adversarial 
relationships. This was also done to increase project performance and obtain value. 
In the Cost Led procurement, the project details are clearly identified and a ceiling cost 
calculated. Typically, an integrated supply team (one or more) is identified through a 
framework agreement and the team work together to complete the project at below the ceiling 
cost (Government Construction Strategy, 2012). In subsequent similar projects within a 
framework, Cost Led Procurement offers the opportunity for further reduction of costs. The 
project is offered to suppliers outside the framework if none of the existing teams can deliver 
the project below the ceiling cost. (ICE, 2016). 
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Integrated Project Insurance (IPI) is an innovative insurance product which gives the IPI 
model its name. It collectively insures the client and all the other Alliance partners: consultants, 
specialists, manufacturers, construction managers and their supply chains. (ICE, 2016). Udom 
(2012) say that combining insurance policies can save approximately 2.5% on cost and 
commercial risks (Oteng and Park, 2013). The major advantage to this method is that it removes 
adversarial relationships, especially when disputing costs overruns. It aims to foster a target 
gain and pain share environment that will further encourage the industry to be more efficient 
and cost effective.  
Finally, in the Two-stage open-book bidding, an outline tender and benchmark cost are 
provided to prospective project teams. Following the first stage, the project team work with the 
client to develop the proposal and the contract is then awarded at the second stage. This allows 
the client to work at an early stage with a single, integrated team and allows faster mobilisation. 
Two-stage, open-book can be used on single projects or a programme of works. (ICE, 2016; 
Government Construction Strategy, 2012). 
2.2.2 Tender Methods 
 
A tender involves a submission of a bid from a prospective contractor/supplier in response to 
an invitation to tender. In the context of construction, the main tender process is generally for 
the selection of the contractor that will construct the works (ICE, 2016). The following are the 
most common form of tendering in the UK: 
 Open tendering allows anyone to submit a tender to supply the goods or services that 
are required. Generally, the client will advertise the invitation to tender in a relevant 
newspaper or any relevant social media domain; providing pertinent project details and 
informing the tenderers of the closing place, date and deadline of tender submission. 
This form of tendering offers an equal opportunity to any organisation to submit a 
tender. It has been criticised for attracting tenders / expressions of interest from large 
numbers of suppliers, some of whom may be entirely unsuitable for the contract and as 
a result it can waste a great deal of time, effort and money. It can force contractors to 
lower their tender prices to gain advantage over their competitors (May et al., 2001).  
However, open tendering offers the greatest competition and has the advantage of 
allowing new or emerging suppliers to try to secure work. (ICE, 2016; Griffith et al., 
2003). 
 Selective tendering is fundamentally different from open tendering as it only allows a 
limited number of contractors/suppliers to submit tenders by invitation. A pre-selected 
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list of possible suppliers is prepared that are known by their track record to be suitable 
for a contract of the size, nature and complexity required. Therefore, a pre-qualification 
process must be employed beforehand to select contractors/suppliers that meet or 
exceed predetermined criteria. Consultants or experienced clients may maintain 
‘approved’ lists of prospective contractors/suppliers and then regularly review 
performance to assess whether suppliers should remain on the list. This can give clients 
greater confidence that their requirements will be satisfied and should reduce the 
wasted effort that can be involved in open tendering. It may be particularly appropriate 
for specialist or complex contracts, or contracts where there are only a few suitable 
firms. However, it can exclude smaller contractors/suppliers or those trying to establish 
themselves in a new market. (ICE, 2016; Griffith et al., 2003). 
 Negotiating tendering is usually with a single supplier and may be appropriate for 
highly specialist contracts, or for extending the scope of an existing contract. It can 
reduce the costs of tendering and allow early contractor involvement; as well as 
increasing the speed with which price can be obtained for work. However, the 
competitive advantage of a formal tendering process is compromised, and unless the 
structure of the negotiation is clearly set out there is the potential for an adversarial 
atmosphere to develop, even before the contract has been awarded. (ICE, 2016; RICS, 
2014). 
 Single-stage tendering is used when all the information necessary to calculate a 
realistic price is available when tendering commences. An invitation to tender is issued 
to prospective contractors/suppliers, who are all given the chance to tender for the 
project based on identical tender documentation. The tenders are then prepared and 
returned, a preferred contractor/supplier is selected and following negotiations they 
may be appointed. (ICE, 2016; RICS, 2014). According to RICS (2014) this was the 
most common type of tendering strategy at the time for obtaining price for the whole 
of the construction works. 
 Two-stage tendering allows for the early appointment of a contractor/supplier, prior 
to the completion of all the information required to enable them offer a fixed price. 
This is to enable the adoption of a more collaborative approach between clients and 
contractors, while still aiming to deliver value for money (Rawlinson and Langdon, 
2006). In the first stage, a limited appointment is agreed to allow work to begin and in 
the second stage a fixed price is negotiated for the contract. (ICE, 2016; RICS, 2014).  
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Along with deciding on the procurement and tendering method, clients or decision-makers must 
also decide on the payment method; there are a few of them but the most popular in the UK is 
fixed price or lump sum (NBS, 2015; see Table 2.2.2). In this payment mechanism, a lump sum 
price is agreed before the work begins. If the actual cost of the work exceeds the agreed price, 
then the contractor bears the added cost. On the other hand, if the cost is less than the agreed 
price, contractor makes a profit. 
Table 2.2.2: The price mechanism most used in projects in 2015 
Price Mechanism  Client% Contractor% 
Fixed price or lump sum 53 64 
Target Cost 22 20 
Re-measurement 17 12 
Cost re-imbursement 3 0 
Source: NBS 2015 (Adapted by researcher) 
The traditional method of procuring in the industry has long had its problems worldwide and 
not just in the UK. Seemingly, the use of the management, the design and build, and the private 
finance initiative procurement model has done little to help the UK construction industry. In 
2011, the UK Government’s Plan for Growth; together with Budget 2011 emphasised the 
importance of an efficient construction industry to the growth of the UK economy; the 
government wants to become more intelligent with greater knowledge of balancing cost and 
quality, thus achieving better value for money (Oteng and Park, 2013). Therefore, a 
Construction Strategy was set up to find out ways of improving the performance of the industry. 
The conclusion the came to, was that the Government procurement practices were stale, 
expensive, time consuming, and bureaucratic and that new procurement models had to be 
introduced (Oteng and Park, 2013).  
The new procurement methods introduced seem to be working so far, at least in all its trial 
projects (Cabinet Office, 2015). Improvements can be noted, at least from the description of 
the models, for example the integrated project insurance method, this method aims to eliminate 
the adversarial blame culture that the industry has long been known for; especially when it 
comes to disputing cost overruns. However, only time will tell whether these new procurement 
methods are successful. The early indication from looking at these new methods, is that the 
government are going around in circles; Oteng and Park (2013) pointed out how these new 
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methods are so cost centred that it may eventually lead the industry back to the traditional 
procurement method of procuring projects. Furthermore, the government may be putting their 
whole attention at the wrong place in their bid to develop the perfect procurement method to 
solve the problems in the industry; as Rawlinson and Langdon (2006) pointed out how 
procurement methods fall in and out of favour depending on the trends in the industry. The 
problem may not be the procurement method itself; it may be down to the obsession of hiring 
contractors and other project participants based on the lowest tender price.  
With that in mind, we can now look at the tendering methods; the three most used form of 
tendering the UK are in this order: single stage, two stage, and negotiation (NBS, 2015; see 
Table 2.2.3). However, there is also an increase in the use of selective tendering in the UK.  
Table 2.2.3: The tendering method mostly used in projects in 2015 
Tendering method Clients, 
Consultants, and 
Contractors % 
Single Stage 77 
Two-stage 57 
Negotiation 45 
Design 
Competition 
10 
Reverse Auction 2 
Source: NBS 2015 (Adapted by researcher) 
The problem with the selective tendering method is that even though the selected contractors 
on the list are chosen based on their capabilities, the awarding of the contract is based solely on 
price. Furthermore, it may be difficult to justify why a certain contractor should be on the list 
over another; the ICE (2016) alluded to the fact that contractors may be excluded from the 
approved list for unknown reasons, due to personal preferences or a lack of awareness. If it is 
due to personal preference then it is in line with Wachs (1990) and Flyvbjerg’s (2008) claim of 
foul play and corruption. Also, this tendering method is likely to cultivate an oligopoly, and it 
may be difficult to offer clients a value for money with a restrictive tendering method (Ofori, 
1990). The single-stage tendering method on the other hand, which is the most used in the UK 
has one obvious flaw to it: the notion that the client has all the information necessary to calculate 
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a realistic price at the beginning of the project is almost impossible, and will likely result in 
disputes down the line of the project life cycle. It is no surprise that this form of tendering 
matches well with the traditional method of procurement; the two methods in tandem will 
continue to encourage clients to select the lowest tender. However, it is imperative that technical 
criteria and tender price should be considered in contractor selection. It is equally important to 
show clients whether considering technical criteria along with tender price and not just solely 
price, is worth it. This leads us to the next section of the thesis that discusses the basis for 
contractor selection strategies.  
2.3 APPROACHES TO CONTRACTOR SELECTION  
 
2.3.1 Lowest or Best Value Tender 
 
Contractors can be selected based on price only (lowest tender), or on a combination of price 
and quality; the latter is called best value or most economically advantageous tender (MEAT) 
(Bergman and Lundberg, 2013). For the best value strategy, clients will have to determine 
which quality (i.e. non-price) criteria to include, how to score each dimension, how to weigh 
each quality dimension to come to a final overall score, how much to weigh quality against 
price, and which formula to use to combine the quality score and the price into one overall 
score, so that the tenders can be ranked (Mateus et al., 2010). The concept of best value 
procurement was introduced a while ago, however due to the high degree of competition that 
the industry faces, procurement personnel are usually held responsible for decisions; thus, is 
very difficult for them to select contractors for anything else than the one offering the lowest 
price (Abdelrahman et al. 2008). However, Palaneeswaran and Kumaraswamy (2001) have 
argued that basing the final choice of contractor solely on the lowest price, does not guarantee 
the delivery of the required outcome in terms of cost, time and quality. This is because, they 
believe that most clients ignore the fact that the same contractor performs differently in a 
dissimilar environment. Furthermore, Kashiwagi and Byfield (2002) say that though lowest 
price criterion is an objective and transparent approach, it fails to guarantee the quality of the 
contractor’s performance. Olaniran (2015) points out that reduced quality is one of the problems 
that is triggered by using the lowest tender strategy. Thus, the lowest tender price may not 
correspond to the most economic choice in the long term; in other words, may not result in a 
lower whole life cycle cost. This is because selecting contractors based on the lowest tender 
price motivates contractors to provide minimally acceptable construction products (Kashiwagi 
and Byfield 2002). But recently we are seeing the use of selective tendering in the UK, 
particularly in the private sector, whereby clients have a list of preferred contractors; perhaps 
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due to familiarity and trust, or because those contractors have passed a prequalification process. 
Thus, these clients usually select the lowest tender out of their list, would that also be considered 
as failing to consider quality? Furthermore, if the project fails to deliver the required outcome 
because of going with the lowest tenderer, i.e. cost overruns, was the cost incurred higher than 
the next lowest tender or all the bids tendered for the contract? This is not to say that the 
difference between the lowest tender and the next lowest tender is a good indication whether a 
project will overrun or not, as Hinze et al. (1992) pointed out in their research done on 468 
Washington construction projects, that the difference between the lowest tender and the second-
lowest tender does not appear to provide any measure by which cost overruns can be predicted. 
However, if a client selects the lowest tender and the project overruns in cost, but the cost 
overrun is still lower than the second-lowest tender, did the client make the right choice? In 
hindsight, there are obviously processes like negotiated tendering (see Section 2.2.2), which 
can get the second-lowest tendered contractor to reduce their tender price through value-
engineering or bill of reduction. This is usually open to two or three of the lowest tenders 
anyway (CIPS, 2013).    
However, the fact that the lowest price strategy is objective and transparent, makes it more 
straightforward and easy to implement than the MEAT strategy. Constructing Excellence 
(2011) say that by accepting the lowest tender, it will be perceived that the client is able to 
demonstrate that it obtains good value with taxpayers’ funds; which will be necessary when 
applying for new investment funds. Furthermore, the benefit to the contractor/supplier is that 
though tender prices may be insufficient to cover the cost of delivering the works, it can be 
easily recovered through the pursuit of claims and disputes once the contract has been secured 
(Constructing Excellence 2011). 
 The MEAT strategy aims to offer client best value. But what is “best value”? The concept is 
vague and there may not be a commonly agreed meaning to it (Choi, 1999). Kashiwagi and 
Savicky (2003) say that owners are reluctant to pay more for best value if they do not understand 
what best value is. This may be one of the main reasons why it has not been accepted in the 
construction industry. The Constructing Excellence (2011) reports: 
“Some organisations consider this process to be the best option because, as they say below, 
why change to anything else?  
 According to the National Audit Office (2001), one out of every four Government 
projects completed in the late 1990s was finished on time, and one in three was 
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delivered within budget. Wouldn’t changing to a different route risk reducing these 
odds that we have found acceptable for all these years? 
 Change would mean losing the influence we, as client, are able to exert over a project. 
At the moment, we are able to define exactly what we want and then employ others to 
design and define component interaction and assembly before the contractors are 
appointed. It’s accepted that few of us have ever actually built anything, but our 
designers have done lots of projects in the past so surely, they can be relied on to know 
what works and what doesn’t? 
 Acknowledged, buildings are more complex now, and there is a lot more design 
associated with components and products with a much greater focus on whole life 
costs. However, there must be lots of things that have stayed constant over the same 
period of time so why change now?” 
 
Best value, though it was introduced to the UK in 1999, represents change from the norm. It is 
alright to change, but what happens when clients do not know what change they are getting 
into? They will be less receptive to that change. The traditional procurement method, which 
uses the lowest tender award criterion, is still the most used procurement method in the UK 
(NBS, 2015). Researchers (Abdelrahman et al., 2008; Gransberg and Ellicott 1997; Akintoye 
et al., 2003; Yu and Wang 2012) say that best value is a procurement strategy which aims at 
strengthening the long-term performance of a project through selecting the contractor that is 
most advantageous to the client. There are various definitions to the term best value, however 
AGC and NASFA (2008) definition gives us a general perception of what best value is: 
“A Best Value Selection is a selection process for construction services where total 
construction cost, as well as, other non-cost factors are considered in the evaluation, selection, 
and final award of construction contracts.” 
According to Stilger et al. (2015) there are over thirty-eight different formulas one can use to 
calculate the best value contractor; all of which may provide a different winning contractor if 
used. Selecting contractors on this method raises questions on what value refers to: does it refer 
to the level of service to the price of the service? Or does it refer to the qualification of the 
contractor and its ability to bring value by being part of the project team?  Furthermore, does 
the client have enough resources to handle managing a best value process? Therefore, selecting 
contractors on best value is not as straightforward and objective as selecting on the lowest 
tender; this probably explains the reason why the UK industry hasn’t entirely bought into it yet. 
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On the other hand, price only may not correspond to the most economic choice in the long term; 
in other words, may not result in a lower final cost, what it does is to motivate contractors to 
provide minimally acceptable construction products (Kashiwagi and Byfield, 2002). One 
important thing to add about best value is that there are cases where the best value contractor 
also has the lowest price; the UK government has factored this fact into its contract award 
provisions (Crown Commercial Service, 2015).  AGC and NASFA (2008) highlights the two 
types of submittals in the best value selection process: 
• “Two-Step” Best Value Selection Process: Step One, Qualifications submittal received; then 
in Step Two, the Technical and Price Proposals are received 
• “One-Step” Best Value Selection Process: Step One, Qualifications, and Technical and 
Price Proposals all received at the same time. 
 However, the process frequently used in the construction industry and is commonly referred 
to as “best value” is the prequalification process. “Prequalification involves determining, in 
advance of asking for a price for the cost of the work prior to the formal selection process, 
whether the firms interested in competing on the project have sufficient qualifications to 
participate” (AGC and NASFA 2008). So, in this process, the contractors submit their 
qualifications to meet the clients’ minimum criteria. If contractors are approved they make the 
clients’ shortlist, and the lowest price contractor is then selected; without any further technical 
criteria evaluated for projects. Although performances are regularly reviewed to assess whether 
the contractors/suppliers should remain on the list, this is selective tendering. The assumption 
to this sort of process is that all prequalified firms are equal and can deliver a project as well as 
any of the others. There are cases where this is true, but there might be other projects where the 
differences in the abilities of the firm may be vital to the success of the project. Also, there is 
the chance that clients will hardly update their contractors’ shortlists, due to familiarity and 
trust; which may not necessarily be a flaw. But to go back to  AGC and NASFA (2008) 
definition, total construction costs as well as other non-cost criteria should be considered in the 
evaluation, selection, and final award of construction contracts, not just in the pre-evaluation. 
The major questions to answer for best value selection process are:  How important is price? 
What non-cost criteria should be considered in the selection and final award of the contract in 
addition to the overall price proposal? Past performance? Relevant experience? Technical 
ability? Sustainability? Health and safety? Innovation? Resource availability? Management 
skills and systems? Table 2.3.1 shows several contractors’ selection criteria identified in 
previous studies. 
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Table 2.3.1: Contractor selection criteria for tender evaluation from selected journal articles 
Authors Contractor selection criteria 
Moselhi and Martinelli 
(1990) 
Bid amount, annual life cycle cost, number of years in business/bid 
amount, volume business/bid amount, financial credit/bid amount, 
previous performance, project management organisation and technical 
expertise. 
Liu et al., (2000) Bid price or cost, time, quality, managerial safety accountability, 
competence and contractors’ sufficiency 
Fong and Choi (1999) 
and Cheng and Li (2004) 
Price, Past performance, Health and Safety record, Financial capability, 
Current workload, Reputation, Past relationship, and Resources. 
Waara and Bröchner 
(2006)  
Bid price, quality assurance system, technical design, environmental 
characteristics, operations cost, project duration, contractors’ capabilities, 
financial capacity, health and safety, conformity with bidding documents.
Abdelrahman et al., 
(2008) 
Bid price, contract time, warranty, unauthorised delay time, rejected 
claims, quality, lane rental cost, traffic control, and employees 
Huang, (2011) Financial standing, technical ability, management capability, quality, 
safety, senior management and current projects/backlog. 
El-Abassy et al., (2013) Price, duration, risk sharing with the owner, financial stability, working 
capital, % of previous work completed on time, past relationship with the 
owner, response to claims, health and safety records, experience with 
similar types of projects, contractor’s staff experience, and equipment 
availability. 
 
The evaluation criteria and its weightings indicate what best value is to the client; with the 
contractor achieving the highest score being appointed. However, the ICE (2016) reported that 
some saw the best value approach, which was first introduced in the UK through the Local 
Government Act in 1999, as a way of further increasing bureaucracy. Although in 2011, the 
coalition government introduced guidance that went some way to watering down the 
requirements of the Act (ICE 2016).  
2.3.2 Models to assign the Best Value Contractor 
 
Table 2.3.2 shows some of the studies conducted to try to develop the right approach for 
selecting contractors/suppliers on best value. Weber et al. (1991) group these approaches into 
three main categories: mathematical programming, linear weighting, and 
statistical/probabilistic; though other studies have come up with approaches that do not 
particularly fit into any of these theories. 
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Table 2.3.2: Approaches to Best Value Contractor Selection 
Group Study 
Mathematical Programming Yu et al. (2013), Weber and Current (1993), Chaudhry 
et al. (1993), Ghodsypour and O'Brien (2001), Kumar et 
al. (2003) 
Linear Weighting Mandal and Deshmuk (1994), Kwong et al. (2002), 
Bayazit and Karpak (2005), Abdelrahman et al. (2008), 
Cheng and Li (2004)  
Statistical/Probabilistic Mummalaneni et al. (1996), Verma and Pullman (1998), 
Tracey and Tan (2001), Love et al. (2013) 
Other Methods: Simulation, Fuzzy 
Logic, Activity Based Cost (ABC), and 
Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) 
Lo and Yan (2009), El Asmar et al. (2009), Bendana et 
al. (2008), Bevilacqua and Petroni (2002), Kwong et al. 
(2002) 
 
Yu and Wang (2012) research on best value developed a mathematical model that can be 
consulted to determine whether a best value contractor selection should be favoured against a 
price only contractor. Their research paper proposed an index named Price Elasticity of 
Performance (PEP hereafter) to help procurers reach an objective decision in selecting the most 
appropriate contractor. Yu and Wang (2012) say that the heterogeneity of the market is a critical 
factor in selecting the most appropriate contractor; their take is that price only is useful in 
certain situations. They (Yu and Wang, 2012) define heterogeneity as “the different quality 
(conceived by the consumers and measured by a set of predefined selection criteria) of 
contractors (in a tender competition) that reaches equilibrium of price in the market.” So, the 
PEP was mathematically formulated by them not only to measure the heterogeneity of the 
market but also of an individual contractor. PEP was defined as the ratio of percentage of 
changes in the committed performance of a work (by the contractor) because of change in price 
(Yu and Wang, 2012). This is a simple analysis of their model; it was an aggregate index market 
PEP (Em), which is proposed to measure the heterogeneity of the market; this provides a 
criterion for determining a more appropriate contractor selection method. Therefore, if Em is 
greater than 1.0, the market is considered more heterogeneous and the best value should be 
adopted for contractor selection. If Em is less than 1.0, the market is considered less 
heterogeneous and the lowest priced contractor method should be used for contractor selection. 
Their methodology of assessing the market may be deemed confusing and time consuming for 
procurement personnel; it may require specialist skill. However, the method is a good way to 
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choose whether contractors should be selected through price only or best value. Also, it shows 
that choosing the lowest tender method is also a form of achieving best value if the market has 
been properly assessed and the project needs correctly specified.  
Yu et al. (2013) research is quite like that of the Yu and Wang (2012) but this time it measures 
the Price Elasticity of Quality (PEQ hereafter) of a product or service offered by contractors in 
a tendering process. One measures the performance of contractors, the other measures the 
quality/services offered by contractors. The research also involved using a mathematical model; 
Yu et al. (2013) was a mixture of graph plotting and mathematical equations to determine the 
contractor with the best quality or service. Just like the previous research, it may be confusing 
at first and time consuming; the practicability of using this sort of methodology in construction 
organisation is one that should be questioned. It is complicating, and like most models, there 
are several assumptions that are made that isn’t entirely the case in the real world, such as the 
perfect competitive market assumption when there is no perfect market in the construction 
industry. Additionally, one must consider whether these mathematical models will be 
applicable in every type of construction projects.  
Many other tools have been developed to help in selecting the best value contractor such as 
simulation, simple weighting, analytical network process (ANP), analytical hierarchy process 
(AHP), simulation and multi-utility theory. Lo and Yan (2009) developed simulation models to 
analyse contractors’ pricing behaviour and dynamic competition process under the qualification 
based system (QBS). The strength of this research is that it is possible to identify unrealistic 
tenders using the model. Furthermore, El Asmar et al. (2009) used simulation to quantify 
criteria and combine them into a single score when assessing contractors. The major drawback 
to this research is the assumption that it could be used in all types of projects to assess 
contractors. Construction projects usually differ; clients’ needs also differ and models should 
be able to take this into consideration. Having said that, there are methods that exist and were 
introduced a while ago that are being used as contractor selection approaches to account for the 
clients’ needs or the specific needs of the project at hand. The AHP, being one, is a popular 
technique used for ranking and prioritising criteria used in selecting contractor; it can analyse 
multi-criteria problems according to pairwise comparison scale. According to Fong and Choi 
(2000) the technique identifies contractors with the best potential to deliver satisfactory 
outcomes in a final contractor selection process which is not based simply on the lowest tender. 
One of the main benefits of this tool is that it can be combined with other tools to assist decision 
makers such as fuzzy logic and ANP. The ANP, is an extension for the AHP to allow for 
interdependencies between criteria in selecting contractors (Cheng and Li, 2004). Abdelrahman 
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et al. (2008) introduced a concept of best value modelling that was specific to each project. It 
combined the AHP and the weighted average method to quantify the qualitative effect of 
subjective factors in selecting the contractor. This study was relatively easy to understand and 
implement, however there is a high level of subjectivity to this study. The weights given to the 
criteria was the researcher’s discretion, even at that there is no real evidence that the criteria 
used to select the contractors will result in project success. Although it is fair to add, that the 
main purpose of their study was to assist in selecting the best value contractor not whether the 
best value contractor will be successful or not. Similar studies have also been undertaken like 
Kwong et al. (2002) and Bevilacqua and Petroni (2002), which used the combination of a 
scoring system and fuzzy theory for ranking the best value tenders. Bendana et al. (2008) also 
developed a fuzzy logic assessment model, where they analysed both the qualitative and 
quantitative issues that influence whether a contractor is suitable to win the project. Zadeh 
(1965) first introduced the concept of fuzzy set, which basically transforms linguistic variables 
that are ill-defined into traditional quantitative terms (El Agroudy et al. 2009). In this type of 
study contractors are scored in each criterion as Low, Medium, and High (1, 2, and 3). Then 
depending on the number of criteria used to assess the contractors, let us say for example 5, this 
usually results in a final score for each contractor between 5 and 15. So if a contractors’ score 
is between 5 and 9 they will be considered Poor. 10 and 13 will be considered Good, while 14-
15 is Very Good. This is just an example of a scale used, each client can subsequently use their 
own scale. However, using this example, one can question how sensitive the scores are to 
subjectivity; with the fact that at 9 a contractor is considered Poor and at 10 Good. Assuming 
the choice of the contractor boiled down to 9 and 10 contractors, with the latter at a higher price. 
How can it possibly be justified to the client to select the contractor with the score 10 at a higher 
price, when it’s supposed ‘quality score’ is just one point above a contractor with a lower price? 
How much of a difference does that one point make in the project outcome? The strength of 
this technique however is that it can be tailored to the owners’ requirement; the client should 
have the power to score contractors the way they like, but whether that results in project success 
usually remains unclear until the end of the project.  
Other research has proposed the use of multi-criteria evaluation model for contractor selection; 
Topcu (2004) for one incorporated this method for construction contractor selection in the 
Turkish public sector. A major strength of these models is the capacity to allow more factors 
that are likely to influence a contractor’s performance to be taken into consideration. Zavadskas 
et al. (2008) demonstrated this in its research by developing a contractors’ assessment and 
selection based on the multi-attribute method. There are also models that have been developed 
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to assess the contractors after project completion. Hancher and Lambert (2002) developed an 
evaluation system to evaluate the performance of contractors at the end of each year of project 
duration. Minchin and Smith (2005) also produced a quality based performance rating system 
model that generated an index for each contractor to represent contractor’s quality over a 
specified frame. Despite the vague nature of quality, the research has at least tried to establish 
a link between contractor selection and the outcome of the project by assessing the contractors. 
By doing so, clients can take these assessments into consideration for future projects. 
It is also worth mentioning that the use of subcontractors in the construction industry has been 
steadily on the rise. Main contractors are now subcontracting majority of the works of a project 
which means that subcontractors should be assessed as well. Albino and Garavelli (1998) have 
proposed a neural network process for subcontracting rating. While, Arslan et al. (2008) 
developed a web based subcontractor evaluation system called WEBSES for the Singaporean 
construction industry that evaluated contractors based on combined criterion.  
 
2.4 SUMMARY 
 
Literature review on the sources of cost overruns did not entirely reveal contractor selection as 
one of the main sources of cost overruns; although from the explanation given one would be 
able to see how wrong contractor selection plays a part. Take for example two of the main 
sources of overruns: optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation; this involves project 
participant, knowingly or unknowingly, underestimating the cost of carrying out the works to 
win contracts or funding. This is a product of wrong contractor selection. On the other hand, 
literature review on the various approaches to contractor selection, did little to show the effect 
that a contractor selection strategy has on the outcomes of construction projects as majority of 
these research tended to be subjective and based on self-perception questionnaires. However, 
there are a plethora of research that are aimed to determine the best value contractor, whether 
they are mathematical models, or linear weighting models, or statistical approach; all of which 
include cluster analysis, simple weighting, AHP, fuzzy set theory, discriminant analysis, etc. 
(Waara and Bröchner 2006; Tsai et al., 2007; Lambropoulos 2007). However, these methods 
do little to show the effect a contractor selection strategy: either lowest tender or best value, has 
on the outcome of a construction project: final cost and duration. This refers back to the problem 
statement in Section 1.1. El-Abassy et al. (2013, pp 766) in their research that developed a 
model used to select the best value contractor recommends a further study: 
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“if the developed model determined the best contractor for a project whose submitted price is 
not the lowest price, then an analysis should be done to show what-if scenarios for the 
contractor with the lowest price if he/she is awarded the contract instead. The analysis can 
include the response to claims for this contractor, the rework that may occur during the project 
because of inadequate past experience, for example, or any other weak points for the contractor 
with the lowest price that may result in an extra cost beyond the original price. These extra 
costs might include (1) rework because of bad quality, (2) delays because of incompetence, (3) 
short life cycle because of bad quality material, (4) operation and maintenance problems 
because of inadequate experience, and (5) many claims because of bad management.” 
The research will carry out this further study, but not by assuming that the lowest tenderer 
comes with all these problems. Rather by using historic data and analysing how they have 
performed in the past, to predict how they will likely perform in the future. Yu and Wang (2012) 
say that the market should dictate what strategy to select; meaning that there are times when it 
is best to go for the lowest tender strategy. Olaniran (2015) also mentions that in simple projects 
with no special quality desired, awarding contracts on price alone may be a logical action. This 
research will establish the link between contractor selection strategy and project outcomes; one 
that eliminates biases and subjectivism. El-Abassy et al. (2013) insinuated that selecting the 
lowest tenderer will incur extra costs for “(1) rework because of bad quality, (2) delays because 
of incompetence, (3) short life cycle because of bad quality material, (4) operation and 
maintenance problems because of inadequate experience, and (5) many claims because of bad 
management.” This might be true, but there is no empirical and objective evidence to prove 
this claim. Table 2.4.1 shows that the bulk of the literature are subjective and aimed to develop 
models that select the best value contractor. This research is empirically investigating which 
strategy works where. Furthermore, there are research in Table 2.4.1 that established the link 
between contractor selection strategy (selecting the lowest tender) and project outcome. But, 
these research carried out surveys, which allows some subjective responses. By analysing 
historic data that have used either the lowest tender or best value strategy, it enables the 
development of an objective method that establishes a link between the selection strategy and 
project outcome. In doing so, this research will offer justification on how a selection strategy 
affects project outcomes. Furthermore, this research will also offer an empirical support to Yu 
and Wang (2012) claim that no one strategy fits all; we can know which strategy works where.  
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Table 2.4.1 Literature Review Summary 
Research Quantitative Qualitative Subjective Objective Contractor 
Selection 
Approach 
Established 
link between 
contractor 
selection 
strategy and 
performance 
Proposed 
Model 
      
Assaf and Al-
Heijj (2006) 
        
Olaniran 
(2015) 
      
Mulla and 
Waghmare 
(2015) 
      
Sambasivan 
and Soon 
(2007) 
      
Walker (1995)       
Kumaraswamy 
and Chan 
(1998) 
      
Al-Khalil and 
Al-Ghafly 
(1999) 
      
Palaneeswaran 
and 
Kumaraswamy 
(2001) 
      
Kashiwagi and 
Byfield (2002) 
      
Moselhi and 
Martinelli 
(1990) 
       
Liu et al., 
(2000) 
       
Fong and Choi 
(1999) and 
Cheng and Li 
(2004) 
       
Waara and 
Bröchner 
(2006)  
       
Abdelrahman 
et al., (2008) 
       
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Research Quantitative Qualitative Subjective Objective Contractor 
Selection 
Approach 
Established 
link between 
contractor 
selection 
strategy and 
performance 
Huang, (2011)        
El-Abassy et 
al., (2013) 
       
Stilger et al. 
(2015) 
      
Gransberg and 
Ellicott 1997 
      
Yu et al. 
(2013) 
      
Kwong et al. 
(2002) 
      
Cheng and Li 
(2004) 
      
Lo and Yan 
(2009) 
      
El Asmar et al. 
(2009) 
      
Bendana et al. 
(2008) 
      
Bevilacqua 
and Petroni 
(2002) 
      
Kwong et al. 
(2002) 
      
Zavadskas et 
al. (2008) 
      
Topcu (2004)       
Arslan et al. 
(2008) 
      
El Agroudy 
(2009) 
      
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The next chapters will now aim to provide a conceptual model of determining the probability 
distributions of cost and time arising from choosing different contractor selection strategies. Up 
to date there has been no quantitative assessment of the probability distribution of the outcome 
cost and duration of either selection strategy. The client may want to know not just the expected 
outcome cost of a strategy but also what would be the probability of a strategy leading to an 
extremely high final cost. Such a probability distribution can point out whether there is a chance 
that one selection criteria would give the lowest cost on average but could, on occasions, give 
to outcome costs so high that far exceeds the budget. 
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Chapter 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter first begins with a short description of the two-research approach: qualitative and 
quantitative, and the reasons for adopting the quantitative research approach. Then the simulation 
framework that helped structure the modelling aspect of the research is presented. Next, the different 
cost modelling techniques are examined, as well as the background, applications, strengths and 
drawbacks of MCS. 
 
3.1 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY  
 
Research philosophy is a way by which data concerning a phenomenon can be gathered, analysed, and 
used. According to Mkansi and Acheampong (2012) there is a heightened difficulty in conducting 
research due to the incoherent classification of research philosophies such as epistemology, ontology, 
and anxiology. Researchers such as Saunders et al. (2009), Ritchie and Lewis (2003) and Guba and 
Lincoln (1994) have used different meanings to characterize these research paradigms. 
Epistemology according to Saunders et al. (2009) is what is considered acceptable knowledge in a field 
of study; in other words, what is known to be true. Ontology is the researcher’s view of the nature of 
reality or being. Saunders et al. (2009) say that there are two aspects of ontology: objectivism and 
subjectivism. The latter is when social phenomena is created from the perception and consequent 
actions of the social actor concerned with its existence. While objectivism is the existence of social 
entities irrespective of the social actors concerned with their existence. (Saunders et al., 2009). Axiology 
is a research philosophy that is concerned with the role that the researchers’ own value plays in all the 
stages of the research process. Heron (1996) claims that the only way a research can be deemed credible 
is by stating your own personal value in relation to the topic that you are studying. Heron (1996) states 
that our values are the guiding principles of all human action. 
From this different stance of research philosophy there are several perspectives that can be derived. The 
four main perspectives are positivism, realism, interpretivism, and pragmatism. Positivism is the belief 
that reality can be observed and described from a neutral standpoint without interfering with the 
phenomena being studied. The finding derived from this study should be isolated and can be repeatable 
(Remenyi et al., 1998). Realism is like positivism, Saunders et al. (2009) say that “The philosophy of 
realism is that there is a reality quite independent of the mind”. Interpretivism on the other hand, 
     
54 
 
 
 
involves the subjective interpretation and intervention to a research study. The strength of this study is 
that researchers usually adopt a compassionate stance, one that tries to see things from others point of 
view. This type of study is usually applicable in business environments where projects are usually 
complex and unique. Finally, pragmatism states that the research question is solely responsible for 
deciding the research philosophy adopted. It advocates an agile approach that may involve combining 
the positivist and interpretivist philosophy, or quantitative and qualitative research approach. This is 
known as the mixed method approach.    
 
3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH 
 
In a thesis, it is often the case that a research approach is classified as qualitative, quantitative, or both; 
in which case, it is termed as mixed methods. The qualitative research method focusses on discovering 
and understanding the experiences, perspectives, and thoughts of participants; it seeks to find out what 
people’s perceptions are of different social human phenomena (Creswell 2009; Harwell, 2011). 
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2005), “qualitative research is a situated activity that locates the 
observer in the world. It consists of a set of interpretive, material practices that make the world visible. 
These practices transform the world. They turn the world into a series of representations, including 
field notes, interviews, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self. At this level, 
qualitative research involves an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world. This means that 
qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or interpret, 
phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them.” This method of research conducted through 
case studies, ethnographic work, interviews, etc. From the definition given on the qualitative research 
method, this method is difficult to replicate or be generalised as the results are usually obtained by 
participants. Fellows and Liu (2008) noted that a good qualitative study often forms a prelude to 
quantitative methods.  
Quantitative research methods on the other hand seeks to maximise objectivity, causality, replicability, 
and generalisability of findings, and are typically interested in prediction (Bryman, 2012). The 
generalisation aspect is the extent in which the conclusions and findings drawn from the research can 
be extended to other population and settings. Furthermore, in this type of research, the researcher will 
set aside their personal biases, experiences, and perceptions to ensure objectivity in the conduct of the 
study and the conclusions that are drawn. This is to ensure that the study can be repeated using the same 
methods, different experimenters, subjects, and fields. This is an important step to validate the research 
and test the generalisability of its findings. The key features of many quantitative studies are the use of 
instruments such as tests or surveys to collect data, and reliance on probability theory to test statistical 
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hypotheses that correspond to research questions of interest (Harwell, 2011). The drawback to this type 
of research, is that there is the assumption that it offers the only truth that exists, independent of human 
perception (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). According to Trochim and Land (1982), the quantitative research 
method is the “glue that holds the research project together. A design is used to structure the research, 
to show how all of the major parts of the research project—the samples or groups, measures, treatments 
or programs, and methods of assignment—work together to try to address the central research 
questions.” Creswell (2009) presents three criteria for choosing a quantitative approach, it says that the 
quantitative method should be chosen if the research problem calls for: 
a) the identification of factors that influence an outcome; or  
b) the measureable utility of an intervention; or 
c) understanding the best predictors of an outcome. 
The mixed method approach basically is a combination of the qualitative and quantitative method in a 
way that compensates each of their weaknesses. Greene (2007) say that the mixed research method 
allows for the “opportunity to compensate for inherent method weaknesses, capitalize on inherent 
method strengths, and offset inevitable method biases.” Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) say that 
“mixed methods research is formally defined here as the class of research where the researcher mixes 
or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or 
language into a single study. Mixed methods research also is an attempt to legitimate the use of multiple 
approaches in answering research questions, rather than restricting or constraining researchers’ 
choices (i.e., it rejects dogmatism). It is an expansive and creative form of research, not a limiting form 
of research. It is inclusive, pluralistic, and complementary, and it suggests that researchers take an 
eclectic approach to method selection and the thinking about and conduct of research.” From these 
definitions, there are advantages of mixing both methods, however this comes with more complexity.  
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Figure 3.2.1: Research Strategies, Choices, and Philosophy 
 
Source: De Villiers (2005, Adapted by researcher) 
Figure 3.2.1 outlines the research strategy, choice, and philosophy of this study. This study was 
predominantly a quantitative approach. There were some elements of a qualitative approach especially 
in the early stage of the research, but not enough to be considered a mixed method approach. A critique 
of existing literature on construction overruns and contractor selection approaches and strategies laid 
the platform on which to develop a method of seeing how a contractor selection strategy affects the 
outcome of a construction project. The reason for using a quantitative method approach is that this study 
will predominantly involve analysing numbers; using tenders to produce probability distributions of 
project outcomes, and to offer empirical evidence on how a contractor selection strategy affects the 
outcome of a project. Existing studies are rich with methods and approaches of selecting a contractor 
which can be interpreted differently depending on the client involved (see Table 2.4.1). What this study 
is doing is putting subjectivism, pre-conceived notions and perceptions (see Table 2.4.1) aside to purely 
analyse historic data on how projects have fared under these two strategies. The study will establish a 
link between contractor selection strategy and project outcomes based on historic data and not from a 
perceptive standpoint that states that the best value strategy should always be picked over the lowest 
tender strategy. However, as this research is not advocating for one strategy over another, it cannot be 
viewed as a purely positivist research. The research aims to show the client the probability distribution 
of possible outcomes involved with going for a strategy, not to predict the outcome. Therefore, whatever 
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strategy the clients decide to adopt is up to them, meaning that the results cannot be considered law-
like generalisations. Clients would likely interpret the findings differently. 
3.2.1 Research Design 
 
The research question is usually considered the driving force behind the choice of a research design and 
any changes made to the element of a design as the study unfolds. The identification of a research design 
is important as it communicates key features of a study. (Harwell, 2011). Yin (2009) say that research 
design provides the structure that guides the collection and analysis of data. This research collected 
historical cost data on 120 educational facilities projects from the Building Cost Information Service 
(BCIS hereafter) of the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS hereafter) database. This was 
then followed by the development of the model mainly using MCS. In using educational facilities 
projects for this study, it was found that most projects used selective tendering to pick contractors (see 
Section 4.2). So, in other words clients have their preferred list of contractors and when there is a 
project, they usually go with the lowest tender from their preferred list. These contractors would have 
passed some sort of pre-qualification test, or are familiar with the client because of past dealings. 
However, this does not qualify as selecting on a best value basis. This is essentially picking the lowest 
tendered contractor with more confidence that it can meet the project outcomes based on familiarity 
and trust. Therefore, by urging clients to select the best value tender, especially when the best value 
tender is not the lowest tender, would need justification. Justification in terms of how it will affect 
project outcomes and not just theoretical reasons why the best value strategy is better than the lowest 
tender strategy. 
Furthermore, the use of the BCIS database allows this study to analyse a big number of projects that 
companies were unable to release due to different reasons such as the sensitivity of the data needed and 
the time constraints involved in handing over this number of projects. The BCIS harboured all the 
standard information needed to carry out this study, however there is always the risk that companies 
only released projects that fared better as opposed to ones that went wrong.   
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3.2.2 Simulation Design 
 
Literature review on the sources of overruns did not entirely reveal contractor selection as one of the 
main sources of cost overruns; although from the explanation given one would be able to see how wrong 
contractor selection plays a part (see Section 2.1). On the other hand, literature review on the various 
approaches to contractor selection, did little to show the effect that a contractor selection strategy has 
on the outcomes of construction projects (see Table 2.4.1). The study created a model that analyses a 
what if scenario, to see what the possible outcomes could be if a project that was meant to be awarded 
to the best value contractor whose price is not the lowest price, was awarded to the lowest price 
contractor instead. A Monte Carlo approach was used for this study, this approach can explore all the 
possible outcomes to a selection strategy under certain bounds of variability expressed to it (Wang et 
al., 2012). The approach can show the minimum and the maximum values possible for each strategy, 
which in turn, will help clients make better decisions regarding which strategy to select. To reiterate, 
the certain bounds of variability expressed to the model was taken from 120 educational facilities 
projects in the BCIS database.  
This part of the chapter (3.2.2) details the steps followed in the experimental phase of this research to 
develop the final model. These steps are supported by Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005) stages to a 
simulation based research. 
3.2.2.1 Developing a Theoretical Derived Research Question of Interest 
 
Paxton et al. (2001) say that the validity and utility of a simulation study is only as strong as the quality 
of questions being assessed. A Monte Carlo study is ineffective when there is a lack of strong theory 
guiding the design and analysis of the simulation. Paxton et al. (2001) likened a Monte Carlo study 
without a strong theory as looking for a needle in a haystack. Therefore, it was vital that the research 
question of this study was tied to statistical theory and that the simulation served as a method to collect 
data to empirically evaluate the research aim. Monte Carlo studies can be a difficult proposition, with 
multiple conditions and massive amounts of resultant data. Thus, by carefully identifying and selecting 
the research hypotheses, the scope of the simulation can be more focussed and manageable.  
The model will investigate how the lowest priced contractor would likely fare on a project that is or has 
already been awarded to the best value contractor in terms of cost and duration. There is a general 
assumption that a high overrun cost is correlated to an unduly low tender price (see Section 2.4; El-
Abassy et al., 2013). Therefore, the projects selected from the database were all projects that selected 
the lowest tender; in order to investigate how the lowest tenderer generally fared. Furthermore, as there 
are different sectors in the construction industry, the model results could not be generalised; it had to 
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be sector specific. The method itself is applicable to other sectors in the industry, however only 
educational facilities projects were selected. This is because, the model had to be validated on recent 
past projects, which was made available by industry partners. Had a different sector been chosen, past 
projects on that sector would be needed to validate the model, and this was unavailable.  
3.2.2.2 Creating Representative Models 
 
Another drawback of Monte Carlo studies is a lack of external validity, a goal of maximizing external 
validity should be as important as the goal of optimally testing a proposed research. Paxton et al. (2001) 
also points out how there are situations in which the research demands a particular model and external 
validity is less important. As explained in the previous section, the construction industry is very sector 
specific, and due to time constraints only one sector could be used. However, a number of sensitivity 
analysis was conducted on the model to mainly see how changes in the correlations inputted into the 
model has an effect on the results. The idea being that each sector is likely to have a different correlation 
between variables.  
3.2.2.3 Designing Specific Experimental Conditions 
 
Once the target model was established, the next step was to determine the conditions to vary in the 
simulation. The condition that varied in this study were the distributions of the variables, therefore an 
appropriate distribution had to be chosen. There are different probability distributions applicable to this 
research, each classified as either open-ended or close-ended distributions. Close-ended distributions 
such as the triangular distribution, implies that the outcome of a project cannot exceed the minimum 
and the maximum limit set in the model. This is an unrealistic assumption in real world projects as there 
are unforeseen issues that may come up that causes a project to exceed its limit. Graves (2001) suggested 
using an open-ended distribution such as the lognormal distribution which would at least allow the 
maximum estimated limit to be exceeded, making it applicable to real world projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
60 
 
 
 
3.2.2.4 Choosing Parameters 
 
There are different parameters that are used to determine the performance of construction projects. 
However, according to Angus et al. (2005) construction projects have traditionally measured project 
performance success by cost, time, and quality. 
 Cost: This is the final cost of the project not the tender price. 
 Time: The actual duration of the project 
 Quality: Reliability of the contractor/project? Client satisfaction? 
In the UK Glenigan Report there are nine key performance indicators (KPI; see Table 3.2.2.4). As the 
research is investigating the effects a strategy has on project outcomes, it means that the study is only 
interested in the construction phase of the project where the contractor is responsible. Furthermore, the 
KPIs in Table 3.2.1 indicate, just as Angus et al. (2005) stated, that cost, time, and quality are 
traditionally the measuring tool of project success. As one may argue that the parameter Quality covers 
all the other performance indicators. 
Table 3.2.0.1: UK Glenigan Report KPIs 
Key Performance Indicators 
Client satisfaction-Service 
Client satisfaction-Product 
Defects-Impacts at Handover 
Predictability Cost-Project 
Predictability Cost-Design 
Predictability Cost-Construction 
Predictability Time-Project 
Predictability Time-Design 
Predictability Time-
Construction 
 
Cost and time are two of the most important objectives which can be easily quantified. Quality on the 
other hand is difficult to quantify; how does a contractors’ quality score affect the project cost? Klerides 
and Hadjiconstantinou (2010) mentions how time and cost trade-off have been researched for a long 
time, but on the other hand only a handful of research has developed time-cost-quality trade-off. Though 
the aim of this research was not to develop one, it does show the level of difficulty associated with 
understanding quality.  
Improving quality is the best way to increase clients’ satisfaction; although this must be done at the 
lowest possible cost as well. For this to happen, Schiffauerova and Thompson (2006) say that the costs 
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needed to achieve quality should be reduced and this is only possible if the quality is identified and 
measured. There are various definitions of quality, as this is a vague term that has its different meaning 
to different people. Therefore, the idea here is not to try to give a broad definition of what quality is, 
rather to find a way to cost and measure it. Quality measurement plays an important role in the cycle of 
never ending improvement; this measurement is considered as a spark for improvement. Waje and Patil 
(2012) say that no improvement can be made if there are no measurements applied and analysed to 
assist in identifying opportunities for improvement.  
Quality is a factor that should influence the decision made by the client, and paying attention to it when 
planning is considered economic. Though the process of costing quality may be challenging, the concept 
was first introduced in 1951 by Juran; this concept is called the ‘cost of quality’ (COQ hereafter). COQ 
is the ‘price for non-conformance.’ (Crosby, 1979). It is the cost incurred because of not delivering the 
product or service right in the first place. Below are the four categories of COQ, and its brief description 
(Waje and Patil, 2012): 
 “Internal failure cost is a cost that would disappear if no defects existed prior to shipment to 
the customer. These costs include rework, scrap, re-inspection, re-testing, corrective action, 
redesign, material review, material downgrades, vendor defects, and other like defects. 
 External failure cost is a cost that would disappear if no defects existed in the product after 
shipment to the customer. These costs include processing customer complaints, customer 
returns, warranty claims and repair costs, product liability and product recalls. 
 Appraisal costs are incurred while performing measuring, evaluating, or auditing to assure the 
quality conformance. These costs include first time inspection, checking, testing, process or 
service audits, calibration of measuring and test equipment, supplier surveillance, receipt 
inspection etc.,. 
 Prevention costs are related to all activities to prevent defects from occurring and to keep 
appraisal and failure to a minimum. These costs include new product review, quality planning, 
supplier surveys, process reviews, quality improvement teams, education and training and 
other like costs.” 
Therefore, quality cost is usually calculated as: 
ۿܝ܉ܔܑܜܡ	۱ܗܛܜ ൌ ࡼ࢘ࢋ࢜ࢋ࢔࢚࢏࢕࢔	ࢉ࢕࢙࢚࢙	 ൅ 	࡭࢖࢖࢘ࢇ࢏࢙ࢇ࢒	ࢉ࢕࢙࢚࢙	 ൅ 	ࡲࢇ࢏࢒࢛࢘ࢋ	ࢉ࢕࢙࢚࢙	 
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There have been economic and mathematical models developed to find the optimum COQ, however 
according to Kazaz et al. (2005), Brown and Kane (1984) is the most frequented in the literature. Below 
is their basic model. 
Figure 3.2.2.4: The basic model of cost of quality 
 
Source: Kazaz et al. (2005) 
According to Figure 3.2.2.4, prevention and appraisal cost have one curve that has an inverse 
relationship with the cost of failure. Thus, the optimum cost of quality is where the increasing costs of 
prevention and appraisal curve converges with the decreasing failure cost curve. To minimize total 
quality cost, the curve must reach a point where the prevention and appraisal curve equals the cost of 
failure. The total quality cost curve represents the sum of the two curves, and the minimum point of that 
is sometimes referred to as the optimum point. (Kazaz et al., 2005).  
From the subsequent review, it seems that the method for quantifying quality is to subtract the initial 
tender price from the final cost. While this is straightforward and clear, is this universal? Quality is a 
subjective term, it has already been raised in sections 3.2.2.2 and 3.2.2.3 about how the construction 
industry is likely to differ from sector to sector. Quality on the other hand is also likely to differ from 
client to client, hence, the parameters set for this research is Final cost, and Actual duration.  
3.2.2.5 Choosing an Appropriate Software Package 
 
There is no doubt that there are numerous software packages that can be used to carry out this Monte 
Carlo study, however it is not the intention of this thesis to carry out a software critique. In choosing 
the software, these questions were asked: 
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1. Which was fit for purpose? 
2. Is it relatively cheap? 
3. How adequate is the researcher in using the software? 
MATLAB R2014b and Mathematica were the main options for this study. The researcher chose 
MATLAB due to familiarity as a prior MSc research thesis was conducted by the researcher using this 
software. 
3.2.2.6 Executing the Simulations and File Storage 
 
Running a MCS for the first time, one is unlikely to realise how much data will be created. Therefore, 
once the target model and the parameters were established, the simulation was first executed to gauge 
the amount of outputs created from the simulation. Files were saved, grouped and named to enable the 
researcher know what is what, and what was done after the simulation was completed. 
3.2.2.7 Troubleshooting and Verification 
 
Once the simulation was executed, several checks were done to provide verification that the simulation 
worked; this included multiple realisations and iterations. As well as testing and validating the model 
using unseen data that was set aside for that purpose. 
3.2.2.8. Result Summary and Presentation 
 
Once the simulation was completed, results obtained, and the model verified, the researcher was then 
able to present the results. The researcher was spoilt for choice when it came to the method of presenting 
results as MCS produces a lot of output data. The aim here was to help clients make decision on which 
strategy to choose when selecting contractors, so the idea was to keep the presentation as 
straightforward and concise as possible.  
3.3 ALTERNATIVES TO MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS 
 
Oberlander and Trost (2001) say that accurate cost estimates for construction projects are extremely 
important to the sponsoring organisation; budget estimates are needed to manage project costs. While 
there is a universal agreement that cost estimates need to be reliable, the fact is that they are hardly 
accurate. Despite this fact a reasonable forecast of final costs of construction projects are needed to 
justify the projects on economic ground and efficiently allocate the capital required to carry out the 
project (Baccarini, 2005 and 2006). Therefore, an appropriate estimation method is vital, cue the 
concept of cost modelling. The most simple and straightforward definition of cost modelling was given 
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by Ashworth (1999), which states that cost modelling are techniques used to forecast the estimated cost 
of a proposed construction project. Ashworth (1999) and Fortune and Cox (2005) also categorised the 
different types of cost model. Though it is not the intention of the researcher to carry out a critique of 
these models, a straightforward description and example of its application were given: 
1. Traditional Methods: - This is estimating the cost of final cost based on comparable cost of 
past projects, using the standard form of measurement. Examples of this include: Bill of 
quantities, superficial method, and functional unit method. Platforms such as Standard Method 
of Measurement (SMM7) by RICS, Civil Engineering Standard Method of Measurement 
(CESMM) by the Institution of Civil Engineers, New Rules of Measurement (NRM) by RICS, 
and BCIS by RICS have all been established to help industry professional estimate the cost of 
projects based on comparable past projects.  
In a study done by Akintoye and Fitzgerald (2000) about the UK’s estimation practice, it was 
reported that the traditional method of estimation was the most used method in construction 
companies. Although this study is over a decade old, it shows that this method may still be 
popular amongst industry professionals due to the ease of use; the National Construction 
Contracts and Law Survey (NBS, 2015) suggests that it is still the case. 
2. Mathematical Models: - Monte Carlo is included amongst these types of model but was 
explored in more detail in the next section. Other examples of mathematical models are: 
statistical modelling such as regression analysis and parametric models. Regression analysis is 
the most common of these models used to carry out previous research (William, 2003; Lowe et 
al., 2006). Regression model have been used since the 1970s (Ashworth, 1999; Baccarini, 
2006), this model allows explicit relationship between dependent and independent variables to 
be analysed. Skitmore and Patchell (1990) say that these models primarily focus on the best 
predictors of tender price. Although this has now been extended to model final cost. Lowe et 
al. (2006) used 286 building project information collected in the UK to develop construction 
cost of buildings; performing both forward and backward stepwise analyses to produce a total 
of six models. The study reported a best model performance of 19.3% Mean Absolute 
Percentage Error (MAPE hereafter) with R2 of 0.661.  
Odeck (2004) used regression analysis to investigate the statistical relationship between actual 
costs and estimated costs at the detailed planning stage of 620 road Norwegian construction 
projects, collected between 1992 and 1995. The study revealed a cost growth of 7.9% ranging 
from -59% to +183%. The analysis showed that most of the overruns were predominantly 
among smaller projects compared to larger ones. This stepwise regression analysis identified 
two independent variables: estimated cost and completion time R2 of 0.21.   
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Sonmez (2004) used 30 continuing care retirement community projects built by a contractor in 
the US in 14 different locations between 1975 and 1995 to conduct a regression analysis. This 
study was used to estimate project cost, containing five variables: project year, location, 
building areas, percentage of health and common areas, and total area per unit R2 of 0.949. 
Kim et al. (2004) used data of construction costs of 530 residential buildings built by general 
contractors between 1997 and 2000 in South Korea to perform a regression analysis to predict 
final costs of residential construction projects. The analysis was performed on 490 projects with 
the remaining 40 projects used to validate the model with MAPE of 6.95%. One thing to add 
to Kim et al. (2004) study is that the projects used to validate their model was from the same 
sector. As previously mentioned the construction industry is sector specific, therefore it is 
possible that their study would not have produced such good results had their model been tested 
on another sector such as highway projects for example. 
3. Knowledge-based models: - These models include expert systems, case-based reasoning, and 
price. Skitmore (1986) was amongst the early pioneers of adopting expert systems in 
construction research. This type of model uses a domain specific knowledge and heuristics to 
simulate the reasoning of an expert in that field to perform an intelligent task (Adeli, 2003). 
Case-based approach (CBR) uses a knowledge-base containing past project case to help 
estimate the cost of a similar projects. The difference between these models and the traditional 
models is that these models are more domain specific compared to the traditional platforms that 
are industry specific. These models consider the fact that project execution will vary even 
between construction companies in the same sector.  
4. New wave models: - The most notable of these models are the Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANN hereafter); this is an information processing technique that simulates the biological brain 
and its interconnected neurons (Chen and Hartman, 2000). According to Baccarini (2005) ANN 
administers a mechanism that learn and acquire problem-solving capabilities from training 
examples by detecting hidden relationships among data and generalising solutions to new 
problems. Researchers (Chen and Hartman, 2000; Sonmez, 2004; Kim et al., 2004) compared 
the application of ANN to predict cost performance to regression analysis, and they often found 
that ANN produced more accurate predictions. According to Baccarini (2005) here are some 
examples of the application of ANN:  
 “Chen & Hartman (2000) used ANN to predict the final cost of completed oil 
and gas projects from one organisation using 19 risk factors as the input data. 
It was found that 75% of the predicted final cost aligned with the actual 
variance i.e. where the ANN model predicted an overrun/underrun, an 
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overrun/underrun actually occurred. The prediction accuracy of ANN 
outperformed multiple linear regression. 
 
 Chau et al. (1997) used 8 key project management factors to predict the final 
cost of construction projects. It was found that more than 90% of the examples 
did not differ by more than one degree of deviation from the expected. 
 
 Gunaydin & Dogan (2004) used 8 design parameters to estimate the square 
metre cost of reinforced concrete structure systems in low-rise residential 
buildings and found that the ANN provided an average cost estimation 
accuracy of 93%.” 
 
 
These methods provide a single estimate of final cost. This research however is investigating the whole 
probability distribution of final cost and duration per a given contractor selection strategy. Cost 
estimates need to be reliable to effectively manage a project. Section 3.3 looked at the different types 
of cost modelling. The traditional method of estimating cost which includes: Bills of Quantities, 
superficial method, and functional unit method are still popular amongst clients due to their ease of use 
(NBS, 2015). Furthermore, there are platforms established by RICS to help clients estimate the cost of 
projects based on comparable past projects. This method is like this research in that it looks at historic 
data to help predict final cost. The difference is that this research is not trying to predict the final cost 
of a project; rather to give the client the probability distribution of costs to expect. Furthermore, the 
research will assess the effect a strategy (low price versus best value) has on the outcomes of a project. 
To do this, the study had to examine past projects that have selected contractors on a particular strategy 
to see how they normally fare. We see this main difference in other cost models that were looked at in 
Section 3.3; studies have used regression analysis and artificial neural networks to predict cost using 
the same concepts of using historic data. The aim of these models was to accurately predict cost; 
however, the fact is that they are hardly accurate. For example, Lowe et al. (2006) study reported a best 
model performance of 19.3% Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE). MAPE is a measure of 
prediction accuracy of a forecasting method in statistics. Kim et al. (2004) also reported a performance 
of MAPE 6.95%. While their MAPEs are enough to validate their research, the error might cost client 
hundreds of thousands of pounds depending on the size of the project; in other words, the MAPE does 
not tell us whether it is good or bad. Furthermore Tofallis (2015) study of the different measure of 
forecast accuracy found MAPE measure to be biased as it usually leads to predictions that are too low. 
When you compare Tofallis’s conclusion to the reasons of overruns by Flyvbjerg (2008) and Cantarelli 
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et al. (2010) in Section 2.1; MAPE would not help matters. It will only further encourage habits like 
optimism bias; overestimating benefits and underestimating costs. Therefore, the two-main difference 
of this research to other models and MCS studies are: 
 
1. It considered the strategy used to select a contractor. Therefore, it did not analyse past 
projects alone, but past projects and its adopted contractor selection strategy (lowest price 
or best value).  
 Why? This is because the model is producing probability distribution of a project’s 
likely outcomes given a contractor selection strategy (lowest price or best value). By 
solely analysing projects without considering the strategy, it would imply that the 
strategy used to select a contractor does not matter. In other words that the results the 
model would generate is the same for both the lowest priced contractor or best value 
contractor whose price is not the lowest price. Furthermore, by solely analysing 
projects without considering the strategy, the thesis does not differentiate itself from 
existing literature. In the existing literature, we see that researchers analysed a bulk of 
past projects in a specific sector to predict the cost of future projects in that sector. 
Thereby saying regardless of whether the contractor is the lowest tenderer or the best 
value tenderer, this is what the final cost will be. In this thesis however, instead of 
claiming the final cost/duration will be this, a probability distribution of final outcomes 
is given instead. Therefore, analysing projects that selected contractors on a strategy 
allows for the comparisons of strategies (lowest tender or best value tender). 
 
2. It is not aiming to predict the final cost and duration of a project, rather to predict the 
probability distribution of final outcomes (final cost and final duration) given a contractor 
selection strategy.   
 Forecasts should be used as a tool to aid its users in deciding, not a tool that replaces 
the decision-maker. In a dynamic environment such as construction it is dangerous to 
rely on a tool that aims to predict an outcome. By predicting an outcome outright, this 
says to the client that there is no possibility that the outcome can come below or above 
the estimates. However, by generating a probability distribution of outcomes, not only 
are the clients able to know the likely outcome to expect, but they are also able to know 
the risks associated with that strategy. 
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3.4 MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
 
MCS is a tool that can quantify the effects of risk and uncertainty in project costs and duration, giving 
the project manager a statistical contributor of project performance. The models developed in the thesis 
are based on the Monte Carlo approach. This section of the thesis provided a brief history of the 
approach, its application across various disciplines including construction management, as well as the 
advantages and disadvantages of the method.  
3.4.1. Brief History 
 
Stanislaw Ulam, according to Eckhardt (1987), was credited as the inventor of this method especially 
in using computers to make the calculations when he was working on the US’ Manhattan Project during 
World War II. Together with Jon von Neuman and Nicholas Metropolis, they transformed statistical 
sampling “from a mathematical curiosity to a formal methodology applicable to a wide variety of 
problems.” (Eckhardt 1987). Metropolis, according to Kwak (2009) was the one responsible for naming 
the methodology after the casinos in Monte Carlo, and subsequently went to publish a paper on the 
method in 1949 with Ulam (Metropolis and Ulam, 1949). Kwak (2009) gives a simple description of 
the model:  
“A model or a real-life system or situation is developed, and this model contains certain variables. 
These variables have different possible values, represented by a probability distribution function of the 
values for each variable. The Monte Carlo method simulates the full system many times (hundreds or 
even thousands of times), each time randomly choosing a value for each variable from its probability 
distribution. The outcome is a probability distribution of the overall value of the system calculated 
through the iterations of the model.” 
 
3.4.2. Applications 
 
MCS has undertaken successful studies in areas such as modelling complex systems in biological 
research, engineering, geophysics, meteorology, computer applications, public health studies, and 
finance. See Kwak (2009) for a detailed review of MCS across these disciplines. 
3.4.2.1. Application in Construction  
 
MCS studies in construction is generally mentioned in project management literature under the topic of 
risk management, schedule management, and budgeting (Kwak, 2009). Regarding project management, 
the Project Management Institute (2004) defines Monte Carlo as “a technique that computes or iterates 
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the project cost or schedule many times using input values selected at random from probability 
distributions of possible costs or durations, to calculate a distribution of possible total project cost or 
completion dates.”  Here’s Kwak’s (2009)	description on how Monte Carlo can aid in estimating 
project’s cost and time: 
“It aids the project manager in answering questions such as, “What is the probability of meeting the 
project due date?” and, “What is (say) the 90 percent confident project duration?” 
In time management, Monte Carlo simulation may be applied to project schedules to quantify the 
confidence the project manager should have in the target project completion date or total project 
duration. Project manager and subject matter experts assigns a probability distribution function of 
duration to each task or group of tasks in the project network to get better estimates. A three-point 
estimate is often used to simplify this practice, where the expert supplies the most-likely, worst-case, 
and best-case durations for each task or group of tasks. The project manager can then fit these three 
estimates to a duration probability distribution, such as a normal, Beta, or triangular distribution, for 
the task. Once the simulation is complete, the project manager is able to report the probability of 
completing the project on any particular date, which allows him/her to set a schedule reserve for the 
project. The above can be easily completed using standard project management software, such as 
Microsoft Project or Primavera, along with Monte Carlo simulation add-ins, such as @Risk or Risk+.  
In cost management, project manager can use Monte Carlo simulation to better understand project 
budget and estimate final budget at completion. Instead of assigning a probability distribution to the 
project task durations, project manager assigns the distribution to the project costs. These estimates 
are normally produced by a project cost expert, and the final product is a probability distribution of 
the final total project cost. Project managers often use this distribution to set aside a project budget 
reserve, to be used when contingency plans are necessary to respond to risk events.” 
 
 Below are examples of application for this approach in construction: 
 Wall (1997) collected 216 office building from the BCIS database of RICS to outline 
the issues that should be recognised when using Monte Carlo methods. The study 
concluded that lognormal distributions are superior to beta distributions in representing 
a data set. Furthermore, the result of this study shows that the effect of excluding 
correlations is more profound than the effect of choosing between lognormal and beta 
distribution to represent a data set. 
 Clark (2001) details another example of a Monte Carlo application provided by the 
Honeywell Performance Polymers and Chemical, which used the tool to estimate 
contingency on 47 projects ranging from US$1.4 million to US$505 million. In this 
study “contingency is be set at 50% probability level (median), based on the rationale 
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that many projects make up the total annual budget, so cost variations on one may be 
offset by another project. This approach often yields a recommended contingency value 
of less than 5%, or zero for a well-defined project (Clark, 2001). However, for very 
large or strategic projects, an 80% or 90% probability level is chosen for contingency; 
and at a preliminary stage of a project, 95% is usually required.” (Baccarini, 2005). 
 Yang (2008) study developed an algorithm that automatically performs distribution 
free MCS when correlations between random variables must be accounted for.  
 Panthi et al., (2009) study combined MCS with Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) to 
combine the risk distributions of various Bill of quantities items in hydropower 
construction projects. This resulted in a risk adjusted cost from which the contingency 
was determined. 
 Wang et al., (2010) applied the MCS method to life cycle cost analysis with the help 
of @RISK software on Private Finance Initiative (PFI) to estimate total cost. The study 
found that the traditional model underestimated total costs by 6%. 
 Moghaddam (2015) combined hybrid MCS and goal programming to develop a method 
for supplier selection and order allocation in closed loop supply chain systems.  
 Peleskei et al., (2015) study reaffirmed that MCS can be a helpful tool for risk managers 
and can be used for cost estimation in construction projects. The study also found that 
cost distributions are positively skewed and cost elements seem to have some 
interdependent relationships.  
3.4.3 Limitations and Criticisms 
 
The MCS method is well documented as a helpful tool for construction project management 
applications, however Kwak (2009) points out that the method is hardly used by project managers in 
real world situation. There are now a plethora of software and hardware such as @RISK and MATLAB 
that could perform MCS for projects, but this was not the case before. Williams (2003) mentioned that 
one of the main drawbacks of this method is the fact that in the past, the method required high use of 
computing power and time and resources used to complete the simulation activity. Furthermore, that 
there was a lack of easy-to-use software tools to run complex simulation. However, it seems like the 
main reason for the lack of adoption of this approach is due to project managers’ irritation with statistical 
approaches, lack of thorough understanding of the method, and it being perceived as a burden rather 
than a benefit when it was implemented heavily (Kwak, 2009).  Bodea and Purnus (2012) also mentions 
that there are many probabilistic methods that have been developed through software implementation. 
However most of them are rarely applied due to the complexity of the methods, the level of expertise 
involved with applying the method, and the difficulties in collecting historic data. Finding an industry 
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partner to release historic data for this research was also difficult. Hence the reason for using the BCIS 
database.  
Another drawback noted by Panthi et al., (2009) was that some of the Monte Carlo models require a 
detailed quantitative information, which is not normally available during the initial planning stage of 
the project. Furthermore, that the applicability of such models to real project risk analysis is limited, 
because project participant find it difficult making precise decisions. Thus, their study combined a 
subjective model (AHP) to Monte Carlo to allow for subjective evaluations. 
3.4.4 The Reasons for Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
Despite the criticisms of the Monte Carlo method, the perception is that the main drawback to this 
method, according to Kwak (2009), is the statistical nature which presents a dilemma that project 
managers are keen to avoid. If this is the case with the Monte Carlo method, it is the case with all the 
other non-traditional methods listed in the earlier sections of the thesis. One way of tackling this is 
through training programs that demonstrate this simulation technique, however, there is even more 
doubt that project managers would agree to attend these programs anyway.  
Another possible way of dealing with this dilemma is to start small; if indeed it is the statistical aspects 
that frightens them, models should be simplified as much as possible. The bulk of other Monte Carlo 
studies simulated the individual project task schedules and cost components, investigating the 
correlations between the components to produce estimate. This research did consider going the same 
route but instead decided to estimate the probability distributions of final costs and durations by 
analysing the tenders received for contracts. The idea of this developed model was to provide project 
managers like those referred to in Kwak (2009) what they want, not statistics, but final outcomes in 
numbers that they can understand. Obviously, methods used to develop the model had to be explained 
in the thesis, and it was explained in the next chapter. But the main job of a project manager/client is 
not to learn how to develop models, it is the subsequent duty of the researcher to develop the model and 
present it in ways that will assist the project manager/client.    
This research study involved seeing what the likely effect a contractor selection strategy: either lowest 
tender or best value, had on the outcome of a construction project. Therefore, the model is not trying to 
accurately predict or even predict the final cost or duration of the project. The model is a decision 
support tool that provide clients with all the possible cost and duration possible with a given strategy; 
in order to assist them in deciding on which strategy to select. Furthermore, by knowing all the possible 
cost and duration, it will allow clients allocate the necessary reserves that will enable them be agile 
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enough to deal with unforeseen circumstances. This would not be possible with other estimating models, 
which insist on predicting a definite final cost.  
Another reason for using the Monte Carlo method for this study was because it could be extended to 
other sectors in the construction industry and to other industries in general. It was mentioned earlier that 
Quality is a subjective term that means something different to different people. The idea was to develop 
a model that will be able to accommodate each business organisations’ definition of quality on the 
assumption that it can be quantified. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter provided details of the research approach adopted in the thesis; including the reasons for 
adopting this approach. Then the simulation framework that structured the modelling aspect of the 
research was then detailed, followed by all the possible frameworks that could have been used to carry 
out the research. Finally, an overview of MCS method was then provided; this included some of its 
applications in construction research, the potential drawbacks of the method, and the reasons for 
conducting the study with this method.  
Figure 3.2.1 outlined that the research study will adopt a quantitative approach using MCS to investigate 
the effect a strategy has on the outcomes (final cost and duration) of a construction project. However, 
as this research is not advocating for one strategy over another, it cannot be viewed as a purely positivist 
research. The research would investigate the probability distribution of possible outcomes involved with 
going for a strategy, not to predict the outcome. Therefore, whatever strategy the clients decide to adopt 
is up to them, meaning that the results cannot be considered law-like generalisations. Clients would 
likely interpret the findings differently. 
Furthermore, this chapter mentioned the complexity in choosing quality as a parameter for project 
performance in this study. As there was no universal standard of quantifying quality, the quality 
parameter could not be used for this study. 
In the subsequent chapter, the simulation framework design presented in this chapter was applied using 
120 Educational facilities projects, all of which selected the lowest tender. Again, the main modelling 
techniques was MCS, which was conducted with MATLAB R2014b. Microsoft Excel was first used to 
analyse and extract the data needed from the 120 projects for the model. The simulation model was then 
developed to see the effects a contractor selection strategy has on the outcomes of a project and to assist 
clients in deciding on a strategy by providing all the possible cost and duration time. The next chapter, 
carefully went through the steps undertaken to build the model.   
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Chapter 4: PRESENTING THE MODEL 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
The main aim of this research is to provide a model of determining the probability distributions of cost 
and time arising from choosing different contractor selection strategies. The purpose of this section is 
to present the simulation model, as well as the steps that went into developing the model. The research 
extracts information embedded in historical project data to build a model that can show a client the 
probability distribution of possible outcomes one can expect if it decides to go for a contractor selection 
strategy: lowest tender or best value strategy. The concept is not to determine what the “best” strategy 
is but to determine the probability distribution of possible outcomes that could arise from any strategy. 
As already identified in earlier chapters, contractor selection is not the only reason to a successful 
project outcome; therefore, there were considerations to make when analysing historic projects for this 
study. This section also offers a brief description of the data that was used for this model.  
This chapter begins by offering a brief introduction of the modelling philosophy adopted in this 
research. Then there is a description of the data used for the modelling, including the steps that were 
taken to take into consideration that a contractor selection strategy is not the only reason why a project 
would be successful. This also includes the data processing techniques that were used to calibrate and 
validate the model. The model is not advocating one strategy over the other, rather to show clients the 
probability distributions associated with them. The purpose here is to present a model that will aid the 
tender evaluation process; this is not a tool that should be used autonomously to evaluate a contractor. 
One of the strengths of this model is that in cases where the results are largely expected, it can show if 
or when a strategy goes wrong and the probability of it going wrong. The term ‘probability’ is used 
throughout in its correct statistical sense. Which is any number between 0 and 1. So in this case M is 
the number of successful events and N is the number of events. Therefore, the probability will be M 
over N to the infinity. 
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4.1 MODELLING PHILOSPOHY  
 
Williamson (2016) says that when a system resists direct study due to its complexity or the fact that it 
is hard to observe, modelling constitutes a key fall-back strategy. A model gives us an insight into the 
phenomena it models; in other words, they are reductions of reality. Models are generally presented in 
mathematical terms of different forms such as differential equations, statistical models, neural network 
and regression trees. When one model is replaced by another that captures more about how the 
phenomena work, science progresses (Williamson, 2016).  
It has long been recognised that determining the probability density function for complex system is 
difficult to determine analytically. Simulation techniques have been developed to assist in this 
evaluation.  This is particularly evident in water resources engineering. For example, when trying to 
evaluate the probability of failure of a complex water resources scheme, with direct supply reservoirs, 
river abstractions and complex ground water abstractions numerical models of the system are 
constructed and numerous simulations of different decision rules evaluated (see for example Korobova 
and Poizner, 1982). Simple simulations have been run using the historic record of rainfalls, river flows 
etc. but experience has shown that these often end up dealing with a single historic drought or flood 
event.  
What is required are thousands of years of historic data that follows the patterns of hydrology seen 
today or forecast in the future. The area of Stochastic Hydrology was developed to supply this need (see 
Kottegoda 1980). The methods have been generalised over several years into the concept of MCS (see 
Oladeji and Elgy, 2012). Commercial companies like PanVera have developed the methods such as 
@RISK as add-ins to spreadsheets to make the tools more readily available to the practitioner. GoldSim 
is also another popular tool. There is also MATLAB, and Mathematica. Therefore, there were many 
software packages that could have been used for this study; all of which could have fairly carried out 
the study. The cost, flexibility and familiarity of use ultimately meant that MATLAB R2014b was used 
for the study.   
The modelling in this research is carried out as structured in Figure 4.1.1. The developed model is 
summarised in Figure 4.2.4.1, in which further details will be provided later in the thesis. The MCS 
model for analysing the outcomes associated with a contractor selection strategy was developed from a 
dataset collected from the BCIS database (Dataset 1). The idea is to see how the lowest priced contractor 
would fare in projects that were awarded to the best value tender. Hence, the model developed from 
Dataset 1 was initially tested on recent projects that selected the lowest priced contractor (Dataset 2). 
Having achieved successful results, this model could then be applied on projects that selected the best 
value contractor (Dataset 3) to see how the lowest priced contractor would have fared. Each element of 
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this dataset was created to calibrate, test, and validate the developed models. The aim of the modelling 
was to produce a model that could aid the tender evaluation process of a project; as well as show the 
probability distribution of outcomes expected by going with a strategy.  
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Figure 4.1.1: Modelling Procedure 
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4.2 THE DATA 
 
The BCIS database harbours project data from different sectors in construction. These includes:  
 Utilities, civil engineering facilities  
 Industrial facilities 
 Administrative, commercial, protective facilities 
 Healthcare, welfare facilities  
 Recreational facilities 
 Religious facilities  
 Educational facilities  
 Residential facilities  
It was important to select projects of the same nature to give a reliable representation of how projects 
usually fare in that sector. The reasons for choosing Educational facilities for this research are: 
1. There is the increasing use of selective tendering generally; most of the projects 
collected from the BCIS database for this model used selective tendering, as well as 
the projects used to validate the model. Selective tendering involves having a preferred 
list of contractors and a client will usually select the one that offers the lowest price 
when a project comes up. In the process of searching for real project cases from 
industry players to validate the model, the best value strategy was hardly used. In most 
cases when it was used, the lowest tendered contractor turned out to be the best value 
contractor. Therefore, this research was important to this sector as a way of either 
validating common practice or as a nudge to reconsider strategies.  
2. There were a few real recent project cases that could be used to validate the model, 
including few projects that selected on best value. A few of this project cases were yet 
to be completed by the time of developing the model.  
It would have been preferable to have used a company’s dataset to develop the model to be sure of 
project details such as the real reason why a project overran for example. In Chapter 2, it was mentioned 
that contractor selection is not the only reason for project success. In the BCIS database clients could 
name the reasons why the project overran, and sometimes this had nothing to do with the contractor. If 
the study was done using a company or multiple company data, the reasons could have been double 
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checked. However, by working with the database, it could not. Therefore, this was mitigated by going 
with the reasons stated for overruns in the database. Projects with the following reasons for overruns 
were excluded from this research: 
 Scope Added 
 Design Changes 
 Inflation/Relative Price Changes  
 Exchange Rates 
Again, the model was tested on recent double-checked projects to validate the model.  
Dataset 1: 120 Educational facilities project cases, all of which selected the lowest tender, from the 
Building Construction Information Service database. These projects had a total contract value of over 
£270 million and completed between 2008 and 2015. A further 10 project cases from this database and 
from the same sector were used to initially test the model (see Figure 4.1.1). 
Dataset 2: 20 recent Educational facilities projects, all of which selected the lowest tender from a 
consultant. 5 of these projects were still to be completed at the time of undertaken this study. These 
projects had a total contract value of over £68 million. The project outcomes were verified and was 
used to validate the model.  
Dataset 3: 20 recent Educational facilities projects, all of which selected the best value tender, from 
two consultants and the BCIS database. These projects had a total contract value of over £74 million. 
This was used to apply the model and see how the lowest tenderer would have fared in these cases.  
 
4.2.1 Data Pre-processing 
 
Data pre-processing is an important step in the data process. Raw data is usually dirty; it is highly 
susceptible to noise, missing values, and inconsistency. The quality of the data influences results; a poor 
quality of data can produce misleading results. Pyle (1999) points out that raw data contains errors, 
outliers, wrong measurements or aggregate data. Therefore, to help improve the quality of the data, and 
subsequently of the results, raw data is pre-processed to improve the efficiency and ease of the process. 
Furthermore, this assures that the developed model is built right and is reliable (Pyle, 1999). The steps 
to this process can include cleaning the data or removing duplicate entries. It can also include 
transforming the data to suit the needs of the model. The data used in this research were pre-processed 
as follows:  
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4.2.1.1 Data Cleaning  
 
Data cleaning is important as raw data can be incomplete, noisy, and inconsistent. This is usually the 
case when extracting data from a large, real-word database and data warehouses such as the BCIS 
database. The purpose of this study was to see how the lowest tendered contractor usually fared in its 
projects, therefore there was no room to take chances with incomplete data. For example, in the database 
there were cases where the lowest tender was said to be accepted, but the final cost of the project was 
missing. These kinds of projects were not used for this study to avoid bias. In dealing with 
inconsistency, majority of the projects in the Educational facilities sector was around £5 million; 
however, there were extreme cases of projects costing more than £20 million. Disregarding these cases 
however would fail to capture all the possible range of cases that may be encountered in practice. 
Therefore, the model’s sensitivity to these extreme cases were tested on ten projects before deciding 
whether to include them in the final model. Noisy data, is usually human or computer errors occurring 
at data entry; for instance, in cases where there were decimal points in the wrong place. These were 
usually corrected and used in the model. 
 
4.2.1.2 Data Transformation 
 
The next step of data pre-processing used in this research was transforming the data into a specified 
range. The main issue here was that the clients’ expected and actual duration were given vaguely; as 
months and weeks. So, assuming a project was completed in 8 months, was this exactly months? What 
if it was a few days shy of being 8 months? Therefore, the months and weeks were converted to working 
days using Excel; not to necessarily prove for example that it was exactly 8 months, rather to provide a 
consistent unit for the model. Furthermore, as it was unknown whether workers worked for a normal 
Monday to Friday shift, or during weekend; this was not provided in any of the data received. The 
assumption here was that workers worked Mondays to Fridays in each of the projects. The maximum 
working hours per week is 48 hours; which could of course be divided across 5 or 6 working days. 
Furthermore, workers can indeed choose to opt out of the 48 hours per week threshold. With educational 
facilities project, it is fair to assume that workers are likely to work Saturdays and even Sundays when 
students’ disturbances are unlikely. However, the working days for this research is 5 (Monday to Friday) 
for the model as anything else would be an unjustified assumption given the nature of the data received. 
This was converted in excel and it was as follows: 
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܅ܗܚܓܑܖ܏	܌܉ܡܛ	ܑܖ	܉	ܟ܍܍ܓ ൌ ૞ 
܅܍܍ܓܛ	ܑܖ	܉	ܕܗܖܜܐ ൌ ૝ 
 
So, for example if duration is 5 months converting it to days in Excel is as follows: 
۲ۯ܇܁ሺ܍ܖ܌܌܉ܜ܍, ܛܜ܉ܚܜ܌܉ܜ܍ሻ 
 
۲ۯ܇܁ሺ31/&૞&/2016,31/12/2015ሻ ൌ ૚૞૛	܌܉ܡܛ 
	
 
Now to convert this to working days, the assumption is that there are 8 days in a month where workers 
do not work.  
૚૞૛ െ ሺૡ ∗ ૞ሻ ൌ ૚૚૛	ܟܗܚܓܑܖ܏	܌܉ܡܛ 
 
For projects given in weeks, a week contains 5 working days, therefore the number of weeks is 
multiplied by 5 to convert to working days. This allowed the model to capture a more detailed and 
realistic probability distribution of duration.  
 
4.2.1.3 Data Reduction 
 
To analyse a complex and huge amount of data takes time, and usually makes such analysis impractical 
and infeasible. Data reduction is not only helpful but necessary; this technique allows one to analyse a 
reduced representation of a dataset without compromising the integrity of the original data and at the 
same time furthering knowledge. This technique is basically reducing the volume of the data. The BCIS 
database carries projects that dates to the 1980s, analysing projects from that time may not have given 
an adequate picture of similar projects to date. For example, what inflation rate should be applied? Has 
technology changed? These are some of the questions one would have to consider. Therefore, this was 
shortened to projects between 2008 and 2015. Even so, this had to be reduced further, especially due to 
the data cleaning steps. It was reduced to 120 from 263, but as mentioned in the 4.2.1.1 Data Cleaning 
section, the model was tested on a further 10 projects from the dataset to know whether it captured the 
probability distribution of outcomes correctly. This would be expanded on in section 4.3.  
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4.3 DEVELOPING THE MODEL 
 
The outcome of any construction project consists of several components: The final outcome price, the 
quality of the finished product, any overrun on the project duration etc. All these are linked to the 
original tender price, the quality and reputation of the contractor and several random factors that can 
only be described in probabilistic terms such as bad weather, unforeseen ground conditions etc. Each 
of these components has a probability distribution associated with it and crucially correlated to the other 
components. As there is no universal way of judging quality, it was not used as a parameter for this 
research. However, for example there is the assumption that a high overrun cost is correlated with 
unduly low tender price (see Section 2.4; El-Abassy et al., 2013). This is not to say that every low tender 
will result in a higher cost and duration merely that it may be a tendency. The strength of the tendency 
is measured by the correlation between low tenders and the difference between the final cost of the 
project and the tender price (Diff). In simple terms, this can be expressed as the correlation coefficient, 
ρ. A simple equation will be used to generate a set of correlated random numbers 
ሺ૚ሻ	ܠ ൌ ۯિ      
Where x is a vector of n correlated random numbers of mean zero and unit standard deviation, which 
will be rescaled later to produce tender prices, overrun costs and delay later. A is an n*n matrix of 
coefficients and η a vector of η independent random numbers to some distribution with zero mean and 
standard deviation of one.  
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍܠ૚ܠ૛ܠ૜⋯
ܠܖے
ۑۑ
ۑې ൌ
ۏ
ێێ
ێ
ۍ܉૚,૚ ܉૚,૛ ܉૚,૜ ⋯ ܉૚,ܖ܉૛,૚ ܉૛,૛ ܉૛,૜ ⋯ ܉૛,ܖ܉૜,૚ ܉૜,૛ ܉૜,૜ ⋯ ܉૜,ܖ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ܉૚,૚܉ܖ,૚ ܉ܖ,૛ ܉ܖ,૜ ⋯ ܉ܖ,ܖے
ۑۑ
ۑ
ې
ۏێ
ێێ
ۍિ૚િ૛િ૜⋯
િܖے
ۑۑ
ۑې 
The matrix A can be evaluated by taking moment and mathematical expectations as proposed by 
Matalas (1967).  
Post multiply both sides of equation 1 by ܠܜ gives 
ܠܠܜ ൌ ۯિሺۯિሻܜ 
ሺ૛ሻ	ܠܠܜ ൌ ۯિિܜۯܜ  
If we take the expected values of these then the expected value of		ܠܠܜ	ࡱሺ࢚࢞࢞ሻ ൌ ࡱሺ࡭ࣁࣁ࢚	࡭࢚ሻ.	
 ۳ሺܠܠܜሻ	is the correlation matrix between all the values, M.   
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ۻ ൌ ൦
૚ ૉ૚,૛ ⋯ ૉ૚,ܖ
ૉ૛,૚ ૚ ⋯ ૉ૛,ܖ⋯ ⋯ ⋯ ⋯
ૉܖ,૚ ૉܖ,૛ ⋯ ૚
൪ 
Since the η values are independent of one another their expected cross correlations are zero with the 
diagonal elements alters the variances of the elements, 1. This is the identity matrix I.  
Any matrix pre-or-post multiplied by the identity matrix is unaltered therefore the expected values give. 
ሺ૜ሻۻ ൌ ۯۯܜ 
Any matrix multiplied by its own transpose will give a symmetrical matrix and the correlation matrix 
is bound to be symmetrical. This means that there are effectively only ܖሺܖ ൅ ૚ሻ ૛⁄  independent 
variables in A. There are numerous ways to evaluate these independent variables, for example by 
assuming A is upper triangular or using the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of M. Since MATLAB has a 
function to do this this will be the function used. 
It should be noted that if a negative eigenvalue is present in M the matrix A will not be entirely real but 
have an imaginary component. This is possible if there are inconsistent correlations in the matrix M. 
This happened with surprising probability when pair wise instead of case wise correlations was used 
to evaluate the correlations. The higher the n the more likely this inconsistency is likely to occur. The 
estimation of correlation coefficient between the components of the constructions projects proved tricky 
to estimate and some “tweaking” was required to ensure they were consistent. As Wall (1997, p248) 
rightly say: 
“Establishing the strength of an empirical association between elemental rate variables is a relatively 
simple matter of using a statistical procedure from a computer program to calculate the correlation 
coefficient between the variables. It is much more difficult to determine whether the association found 
is generally reliable or whether it is a coincidence. The difficulties arise for at least three reasons. First, 
the variables are standardized and the standardization could introduce spurious correlations between 
elemental data; second, the data are imprecise) and the identified correlations could mean nothing; 
and third, the data show high variability and this could result in spurious correlations or the true 
correlations being distorted.” 
Table 4.3.1: Problem with correlation illustration example 
Variable        
A 4  2 1 3 3 1 
B 7 7 5   1 2 
C  8 1 4 2  6 
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Table 4.3.1 presents an illustration of a problem that is usually common when dealing with multivariate 
statistics that has multiple variables; Table 4.3.1 would produce an inconsistent correlation as there are 
missing values in all 3 variables to be able produce a reliable dataset between A, B, and C. There were 
only 2 instances when a simultaneous data was received for all 3 variables at the same time. Fortunately, 
in datasets with many variables, groups of variables often move together. One reason for this is that 
more than one variable might be measuring the same driving principle governing the behaviour of the 
system.  
In many systems, there are only a few such driving forces. But an abundance of instrumentation enables 
you to measure dozens of system variables. When this happens, you can take advantage of this 
redundancy of information. Principal Component Analysis (PCA) can reduce the dimensions of a data 
set. It reduces the data down to basic components, removing any unnecessary parts. This helps simplify 
the data and makes it easier to visualize. In this case one can simplify the problem by replacing a group 
of variables with a single new variable. In other words, the correlation was got to work by making 
minimum possible changes to the correlations to make them consistent. Consistent taken to mean, that 
all the eigenvalues of the correlation matrix are positive.  
When there is a set of data points, the set can be deconstructed into eigenvectors and eigenvalues. 
Eigenvectors and eigenvalues exist in pairs: every eigenvector has a corresponding eigenvalue. An 
eigenvector is a vector whose direction remains unchanged when a linear transformation is applied to 
it. Therefore, if T is a linear transformation from a vector space V over a field F into itself and v is a 
vector in V that is not the zero vector, then v is an eigenvector of T if T (v) is a scalar multiple of v. 
ࢀሺ࢜ሻ 		ൌ ࣅ࢜ 
An eigenvalue is a number, telling you how much variance there is in the data in that direction where 
λ is a scalar in F associated with the eigenvector v.  
If V is finite-dimensional, then T can be represented as a square matrix A, and the vector v by a column 
vector. The above mapping will then be a matrix multiplication on the left-hand side and the scaling of 
the column vector on the right-hand side in the equation 
࡭ሺ࢜ሻ 		ൌ ࣅ࢜ 
See Aldrich (2006) for eigenvector and eigenvalue formula. 
Nering (1970, p.38) points out that there is a correspondence between n by n square matrices and linear 
transformations from an n-dimensional vector space to itself. Therefore, it is like define eigenvalues 
and eigenvectors using either the language of matrices or the language of linear transformation. 
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An eigenvector that corresponds to a real non-zero eigenvalue, points in a direction that is stretched by 
the transformation and the eigenvalue is the factor by which it is stretched. If the eigenvalue is negative, 
the direction is reversed (Burden and Faires, 1993, p.401). The eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue 
is therefore the principal component. See Jackson (1991) and Jollife (2002) for further information on 
PCA. Also see Herstein (1964) and Nering (1970) for further information on eigenvector and 
eigenvalues. Getting the correlation right was the first and most important step in developing the model, 
the next step was to determine the distribution.  
Though no probability distributions were assumed for x or η, Quenouille (1957) showed that the 
estimates were maximum likelihood estimates when x and η were normally distributed. It is possible to 
determine the distributions of x and η by fitting the model to the observed data and examining the 
resultant distributions. However due to the small sample size, distributions were difficult to determine.  
Due to the small number of samples, common distributions such as normal and lognormal (additive and 
multiplicative errors respect) make sensible choices with the parameters estimated from the sample 
data. Furthermore, this is supported by Graves (2001; mentioned in Section 3.2.2.3) who discussed 
different probability distributions that can be used for projects. Graves (2001) proposed using open-
ended distributions, especially the lognormal distribution instead of a close-ended one such as the 
triangular distribution. The reason behind this is the fact that a close-ended distribution such as the 
triangular has a minimum and maximum limit; using this distribution in a construction project assumes 
that a project would never go beyond those limits. This is not a realistic assumption when it comes to 
real world projects, as there are unforeseen issues that were hardly expected which can cause problems 
in the project.  Therefore, for this research the normal and lognormal distributions were the two 
considered; see Graves (2001) for further information on different types of probability distributions. 
The Normal (or Gaussian) distribution is the most common distributed function.  The notation ܺ ∼
ܰሺμ௑	, ߪ௑ଶሻ	     denotes that X is a normal random variable with mean μࢄ	 and standard deviation		ોࢄ૛ . 
The standard normal random variable, Z, or “z-statistic”, is distributed as				ࡺ	ሺ૙, ૚ሻ. 
The probability density function (PDF) of a standard normal variable has its symbol φ (z): 
࣐ሺࢠሻ ൌ ૚√૛࣊ࢋቆെ
ࢠ૛
૛ ቇ	
A normally distributed random variable can be characterised in terms of the standard normal random 
variable, through the change of variables  
 ࢄ ൌ μࢄ	 ൅ ࢆ࣌.	 
 
If X is normally distributed, it has the PDF 
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ࢌ࢞ሺ࢞ሻ ൌ 	࣐ ቀ࢞ െ μࢄ		࣌૛ ቁ ൌ 	
૚
ට૛࣊࣌ࢄ૛
ࢋ ቆെ ሺ࢞ െ μࢄ	ሻ૛	૛࣌ࢄ૛
ቇ 
See Engineering Statistics Handbook (2013) for normally distributed formula. 
Figure 4.3.1: An Illustration of a Normal Distribution 
 
From Figure 4.3.1 we see that a normal distribution is symmetric and will produce both positive and 
negative values regardless of the value of the mean and standard deviation of a dataset. However, in 
construction projects, sometimes having a negative value makes no sense; therefore, using a distribution 
which admits only positive values will eliminate any possibility of unrealistic negative values. The 
lognormal distribution is appropriate for this.  In this case: 					ܫ݊	ܺ ∼ ࡺሺμ࢒࢔	ࢄ	, ો࢒࢔	ࢄ      then ܺ is 
lognormal. 
The PDF is:  
ࢌ࢞ሺ࢞ሻ ൌ 	 ૚࢞√૛࣊࣌૛ ࢋ
ି ቆሺ࢒࢔	࢞ െ μሻ
૛	
૛࣌૛ ቇ 
The mean and standard deviation of a lognormal ܺ  are related to the mean and standard deviation of 
			ܫ݊	ܺ with mean being 
μ࢒࢔	ࢄ	 	ൌ ࢒࢔μࢄ െ ૚૛࣌࢒࢔	ࢄ
૛  
While the standard deviation being:  
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	࣌࢒࢔	ࢄ૛ ൌ ࢒࢔ ൅ ൫૚ ൅	ሺ࣌ࢄ/μࢄሻ૛൯ 
 
See Harvey et al. (2016) for further information on Probability Distributions. See Engineering Statistics 
Handbook (2013) for lognormally distributed formula. 
 
Figure 4.3.2: An Illustration of a Lognormal Distribution 
 
Figure 4.3.2 shows an example of a lognormal distribution positively skewed; the distribution can also 
be negatively skewed. The lognormal distribution represented the best possible distribution for the 
dataset used in the research study. In Section 4.3.2, Tables 4.3.3 and 4.3.4, and Figures 4.3.7 and 4.3.8 
show that the outcomes of the projects analysed were positively skewed. Which means that the project 
outcomes were usually within the range of expected outcomes, however there were some outliers. Using 
a lognormal distribution for this model allows us to know when things can go wrong in a project and 
the probability of it happening. The next section would explain the code used to develop the model.  
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4.3.1 Implementation of the Model 
 
This section will thoroughly explain the code used in the model. The aim of the research is to see how 
the lowest tender would fare in a project awarded to the best value tender whose price is not the lowest 
price. Project 4 of Dataset 2 (section 4.3.3) will first be used to explain the first phase of the model. 
Table 4.3.2 shows the number of contractors that tendered for the project and their tender prices. The 
last column shows the client’s expected duration for the project. The model MATLAB code in its 
entirety will be displayed first. Then there will be a description of each part of the code. 
Table 4.3.2: Project 4 Tender 
 A B C Expected 
Duration 
(days) 
4 £984,633.15 £1,215,632 £1,425,365 89 
 
 
%model to determine final costs and duration for lowest bid tenders 
%The model produces 3 components for a tender quote: The price; related to 
%the sample inputs, the difference between the final cost and the  
%lowest bid index (diff), and the duration index 
%as a normal standardised random variables. 
%These indices will be converted to prices later. 
  
%A final tender price is made up of the following components: 
%Input variables are: 
%Bid prices 
%and a correlation matrix showing the correlations between price, the 
difference between the final cost and the  
%lowest bid index, and a duration index 
%Output will be a matrix of final cost (FC), the difference between the final 
cost and the 2nd 
%lowest bid (diff), and a duration   
 
 
%Now load the variables 
  
%Now load the varibles 
data= xlsread('P4.xlsx'); %load from excel document 
bidpice = data(1:3); 
lowest = data(1); 
duration = data(6); 
o=mean(data(1:3)); 
p=std(data(1:3)); 
y1= 0.036738; 
y2=0.043266; 
y3=o*y1; 
y4=o*y2; 
n1=0.023; 
n2=0.0827; 
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n3=n1*duration; 
n4=n2*duration; 
 
%select the number of realisations 
  
realisations = 20000;  
  
%find mean and std for bidprice:  
  
m=exp(1/2); 
s=m*(exp(1)-1)^.5; 
 
% rhoTQ - the correlation between tender and overrun prices 
% rhoTO - the correlation between tender price and overrun time 
% rhoQO - the correlation between Overrun price and Overrun time 
 
rhoTQ = 0.57; 
rhoTO = -0.02224; 
rhoQO = 0.021491; 
 
 
  
correl= [1,rhoTQ,rhoTO;rhoTQ,1,rhoQO;rhoTO,rhoQO,1];  
% note - check that the correlation matrix is consistent before getting here 
  
  
A=sqrtm(correl);% The key function correl=AA' 
  
%for 7 different cases generate the likely values 
  
for i=1:3 
% for each different realisation generate the prices, diff, and duration. 
  
    for j=1:realisations 
        neta= (lognrnd(0,1,3)-m)/s;% 3 standard lognormal random numbers 
required 
        x=A*neta; %x are the standardised correlated lognormal value 
        outputs(i,j,1)=x(1)+lowest;% fill up the outputs matrix. The first 
one are prices 
        outputs(i,j,2)=x(2)*y4+y3; %These are indices at the moment. Diff 
        outputs(i,j,3)=x(3)*n4+n3; %These are indices at the moment. 
Duration 
        outputs(i,j,4)=outputs(i,j,1)+outputs(i,j,2); 
    end 
end 
 for j=1:realisations  
%find the price of each tender as if it the sum of the components (FC)mean 
     BP=outputs (i,j,1); 
     FC(j)= outputs(i,j,4); 
     Q(j)=outputs(i,j,2);  
 end 
 %put total prices into that matrix. 
 for j=1:realisations   
     BP(j)=outputs (i,j,1); 
     FC(j)= outputs(i,j,4); 
     delay(j)=outputs(i,j,3); 
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     actualduration(j)= duration + delay(j); 
 end 
 %ignore the others for a while 
 
4.3.1.1 Model description 
 
%model to determine final costs and duration for lowest bid tenders 
%The model produces 3 components for a tender quote: The price; related to 
%the sample inputs, the difference between the final cost and the  
%lowest bid index (diff), and the duration index 
%as a normal standardised random variables. 
%These indices will be converted to prices later. 
  
%A final tender price is made up of the following components: 
%Input variables are: 
%Bid prices 
%and a correlation matrix showing the correlations between price, the 
difference between the final cost and the  
%lowest bid index, and a duration index 
%Output will be a matrix of final cost (FC), the difference between the final 
cost and the 2nd 
%lowest bid (diff), and a duration   
 
%Now load the variables 
 
The above is a description of what the model does. 
data= xlsread('P4.xlsx') %load from excel document 
bidpice = data(1:3); 
lowest = data(1); 
duration = data(4); 
 
The first stage was to get the model to identify the tenders, the lowest tender, and the client’s expected 
duration.  Table 4.3.2 reminds us of Project 4’s tender prices and client’s expected duration, which 
selected Contractor A. 
o=mean(data(1:3)); 
p=std(data(1:3)); 
 
Next, was to get the model to find the mean and standard deviation of the tender prices.  
%Find mean and standard deviation of overrun cost and delay 
y1=; 
y2=; 
n1=; 
n2=; 
 
The next step was to calculate the mean and standard deviation of the ratio between the initial tender 
price and final cost of all 120 projects; ࢟૚	is the mean, while ࢟૛ represents the standard deviation. The 
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first step to this is to calculate the overrun cost in all the project. This is because all the projects are of 
different values, and this needs standardising. 
 
ࡻ࢜ࢋ࢛࢘࢘࢔	࡯࢕࢙࢚ ൌ ࡲ࢏࢔ࢇ࢒	࡯࢕࢙࢚ െ ࢀࢋ࢔ࢊࢋ࢘	࡮࢏ࢊ 
Then we divide the ࡲ࢏࢔ࢇ࢒	࡯࢕࢙࢚ by the	ࡻ࢜ࢋ࢛࢘࢘࢔	࡯࢕࢙࢚ 
ࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕ ൌ ࡻ࢜ࢋ࢛࢘࢘࢔	࡯࢕࢙࢚ࡲ࢏࢔ࢇ࢒	࡯࢕࢙࢚  
Then the mean and standard deviation is calculated  
࢟૚ ൌ෍ࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚૛૙૚૛૙  
࢟૛ ൌ ࢙࢚ࢗ࢘ ቈ෍ሺࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚૛૙ െ ࢟૚ሻ
૛
૚૛૙ െ ૚ ቉ 
This same principle is then repeated to find the mean and standard deviation of Delay in all 120 projects; 
with ࢔૚ representing the mean, while ࢔૛ represents the standard deviation.  
ࡰࢋ࢒ࢇ࢟ ൌ ࡭ࢉ࢚࢛ࢇ࢒	ࡰ࢛࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ െ ࡱ࢞࢖ࢋࢉ࢚ࢋࢊ	ࡰ࢛࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ 
Then we divide the ࡭ࢉ࢚࢛ࢇ࢒	ࡰ࢛࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ by the	ࡰࢋ࢒ࢇ࢟ 
ࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕ ൌ ࡰࢋ࢒ࢇ࢟࡭ࢉ࢚࢛ࢇ࢒	ࡰ࢛࢘ࢇ࢚࢏࢕࢔ 
Then the mean and standard deviation is calculated  
࢔૚ ൌ෍ࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚૛૙૚૛૙  
࢔૛ ൌ ࢙࢚ࢗ࢘ ቈ෍ሺࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚૛૙ െ ࢔૚ሻ
૛
૚૛૙ െ ૚ ቉ 
y3=o*y1; 
y4=o*y2; 
 
The next step was to scale the value of the tenders to the appropriate cost size. In doing so this will 
determine right the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost that Project 4 can expect to incur as it 
chooses the lowest tender. In this case ࢟૜ represents the mean, while ࢟૝ represents the standard 
deviation.   
% rhoTQ - the correlation between tender and overrun prices 
% rhoTO - the correlation between tender price and overrun time 
% rhoQO - the correlation between Overrun price and Overrun time 
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rhoTQ = 0.57; 
rhoTO = -0.02224; 
rhoQO = 0.021491; 
 
correl= [1,rhoTQ,rhoTO;rhoTQ,1,rhoQO;rhoTO,rhoQO,1]; 
% note - check that the correlation matrix is consistent before getting here 
A=sqrtm(correl);% The key function correl=AA' 
 
Then the correlation derived from the 120 projects are inputted into the model at this stage. The 
correlations were between three variables: 
 Tender Price (which is always the lowest tender, T) 
 Overrun Cost (Diff or Q) 
 Delay (O) 
for i=1:3 
% for each different realisation generate the prices, diff, and duration. 
 realisations = 20000 
 
The model is then reproducing the tenders received for Project 4 20,000 times. It assumes that the 
project is being conducted 20,000 to get more stability and reproducibility in results. The model is 
simulating 20,000 realisations of the same tender as if they could occur now. This is to get a distribution 
of the likely outcomes and not a single realisation of the stochastic event.  
m=exp(1/2); 
s=m*(exp(1)-1)^.5; 
 
for j=1:realisations 
        neta= (lognrnd(0,1,3)-m)/s;% 3 standard lognormal random numbers 
required 
        x=A*neta; %x are the standardised correlated lognormal vlaue 
 
The model is then instructed to produce the distributions lognormally of all the three variables: Tender 
Price, Diff, and Delay. 
outputs(i,j,1)=x(1)+lowest;% fill up the outputs matrix. The first one are 
prices 
 
The first variable coming through are the standardised indices tender prices. These are then correctly 
formatted by instructing the model to always pick the lowest tender for all 20,000 realisations; which 
has already been identified right at the beginning. Therefore, Contractor A tender of £984,633.15 is 
selected every time.  
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Figure 4.3.3: Project 4 Tender Bid Selected 
 
 
 
outputs(i,j,2)=x(2)*y4+y3; %The 2nd are of Diff 
 
The second variable are for diff; these are formatted by multiplying the indices by the standard deviation 
of overrun cost to expect for Project 4, ࢟૝ and adding it to the mean overrun cost to expect for Project 
4, ࢟૜ . The probability distribution of diff cost can also be viewed. 
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Figure 4.3.4: Project 4 Diff Cost 
 
 
outputs(i,j,3)=x(3)*n4+n3; %The 3rd are of Delay 
 
The third variable are for delay; these are formatted by multiplying the indices by the standard deviation 
of delay time to expect ࢔૝ and adding it to the mean delay time to expect	࢔૜ for Project 4. The 
probability distribution of delay can also be viewed. 
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Figure 4.3.5: Project 4 Delay  
 
FC = outputs(i,j,1)+outputs(i,j,2); 
Actualduration = duration + outputs(i,j,3) 
    end 
end 
 
Finally, the model is instructed to find the final cost and actual durations to expect for Project 4. To find 
the final cost was to add the correctly rescaled 1st and 2nd variable; with the 1st variable being the lowest 
tender and 2nd being the overrun costs to expect. The same principle is then applied to find the actual 
durations to expect for this project by adding the client’s expected duration which was already identified 
at the beginning of the model to the 3rd variable. The 3rd variable being the delay times to expect for the 
project. 
As the model could capture the probability distribution of outcomes for the lowest tender selected 
contracts; first in the initial testing phase with Dataset 1 and then in the validation phase with Dataset 
2, it could then be applied to Dataset 3. Dataset 3 again are projects that selected the best value 
contractor whose price is not the lowest price. This was done to see how the lowest tenderer would 
likely fare. Figure 4.3.6 depicts a visual summary of the developed model. 
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Figure 4.3.6: Summary of developed model 
 
 
  Note: The histogram in Figure 4.1.2 are illustrations generated randomly on MATLAB R2014b.  
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4.3.2 Dataset 1 
 
Dataset 1 was used to develop and test the MCS model. The Building Cost Information Service of RICS 
(BCIS) database was used to conduct this study. A total of 120 Educational facilities projects, all of 
which was awarded to the lowest tender, were analysed. Each project showed: 
 Details of the contract awarded (the tendering method, tenders received from all the 
contractors that tendered for the project; companies were anonymous) 
 Selection criteria; (lowest tender accepted) 
 Project outcomes: initial tender price, final cost, the expected duration, and actual duration. 
All 120 projects used the Traditional procurement method (see section 2.2.1), however the tendering 
methods (see section 2.2.2) were different: 
 Single-stage Selective tendering: 96 projects 
 Single-stage Open tendering: 19 projects 
 Negotiating: 5 projects 
Therefore 120 projects were used for this model with most of the projects costing around £5 million. 
Table 4.3.3 and Figure 4.3.7 show the frequency of the final cost of projects. 
Table 4.3.3: Final Cost Frequency (in £millions) 
 
Final Cost (in £millions) Frequency 
0—5 113 
5—10 3 
10—15 1 
15—20 1 
20—25 2 
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Figure 4.3.7: Final Cost Frequency (in £millions) 
     
The duration of this projects varied, with the bulk of them completed within 400 working days. Table 
4.3.4 and Figure 4.3.8 show the probability of the actual duration of projects. 
Table 4.3.4: Actual Duration Frequency (in days) 
Actual Duration of projects (days) Frequency 
0—100 7 
100—200 38 
200—300 52 
300—400 18 
400—500 3 
500—600 0 
600—700 2 
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Figure 4.3.8: Actual Duration Frequency (in days) 
 
 
One could assume that the higher the project cost the higher the duration, however a plot of actual 
duration versus final cost in Figure 4.3.9, does not appear to be show a linear relationship. 
Figure 4.3.9: Actual Duration vs Final Cost 
 
Furthermore Figures 4.3.10 and 4.3.11 show a chart that plots the clients’ expected outcomes against 
the actual outcomes. 
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Figure 4.3.10: Contract Value vs Final Cost 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.11: Expected Duration vs Actual Duration 
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From these Figures, the difference between clients’ outcomes and project outcomes appears to be 
minimal. In other words, the lowest tenderer seems to have delivered quite in line with cost and time 
targets. The first step of the research was to use the findings in these projects to build the model. The 
next stage was then to test the model on 10 further Educational facilities project that selected the lowest 
tender from the database. The final outcomes of a project must be within the probability distribution of 
outcomes produced in the model to pass the training. Table 4.3.5 show the project cases that were used 
to initially test the model, with the tenders arranged in ascending order. While the Figures in Appendix 
1, and Table 4.3.6 show the model and actual project results. The results in Appendix 1 will show that 
the final outcomes of these projects where within the probability distribution of outcomes produced 
from the model. 
 
Table 4.3.5: Project cases for Model Testing. 
 A B C D E F Expected 
Duration 
(days) 
1 £1,309,23
6 
£1,327,147 £1,330,990 £1,350,410 £1,397,686 £1,585,26
4 
225 
2 £954,426 £986,428 £1,065,237 £1,092,862 £1,154,428 £1,233,74
3 
202 
3 £607,107 £610,510 £611,573 £620,263 £622,677 £649,873 225 
4 £810,000 £870,425 £875,785 £950,265   134 
5 £407,255 £420,902 £450,178 £510,000 £512,000  67 
6 £650,000 £667,000 £670,000 £685,000 £690,000  112 
7 £204,000 £220,000 £224,635 £241,500 £252,500  44 
8 £750,000 £777,500 £781,000 £835,532   112 
9 £925,000 £978,736 £1,020,783 £1,200,000 £1,250,000  157 
10 £1,725,35
7 
£1,780,741 £1,827,148 £1,900,691 £2,225,221  247 
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Table 4.3.6: Actual Project Result 
Project Cost  Duration 
(days) 
1 £1,331,236 247 
2 £999,426 202 
3 £638,271 225 
4 £837,235 147 
5 £422,125 75 
6 £672,145 131 
7 £211,000 44 
8 £759,000 112 
9 £936,000 157 
10 £1,732,000 247 
 
Again, the research is investigating how the lowest tenderer would fare in a contract awarded to the best 
value contractor with a higher price. Therefore, the model had to first be tested and validated with 
projects that awarded to the lowest tenderer. From the Model Results in Appendix 1 we see that the 
model captured the probability distribution of the final outcomes. The developed model is now ready 
to be validated with Dataset 2.  
4.3.3 Dataset 2   
 
As the model passed the test using Dataset 1, the model now had to be validated with Dataset 2. Dataset 
2 is a set of 20 recent projects, all of which selected the lowest tender; with the tenders arranged in 
ascending order. The same principle used in selecting the projects to develop the model in section 4.3.2 
Dataset 1, was also applied in this dataset. Furthermore, as the data was from industry partners, the 
facts of the project could be double-checked. All 20 projects used the traditional procurement route, 
again the tendering methods differed.  
Table 4.3.7: Tendering Methods for Dataset 2 
Tendering Methods Projects 
Single-stage Selective  1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 11,12,14,15,17,18,19, 
and 20 
Single-stage Open 13 and 16 
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Table 4.3.8 show the project cases that were used to validate the model while the Figures in Appendix 
2 and Table 4.3.9 show the model and actual results.  
Table 4.3.8: Project cases for Model Validation 
 A B C D E Expected 
Duration 
(days) 
1 £5,319,15
5.35 
£5,613,917.
77 
£6,386,688   202 
2 £2,085,23
9.76 
£2,160,838.
19 
£2,290,031.
02 
£2,482,976.
95 
£2,564,36
4.13 
89 
3 £5,980,49
3.45 
£6,065,465 £6,087,686 £6,190,328.
30 
£6,407,41
5 
292 
4 £984,633.
15 
£1,215,632 £1,425,365   89 
5 £6,167,47
6 
£6,544,768 £6,592,106.
32 
£6,679,425 £7,121,60
1 
270 
6 £1,519,21
4 
1,699,619 £1,846,705.
80 
  112 
7 £953,572 £992,505.60 £1,302,560   180 
8 £1,486,44
9.49 
£1,500,060.
74 
£1,909,574.
39 
  112 
9 £2,787,62
2 
£3,214,855 £3,364,044   270 
10 £4,271,60
9.13 
£4,399,151.
17 
£4,645,637.
14 
£5,416,261.
42 
 225 
11 £897,328.
47 
£929,598.99 £1,089,443   67 
12 £396,162.
86 
£452,738.72 £467,824.25   67 
13 £2,774,44
5.74 
£3,029,624 £3,047,041   202 
14 £1,900,00
0 
£2,324,562 £2,752,842.
17 
  112 
15 £7,821,14
3.66 
£8,718,245    292 
16 £4,299,12
4 
£4,414,468 £4,736,222 £4,795,316  134 
17 £1,933,99
1 
£1,938,227 £2,033,050 £2,037,620 £2,098,85
4 
112 
18 £2,747,84
7 
£2,777,291 £2,914,958 £2,916,502  112 
19 £855,182 £861,183 £862,143 £862,433 £869,138 89 
20 £1,802,89
2 
£1,835,219 £1,894,698 £1,918,792 £1,942,10
7 
225 
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Table 4.3.9: Dataset 2 Actual Project Results 
 
Project Cost Duration 
1 £5,388,074 202 
2 £2,162,406.45 89 
3 £5,992,456 290 
4 £1,002,408.14 89 
5 £6,223,000 270 
6 £1,561,325 112 
7 £987,276.96 180 
8 £1,521,456.78 134 
9 £2,801,192 292 
10 £4,271,609.13 247 
11 £947,788.20 67 
12 £424,278.97 89 
13 £2,890,412.14 247 
14 £1,929,352 112 
15 £7,838,486 292 
16 £4,418,642 178 
17 £1,970,900 112 
18 £2,813,591 134 
19 £862,143 89 
20 £1,814,892 225 
 
The model captured the probability distribution of outcomes: both cost and duration of all 20 projects 
(see Appendix 2). Therefore, as the developed model was validated with a 100% mark, it could then be 
applied to Dataset 3; which is a set of project cases in Educational facilities that selected contractors on 
best value.  
Dataset 2 was used to validate the model developed but the model was first tested in Dataset 1 to see 
whether it correctly predicted the probability distribution of outcomes of the lowest tenderer. Appendix 
2 shows that the model captured the probability distribution of outcomes: both cost and duration of all 
20 projects. These projects selected the lowest tender and from Table 4.3.7 we see that almost all of the 
projects in the dataset used single-stage selective tendering. Which can mean that there is a positive 
history between the client and contractor; a trust. Or, it can also mean that the contractor has undergone 
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some pre-qualification and is seen by the client as suitable to execute the project. But just because a 
contractor is in a preferred list does not mean things will always go as planned. From Table 4.3.7 we 
see that 18 projects used the selective tendering method.  In 5 out of the 18 projects that used the 
selective tendering method, the consultant cited the slow pace of construction and the scheduling of the 
construction programme as the reason for dispute. This ultimately led to cost and time overruns; these 
are Projects 8, 9, 12, and 18, Project 10 only incurred time overrun. 9 out of these 18 projects cited the 
quality of material as the reason for cost overruns (projects 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 14, 15, 19, and 20). The lowest 
tenderers still managed to deliver on time in these projects. Finally, in the remaining 4 projects (2, 7, 
11, and 17) the contractors claimed to have encountered an unexpected ground condition that resulted 
in cost overruns; while the consultant cited the contractor’s lack of effective planning as the reason for 
cost overruns.  Project 13 and 16 used the open tendering method, and it cited the slow pace of 
construction and scheduling of construction programme as the reason for cost and time overruns. 
Therefore, half of the selective tendering projects cited quality of materials as the reason for cost 
overruns, it meant that the old materials had to be replaced by tested ones. What this shows to clients 
and consultants with a preferred contractors’ list, is that there must be regular assessment of contractors 
on those lists. 
All the projects in Dataset 2 incurred cost and/or time overruns. On cost overruns, project 10’s lowest 
tenderer delivered on cost but not on time. Furthermore in 12 out of the remaining 19 projects (1, 3, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 20), though the lowest tenderer incurred cost overruns the final cost were 
still below that of the second lowest tender. 6 out of the 19 projects’ final cost (2, 8, 11, 16, 17, and 18) 
were below the third lowest tender. While Project 19’s final cost was exactly the third lowest tender. 77 
out of 120 projects analysed in Dataset 1 delivered at a cost that was below the price of the second 
lowest tender. We are used to looking at cost overruns in percentages; analysis of Dataset 1 showed that 
the lowest tenderer in Educational facilities projects usually overran by 3%. In an ideal world, no client 
would want cost overruns. But we cannot really say how bad this 3% figure is. However, when we 
compare the projects’ final cost to the other tenders received, we get a better idea of how bad the cost 
overrun is. In Section 2.3, Construction Excellence (2011) reported on how industry professionals 
wanted a reason for change i.e. selecting the best value contractor. Their argument was that what they 
are currently doing (selecting the lowest tender strategy) is working for them so there is little reason to 
change. Again, the research is not advocating one strategy over the other, but from the results of Dataset 
2 it is difficult to argue for the use of best value strategy in terms of cost in Educational Facilities 
projects. Furthermore, it is more than likely that in most of these projects contractors would have 
undergone some sort of pre-qualification evaluation. Therefore, from validating the model on Dataset 
2, 2 conclusions are drawn out: 
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1. Selective tendering might imply that the client and contractor have a good history, or that 
the contractor has at least undergone some sort of pre-qualification that deem he/she 
qualified. However, regular assessment is needed. 
2. Cost overruns are not always as bad as it seems especially when the cost is below the 
starting price of the next highest tender.  
 
4.3.4 Model on Best Value Contracts (whose price is not the lowest price, Dataset 3)  
 
The model is now fit to be applied on projects that selected the best value contractor whose price is not 
the lowest price to see how the lowest tender would have likely fared if it was awarded the contract 
instead. There were difficulties in finding projects in these dataset, hence the reason why it was collected 
from multiple sources. These kinds of projects were rare; the 20 projects used from this dataset came 
from multiple sources which also included the BCIS database. The Design and Build procurement 
methods were used for these projects. 
Table 4.3.10: Tendering Methods Dataset 3 
Tendering Methods Projects 
Single-stage Selective 1,2,5,6,7,8,10,11,13,14,15,19, and 20 
Single-stage Open 3, 9, 12, 16 and 17 
Two-stage Open 4 and 18 
 
The limitation in Dataset 3 is that contractors’ quality scores were not given; the BCIS database do not 
include contractors’ quality scores, and consultants that offered projects in this dataset did not reveal 
the scores due to its sensitivity. Another consultant that could provide 3 best value selected tender 
projects, all had the lowest tender as the best value tender and hence could not be used for the research. 
Therefore, it is possible for the lowest tender not to be suitable for the project in the first place, when a 
best value analysis is conducted; there might be a reason that may have disqualified the lowest tender. 
The assumption here is that all the lowest tenders in this dataset have at least passed the minimum 
threshold of clients’ quality and can ultimately carry out the work respectably.  
Table 4.3.11 show the tenders of projects who selected the best value tender whose price is not the 
lowest price; the highlighted (in red) column shows the tender selected in each project. Table 4.3.12 
show the actual project results of best value tenderer and the most likely project results of the lowest 
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tenderer. The Figures in Appendix 3 show the probability distribution of outcomes of how the lowest 
tenders in these projects are likely to fare and the actual project result of the best value tender.     
Table 4.3.11: Best Value Project Cases 
 A B C D E F Exp.(da
ys) 
1 £4,299,66
4 
£4,343,931 £4,371,59
6 
£4,447,08
1 
£4,724,37
0 
£5,017,1
68 
292 
2 £2,096,38
8 
£2,108,776 £2,123,91
8 
£2,206,34
0 
£2,278,74
3 
 134 
3 £261,778 £313,826 £328,959 £376,187   89 
4 £3,837,78
1 
£3,988,424 £4,700,17
7 
   200 
5 £715,597 £743,247 £788,560    145 
6 £665,844 £676,125 £678,799    130 
7 £523,952 £543,113 £548,481 £589,857   130 
8 £463,499 £465,301 £478,943 £484,459   120 
9 £829,929 £838,961 £863,039 £864,821 £869,927  190 
1
0 
£738,177 £805,539 £811,132    100 
1
1 
£236,013 £248,254 £248,865 £262,251 £308,531 £318,290 65 
1
2 
£6,363,00
0 
£6,483,183 £6,552,28
2 
£6,736,39
4 
  270 
1
3 
£6,598,07
0 
£6,808,821 £7,521,51
5 
   270 
1
4 
£264,184 £284,214 £298,129 £298,660 £307,877 £341,231 202 
1
5 
£864,810 £897,460 £912,145 £919,938 £938,706  247 
1
6 
£10,397,6
12 
£10,582,00
0 
£10,767,4
58 
£10,805,8
94 
£11,188,4
59 
£12,144,
742 
343 
1
7 
£873,326 £969,078 £974,671 £989,102   95 
1
8 
£1,284,65
8 
£1,360,450 £1,393,09
9 
£1,447,25
0 
£1,695,27
4 
£1,912,6
60 
134 
1
9 
£559,180 £569,171 £570,515 £584,380 £648,297  200 
2
0 
£314,525 £315,529 £316,430 £381,420 £404,050  112 
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Table 4.3.12: Actual Project Results 
Project Actual Final 
Cost of Best 
Value 
Tenderer 
Duration 
of Best 
Value 
Tenderer  
Average Final 
Cost of Lowest 
Tenderer (from 
model) 
Average 
Duration of 
Lowest 
Tenderer 
(from model) 
1 £4,371,596 292 £4,467,600.00 299
2 £2,123,918 134 £2,175,500.00 137
3 £343,200 89 £273,500.00 91
4 £3,965,134 200 £3,991,500.00 204
5 £743,247 145 £742,970.00 148
6 £678,799 130 £690,630.00 133
7 £543,113 130 £544,180.00 133
8 £465,301 120 £480,820.00 123
9 £842,156 190 £861,700.00 194
10 £805,539 100 £766,950.00 102
11 £248,254 65 £245,980.00 66
12 £6,613,683  270 £6,603,700.00 276
13 £6,808,821 270 £6,858,900.00 276
14 £298,129 202 £275,260.00 207
15 £919,938 247 £898,040.00 253
16 £10,779,400 343 £10,803,000.00 351
17 £989,102 95 £907,790.00 97
18 £1,353,478 134 £1,340,600.00 137
19 £569,171 200 £580,810.00 204
20 £316,430 112 £327,270.00 115
  
13 out of the 20 projects of Dataset 3 used single-stage selective tendering, the best value tenderer 
delivered the project at the exact amount that was initially tendered, and in the clients’ expected 
duration. The results of the model also show that in these projects (1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 
19, and 20), the actual project results were well within the range of outcomes of how the lowest tenderer 
would have fared if he/she was awarded the contract instead.  
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Project 4 and 18 of this dataset used two-stage open tendering, and the best value tender delivered the 
project below the initial tender. Again, this was well within the 95% interval of the expected final cost 
of the lowest tender. In Projects 3, 9, 12, 16, and 17 (single-stage open tendering) the best value tender 
incurred cost overruns. Apart from 3 and 17, the costs were well within the 95% interval of the expected 
final cost of the lowest tender. In projects 3 and 17, we find that the costs are outside this interval, 
however, the results were within the range of outcomes that the model predicted. The consultant cited 
the fact the best value contractor had to alter its approach mid-way into the project. The strength of this 
model is its ability to also show when things can go wrong; in real-world projects where there are 
unforeseen issues that can cause problems in the project. This also justifies the reason for using an open-
ended distribution like the lognormal to carry out the research.   
In Dataset 3, the best value tenderers’ average final costs of all 20 projects were just over 1% more than 
the final cost of the lowest tenderer; with a standard deviation of 5.5%. This means that on average the 
lowest tenderer incurs less than the starting price of the best value tender whose price is not the lowest 
price. In 9 out of 20 projects in Dataset 3, the model is predicting that the lowest tenderer final cost will 
likely be below the starting price of the best value tender (Projects 3, 5, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18 see 
Table 4.3.12). It is important to remember that the model is not aiming to predict the exact final cost, 
the mean average cost here is the likely final cost. Furthermore, this is only being stated to see how the 
lowest tenderer would on average fare in a project that is being awarded to the best value tender whose 
price is not the lowest price. 
Regarding the duration, the best value tender met the clients’ expected duration, however there is a 
higher likelihood of delaying the project in going for the lowest tender. The initial analysis of lowest 
tender projects (Dataset 1) found that the lowest tenderer would on average incur a 2.23% increase on 
the expected duration, with a standard deviation of 8.27%. Furthermore in 7 projects from Dataset 2 the 
client cited the slow pace of construction and the scheduling of construction programmes as the reasons 
for disputes and overruns.  Thus, it comes down to how risk averse the client selecting is; will the client 
risk delaying the project at a lower cost? These are the kind of decisions that they will have to make. 
The correlation between Tender Price, Overrun cost (Diff), and Delay in Dataset 1 were found to be 
miniscule; the initial analysis of lowest tender projects that were used to develop the model, found that 
the lowest tenderer usually overran by just over 3%; with a standard deviation of just over 4%. 
Therefore, depending on how high the next lowest tender or best value tender is, the lowest tender was 
likely to still deliver the project below the next highest tender or best value tender. 
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From applying the developed model on the Educational facilities sector, 2 conclusions are drawn out: 
1. The lowest tenderer would likely overrun in cost but this will be below the price of the 
best value tenderer. 
 In Dataset 2, 12 out of 20 projects overran in costs but the final cost was below the 
starting price of the second lowest tender. In Dataset 3, the model recorded on average 
that the lowest tenderer will incur more than the best value tender if it was awarded the 
contract instead. However, in 9 out of the 20 projects the final costs of the lowest 
tenderer were below the starting price of the best value tender. The results are 
influenced by the standard deviation of the tender prices in each project. A higher 
standard deviation of tender prices would likely mean that the lowest tenderers’ final 
cost would likely be below that of the best value tenderer despite an overrun. The next 
section (4.3.5) would investigate this further. 
2. There is a higher probability that the lowest tender will exceed the clients’ expected 
duration.  
 Why? This could relate to the criteria that are used to evaluate contractors in this sector 
and the weights applied to them. The model is limited as there is not a healthy dataset 
of tenders where the criteria used to select contractors is provided. In Section 4.3.6 a 
consultant provided 3 projects that used the same criteria to select the best value 
contractor in the Educational facilities sector. Although it is only 3 projects, it gives an 
idea of which criteria clients prioritise and whether completion time is amongst the 
highly prioritised criteria. It may be that clients do not consider it at all, or that they 
just stipulate when they would like the project to be completed.  Nevertheless, the 
conclusion is supported by Assaf and Al-Hejji (2006) and Olaniran (2015) study that 
found that the most frequent nature of performance problems caused by awarding to 
the lowest tender is project delay (see Section 2.1.3).  
Appendix 4 shows the model’s flow diagram, stating the steps undertaken to develop the model for 
Dataset 1, 2, and 3.  The next stage of the research is to conduct a sensitivity analysis to know how 
often the lowest tender would turn out to be the best overall tender as the correlations between Tender 
Price (lowest tender), Diff, and Delay changed. These correlations are vital to the whole concept and it 
proved difficult to evaluate them. As the correlations were found to be miniscule and has subsequently 
been validated in the results, there is a chance that these correlations are not universal. Indeed, other 
clients may find a higher correlation between these variables, thus the sensitivity analysis will show 
whether a change in these correlations have an effect on the amount of times the lowest tender turns out 
to be the best tender.  
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4.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
The sensitivity analysis of the model required minimal changes to the model which will be explained 
in this section. Projects 8 and 13 of Dataset 3 will be used to demonstrate this analysis. This analysis 
would look at how many times the lowest tender turns out to be the best tender as the correlation and 
variance changes. Best tender in this context is taken to mean that if for example the lowest tender 
overruns but still delivered the project below the tendered price of the next highest tender, then it will 
be considered the best tender in terms of cost. The same will also be conducted for duration, although 
in all these projects contractors did not list their duration time. Therefore, the assumption is that every 
contractor meets the clients’ expected duration time. The model MATLAB code in its entirety will be 
displayed first. Then there will be a description of each part of the code. 
 
Table 4.3.13: Project 13 Tender 
A B C
Expected 
Duration 
(days) 
£6,598,070 £6,808,821 £7,521,515 270
 
%model to determine costs for tenders 
%The model produces 3 components for a tender quote: The price, related to 
%the sample inputs, a quality cost based on existing tender to final cost 
figures 
%and a overrun index (not used at the moment) 
  
%Input variables are: 
% TPmean - the mean of the tender prices 
% TPstd - the standard deviation of the tender prices 
% QPmean - the mean of the overrun price, which is calculated from historic 
% outcome prices 
% QPstd - the standard deviation of the overrun price 
% ORmean - the mean overrun in days 
% ORstd - the standard deviation of overrun 
% rhoTQ - the correlation between tender and overrun prices 
% rhoTO - the correlation between tender price and overrun time 
% rhoQO - the correlation between overrun price and Overrun time 
% numTenders is the number of tenders considered for each project - we could 
% vary it to see what effect it has on the final price 
  
%Output will be a matrix of tender prices (fp, 1), quality prices (ex, 2), 
%and overrun (or,3) indices. The matrix is called outputs. The array itself 
%is 3 dimensional. The first dimension is the realisation number 
(1:realisations), the 
%second the tender (1:numTenders) and the third the actual value(1 refers to 
%tender price, 2 to overrun price, 3 to overrun days and 4 for the final 
%price) 
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%Now load the variables 
data= xlsread('P13.xlsx'); %load from excel document 
bidpice = data(1:3); 
lowest = data(1); 
duration = data(7); 
o=1.048226*7000000; 
p=0.103617*7000000; 
y1= 0.036738; 
y2=0.043266; 
y3=o*y1; 
y4=o*y2; 
n1=0.023; 
n2=0.0827; 
n3=n1*duration; 
n4=n2*duration; 
%Now set the variables - please set them or devise a way to input them from 
%a file 
  
 %select the number of realisations 
         
        realisations = 5000; 
  
TPmean = o; 
TPstd = p; 
QPmean = y3; 
QPstd = 1000; % not used now, but overwritten 
ORmean = n3; % that is on average no overrun 
ORstd = 1; % OK only a single day 
rhoTQ =-.9; 
rhoTO = 0; 
rhoQO = 0; 
numTenders = 3; 
  
% At this point I am setting up the loops to determine the count surface 
% Take 30 different QPstd going from 10,000 to 300,000 in steps of 10,000 
  
QPSfirst = 10000; 
QPSnum = 30; 
QPSstep = 10000; 
  
  
  
for QI = 1:QPSnum %  These will be the indices of the output array 
    QPstd = QPSfirst+QPSstep*(QI-1); 
     
    % now vary the correlation between tender price and quality 
    % Take 20 different values between -0.8 and +0.8 in steps of .05 
     
    rhofirst = -.8; 
    rhonum = 33; 
    rhostep = .05; 
     
    for CJ = 1: rhonum % These will be the indices for the output array 
        rhoTQ= rhofirst+rhostep*(CJ-1); 
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        correl= [1,rhoTQ,rhoTO;rhoTQ,1,rhoQO;rhoTO,rhoQO,1]; 
         
        % note - check that the correlation matrix is consistent before 
getting here 
     
        A=sqrtm(correl);% The key function correl=AA' 
         
        %for 3 different cases generate the likely values 
         
         
        % for each different realisation generate the prices, diff etc. 
        lncount=0; % how many times does the selected tender turn out to 
have the least overall cost 
         
        for j=1:realisations 
            for i=1:numTenders %for each realisation generate a number of 
tenders 
                neta= lognrnd(0,1,3);% 3 standard log normal random numbers 
required 
                x=A*neta; %x are the standardised correlated lognormal vlaue 
(just check they are chiquared test required 
                outputs(j,i,1)=x(1)*TPstd+TPmean;% These are the tender 
prices 
                outputs(j,i,2)=x(2)*QPstd+QPmean; %These are the quality 
prices 
                outputs(j,i,3)=x(3); %overrun days 
                outputs(j,i,4)=outputs(j,i,1)+outputs(j,i,2); 
                 
            end 
             
            % find the tender to accept based on lowest tender price 
            %this really should be the min function on the second dimension 
            lnaccepted_bid(j) = outputs(j,1,1); 
            lnbest_bid(j)=1; %this just keeps a record of what was the best 
bid 
            for i= 2:numTenders 
                if outputs(j,i,1)<lnaccepted_bid(j) 
                    lnaccepted_bid(j)=outputs(j,i,1); 
                    lnbest_bid(j)=i; 
                end 
            end 
             
            %now find the lowest overall final price 
            lnbest_price(j) = outputs(j,1,4); 
            lnbest_outcome(j)=1; %this just keeps a record of what was the 
best final price 
            for i= 2:numTenders 
                if outputs(j,i,4)<lnbest_price(j) 
                    lnbest_price(j)=outputs(j,i,4); 
                    lnbest_outcome(j)=i; 
                end 
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            end 
             
            %keep track of how many times the best tender turns out not to 
have the 
            %lowest final price 
            if lnbest_bid(j) == lnbest_outcome(j) 
                lncount=lncount+1;  
            end 
        end 
        lncountarray(QI,CJ) = lncount; 
        Qualval(QI)=QPstd; 
        Corrval(CJ)=rhoTQ; 
         
    end 
    end 
 
4.3.5.1 Model description 
 
%model to determine costs for tenders 
%The model produces 3 components for a tender quote: The price, related to 
%the sample inputs, a diff cost based on existing tender to final cost figures 
%and a delay index (not used at the moment) 
 
%Input varables are: 
% TPmean - the mean of the tender prices 
% TPstd - the standard deviation of the tender prices 
% QPmean - the mean of the overrun price, which is calculated from historic 
% outcome prices 
% QPstd - the standard deviation of the overrun price 
% ORmean - the mean overrun in days 
% ORstd - the standard deviation of overrun 
% rhoTQ - the correlation between tender and overrun prices 
% rhoTO - the correlation between tender price and overrun time 
% rhoQO - the correlation between overrun price and Overrun time 
% numTenders is the number of tenders considered for each project - we could 
% vary it to see what effect it has on the final price 
  
%Output will be a matrix of tender prices (fp, 1), quality prices (ex, 2), 
%and overrun (or,3) indices. The matrix is called outputs. The array itself 
%is 3 dimensional. The first dimension is the realisation number 
(1:realisations), the 
%second the tender (1:numTenders) and the third the actual value(1 refers to 
%tender price, 2 to overrun price, 3 to overrun days and 4 for the final 
%price) 
  
The above is a description of what the model does. 
 
%Now load the varibles 
data= xlsread('P13.xlsx'); %load from excel document 
bidpice = data(1:3); 
lowest = data(1); 
duration = data(7); 
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The first stage was to get the model to identify the tender prices, the lowest tender, and the client’s 
expected duration. Table 4.3.13 reminds us of Project 13’s tender prices and client’s expected duration, 
which selected Contractor B. 
o=1.048226*7000000; 
p=0.103617*7000000; 
 
Next was to find the mean and the standard deviation of the tender prices. However, the whole idea of 
the sensitivity analysis is not just to analyse the tenders that a client has in front of them, but a set of 
likely tenders from the same multivariate probability distribution. The client can rightly assume that it 
can get a different set of tenders from different contractors for the same project. Therefore, instead of 
limiting the mean and standard deviation of the tender prices to expect to the one already in front of the 
client (Table 4.3.13), the model aims to get an overall picture. To execute this, in the initial analysis of 
the lowest tenders used to develop the model we get the ratio between every contractor tender received 
for a project to the final cost of that project.  	
ࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕ ൌ ࢀࢋ࢔ࢊࢋ࢘	ࡼ࢘࢏ࢉࢋ࢏ࡲ࢏࢔ࢇ࢒	࡯࢕࢙࢚  
Then the mean and standard deviation is calculated, with ࢕ representing the mean, and ࢖ representing 
the standard deviation. 
࢕ ൌ ࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚૛૙૚૛૙  
࢖ ൌ ࢙࢚ࢗ࢘ ቈ෍ሺࡾࢇ࢚࢏࢕૚૛૙ െ ࢕ሻ
૛
૚૛૙ െ ૚ ቉ 
Then the worth of the project, in other words the clients’ budget for the project is multiplied by the 
mean and standard deviation, to give an overall picture of the mean and standard deviation a client can 
expect for the project. 
y1= 0.036738; 
y2=0.043266; 
y3=o*y1; 
y4=o*y2 
 
The next step was to scale the value of the tenders to the appropriate cost size. In doing so this will 
determine right the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost that Project 4 can expect to incur as it 
chooses the lowest tender. In this case ࢟૜ represents the mean, while ࢟૝ represents the standard 
deviation; with ࢟૚ and ࢟૛ staying the same; remember that they represent the percentage of mean and 
standard deviation of overrun cost to expect from the analysis done on 120 projects in Dataset 1.  
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TPmean = o; 
TPstd = p; 
QPmean = y3; 
QPstd = 1000; % not used now, but overwritten 
rhoTQ =-.9; 
numTenders = 3; 
 
% At this point I am setting up the loops to determine the count surface 
% Take 30 different QPstd going from 10,000 to 300,000 in steps of 10,000 
  
QPSfirst = 10000; 
QPSnum = 30; 
QPSstep = 10000; 
 
for QI = 1:QPSnum %  These will be the indices of the output array 
    QPstd = QPSfirst+QPSstep*(QI-1); 
     
    % now vary the correlation between tender price and quality 
    % Take 33 different values between -.8 and .8 in steps of .05 
     
    rhofirst = -.8; 
    rhonum = 33; 
    rhostep = .05; 
 
 
for CJ = 1: rhonum % These will be the indices for the output array 
        rhoTQ= rhofirst+rhostep*(CJ-1); 
        
        correl= [1,rhoTQ,rhoTO;rhoTQ,1,rhoQO;rhoTO,rhoQO,1]; 
         
        % note - check that the correlation matrix is consistent before 
getting here 
     
        A=sqrtm(correl);% The key function correl=AA' 
         
        %for 3 different cases generate the likely values 
 
At this stage of the model, it recognises the mean and standard deviation to expect for tender prices, 
ࢀࡼ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔ and	ࢀࡼ࢙࢚ࢊ. It also then recognises the mean overrun cost to expect for Project 13	ࡽࡼ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔. 
The standard deviation,	ࡽࡼ࢙࢚ࢊ of overrun cost is then overwritten at this stage; when ࢟૝ is calculated 
manually for Project 13, the standard deviation of overrun cost to expect is around £300,000. Therefore  
ࡽࡼ࢙࢚ࢊ is now taken to be any amount between: £10,000 and £300,000. Then the correlation between 
tender price and overrun cost is overwritten; so instead of giving it a fixed correlation like the model 
for Dataset 1, 2, and 3 the model allows it to deviate from -0.8 to 0.8. A correlation of -0.8 means that 
the lower the tender price, the higher the overrun cost. While 0.8 means the higher the tender price, the 
higher the overrun cost. The range from -0.8 to 0.8 removes the extremities of +-1 and +-0.9. 
 
realisations = 5000; 
% for each different realisation generate the prices, diff etc. 
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        lncount=0; % how many times does the selected tender turn out to 
have the least overall cost 
         
        for j=1:realisations 
            for i=1:numTenders %for each realisation generate a number of 
tenders 
                neta= lognrnd(0,1,3);% 3 standard log normal random numbers 
required 
                x=A*neta; %x are the standardised correlated lognormal value 
(just check they are chiquared test required 
                outputs(j,i,1)=x(1)*TPstd+TPmean;% These are the tender 
prices 
                outputs(j,i,2)=x(2)*QPstd+QPmean; %These are the diff prices 
                outputs(j,i,3)=x(3); %overrun days 
                FC=outputs(j,i,1)+outputs(j,i,2); 
                 
            end 
 
The model is then instructed to reproduce results 5,000 times; this is a decrease of the 20,000 it was 
instructed to do in the model for Dataset 1, 2, and 3. The reason is down to the greater number of 
different values mean and standard deviation being considered which would have resulted in a longer 
running time to get the results had it been asked to reproduce 20,000 results.  
The model is then instructed to produce the distributions lognormally of all the three variables: Tender 
Price, Diff, and Delay. The first variable coming through are the standardised indices tender prices. 
These are then correctly formatted by instructing the model to produce 5,000 possible sets of tender 
prices that Project 13 can receive, by multiplying it to the standard deviation of tender prices to expect 
ࢀࡼ࢙࢚ࢊ and adding it to the mean of tender prices to expect	ࢀࡼ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔. The second variable are that of 
diff; these are formatted by multiplying the indices by the standard deviation of overrun cost to expect 
for Project 13, ࡽࡼ࢙࢚ࢊ and adding it to the mean overrun cost to expect for Project 13, ࡽࡼ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔.  
Finally, the model is instructed to find the final cost to expect for Project 13. To find the final cost was 
to add the correctly formatted 1st and 2nd variable; with the 1st variable being the tender prices and 2nd 
being the overrun costs to expect. 
   % find the tender to accept based on lowest tender price 
            %this really should be the min function on the second dimension 
            lnaccepted_bid(j) = outputs(j,1,1); 
            lnbest_bid(j)=1; %this just keeps a record of what was the best 
bid 
            for i= 2:numTenders 
                if outputs(j,i,1)<lnaccepted_bid(j) 
                    lnaccepted_bid(j)=outputs(j,i,1); 
                    lnbest_bid(j)=i; 
                end 
            end 
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Up until this stage of the model, it has not yet been instructed to select the lowest tender from all the 
possible set of tender prices that the model generates. The code here instructs it to do just that, and to 
keep a record of it. 
  %now find the lowest overall final price 
            lnbest_price(j) = outputs(j,1,4); 
            lnbest_outcome(j)=1; %this just keeps a record of what was the 
best final price 
            for i= 2:numTenders 
                if outputs(j,i,4)<lnbest_price(j) 
                    lnbest_price(j)=outputs(j,i,4); 
                    lnbest_outcome(j)=i; 
                end 
            
            end 
 
            %keep track of how many times the best tender turns out not to 
have the 
            %lowest final price 
            if lnbest_bid(j) == lnbest_outcome(j) 
                lncount=lncount+1;  
            end 
        end 
        lncountarray(QI,CJ) = lncount; 
        Qualval(QI)=QPstd; 
        Corrval(CJ)=rhoTQ; 
         
    end 
    end 
 
The model at this stage, then finds out whether the lowest tender selected turned out to be the overall 
best tender. It first keeps a record of the contractor who had the best after the lowest tender has 
completed the project, and subsequently counts the amount of time the lowest tender comes out as the 
best tender. Figure 4.3.12 displays the relationship between the correlation of tender price and overrun 
cost, the overrun cost, and the amount of time that the lowest tender turns out to be the best tender in 
terms of the final cost.  
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Figure 4.3.12: Project 13 Correlation, Overrun Cost, and Count 
 
 
• The X-axis is the correlations that ranges from -0.8 to 0.8 (removing the 
extremities of +-1 and +-0.9), with a step of 0.05; this is then given a range 
from 0 to 33.  
• The Y-axis is the standard deviation of Diff that ranges from £10000 to 
£300,000; this is then given a range from 0 to 30. 
• The Z-axis counts the number of times that the lowest tender did turn out as 
the best overall tender; in other words, if the amount of time that the lowest 
tender’s outcome cost, turns out to still be lower than the next highest price. 
• The model was given 5000 realisations. 
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4.3.5.1.1 Now for Duration 
 
The same principle is then used to find how many times the lowest tender turns out to be the best tender 
for duration. 
TPmean = o; 
TPstd = p; 
ORmean = n3;   
ORstd = 1; % not used now, but overwritten 
rhoTO = -.9; 
numTenders = 3; 
 
% At this point I am setting up the loops to determine the count surface 
% Take 40 different QPstd going from 1 to 40 in steps of 1 
  
  
Dfirst = 1; 
Dnum = 40; 
Dstep = 1; 
  
 for ORI = 1:Dnum; % These will be the indices of the output array 
        ORstd = Dfirst + Dstep*(ORI-1);  
     
    % now vary the correlation between tender price and quality 
    % Take 20 different values between -.8 and .8 in steps of .05 
     
    rhofirst = -.8; 
    rhonum = 33; 
    rhostep = .05; 
     
    for CJ = 1: rhonum % These will be the indices for the output array 
        rhoTO= rhofirst+rhostep*(CJ-1); 
         
        correl= [1,rhoTQ,rhoTO;rhoTQ,1,rhoQO;rhoTO,rhoQO,1]; 
         
        % note - check that the correlation matrix is consistent before 
getting here 
     
        A=sqrtm(correl);% The key function correl=AA' 
         
        %for 3 different cases generate the likely values 
         
At this stage of the model, it recognises the mean and standard deviation to expect for tender prices, 
ࢀࡼ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔ and	ࢀࡼ࢙࢚ࢊ. It also then recognises the mean delay time to expect for Project 13	ࡻࡾ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔. 
The standard deviation,	ࡻࡾ࢙࢚ࢊ of delay time is then overwritten at this stage; remember that the mean 
and standard deviation of delay time was 2.3% and 8.27% respectively in the initial analysis for lowest 
tender projects used to develop the model. Therefore  ࡻࡾ࢙࢚ࢊ is now taken to be anything between: a 
day and 23 days; as 8.27% of Project 13’s duration which is 22.326 days. In the model, however this 
increased to 40 days to dig deeper into the relationship between the correlation of tender price and delay 
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time, the delay, and the amount of time that the lowest tender turns out to be the best tender in terms of 
meeting the clients’ expected duration. Then the correlation between tender price and delay is 
overwritten; so instead of giving it a fixed correlation like the previous model, the model allows it to 
deviate from -0.8 to 0.8.  
realisations = 5000; 
% for each different realisation generate the prices, qulaity etc. 
        lncount=0; % how many times does the selected tender turn out to 
have the least overall cost 
         
        for j=1:realisations 
            for i=1:numTenders %for each realisation generate a number of 
tenders 
                neta= lognrnd(0,1,3);% 3 standard log normal random numbers 
required 
                x=A*neta; %x are the standardised correlated lognormal vlaue 
(just check they are chiquared test required 
                outputs(j,i,1)=x(1)*TPstd+TPmean;% These are the tender 
prices 
                outputs(j,i,2)=x(2); %These are the diff prices 
                outputs(j,i,3)=x(3)*ORstd+ORmean; %overrun days 
                actualduration=outputs(j,i,3)+duration; 
            end 
 
The model is then instructed to produce the distributions lognormally of all the three variables: Tender 
Price, Diff, and Delay. The first variable coming through are the standardised indices tender prices. 
These are then correctly formatted by instructing the model to produce 5,000 possible sets of tender 
prices that Project 13 can receive, by multiplying it to the standard deviation of tender prices to expect 
ࢀࡼ࢙࢚ࢊ and adding it to the mean of tender prices to expect	ࢀࡼ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔. The third variable are that of 
diff; these are formatted by multiplying the indices by the standard deviation of delay to expect for 
Project 13, ࡻࡾ࢙࢚ࢊ and adding it to the mean delay time to expect for Project 13, ࡻࡾ࢓ࢋࢇ࢔.  
Finally, the model is instructed to find the actual duration to expect for Project 13. To find the actual 
duration was to add the correctly formatted 3rd variable to the clients’ expected duration for Project 13; 
with the 3rd variable being the delay time to expect. 
   % find the tender to accept based on lowest tender price 
            %this really should be the min function on the second dimension 
            lnaccepted_bid(j) = outputs(j,1,1); 
            lnbest_bid(j)=1; %this just keeps a record of what was the best 
bid 
            for i= 2:numTenders 
                if outputs(j,i,1)<lnaccepted_bid(j) 
                    lnaccepted_bid(j)=outputs(j,i,1); 
                    lnbest_bid(j)=i; 
                end 
            end 
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Again, up until this stage of the model, it has not yet been instructed to select the lowest tender from all 
the possible set of tenders that the model generates. The code here instructs it to do just that, and to 
keep a record of it. 
  %now find the lowest overall final price 
            lnbest_price(j) = outputs(j,1,4); 
            lnbest_outcome(j)=1; %this just keeps a record of what was the 
best final price 
            for i= 2:numTenders 
                if outputs(j,i,4)<lnbest_price(j) 
                    lnbest_price(j)=outputs(j,i,4); 
                    lnbest_outcome(j)=i; 
                end 
            
            end 
 
            %keep track of how many times the best tender turns out not to 
have the 
            %lowest final price 
            if lnbest_bid(j) == lnbest_outcome(j) 
                lncount=lncount+1;  
            end 
        end 
        lncountarray(ORI,CJ) = lncount; 
        ORval(ORI)= ORstd; 
        Corrval(CJ)=rhoTO;    
    end 
    end 
 
The model at this stage, then finds out whether the lowest tender selected turned out to be the overall 
best tender in terms of duration. It first keeps a record of the contractor who had the best after the lowest 
tender has completed the project, and subsequently counts the amount of time the lowest tender comes 
out as the best tender in terms of duration. Figure 4.3.13 the relationship between the correlation of 
tender price and delay time, the delay, and the amount of time that the lowest tender turns out to be the 
best tender in terms of meeting the clients’ expected duration. 
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Figure 4.3.13: Project 13 Correlation, Delay, and Count 
 
 The X-axis is the correlations that ranges from -0.8 to 0.8 (removing the 
extremities of +-1 and +-0.9), with a step of 0.05; this is then given a range 
from 0 to 33.  
 The Y-axis is the standard deviation of Delay that ranges from 1 to 40; this 
is then given a range from 0 to 40. 
 The Z-axis counts the number of times that the lowest tender did turn out 
as the best overall tender in terms of duration. 
 The model was given 5000 realisations. 
Looking at the sensitivity analysis for duration, Figure 4.3.13, we see a close to perfect linear 
relationship. When the correlation between the tender price and delay time is highly negative i.e. the 
lower the tender price the higher the delay, then the lowest tender price is hardly ever the best tender in 
terms of duration, regardless of the amount of delay time incurred. The more positive the correlation 
becomes; that is the lower the tender the lower the delay or vice versa, the more the lowest tender 
becomes the best tender in terms of duration. This is to be expected given that it is assumed that all the 
other contractors that tendered will meet the clients’ expected duration. Remember that in this project, 
the contractors did not state how long they will take to deliver the project, so it was safe to assume that 
they all can meet the clients’ expected duration.  
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The sensitivity analysis for final cost, Figure 4.3.12, depicts a more complicated relationship between 
the correlation of tender price and overrun cost, the overrun cost, and the amount of time that the lowest 
tender turns out to be the best tender in terms of the final cost. When the correlation is highly negative; 
the lower the price the higher the overrun cost, and the lowest tender incurs its highest overrun cost of 
£300,000, the lowest tender is the best tender 50% of the time. When the correlation is still highly 
negative, but the overrun cost decreases, we find that the chances of the lowest tender being the best 
tender in terms of final cost increases. The more positive the correlation, the better chance that the 
lowest tender turns out to be the best tender in terms of cost. Therefore, at its worst, which is a highly 
negative correlation, and an overrun cost of £300,000, there is still a 50% chance that the lowest tender 
becomes the best tender in terms of final cost when it completes the project. The main reason for this is 
due to the standard deviation of the tender prices one can expect for Project 13. In Table 4.3.3.1 we see 
that the lowest tender is £6,598,070 and the best value tender is £6,808,821 that is already over 
£200,000. Then take into consideration that the thirst highest tender is almost a £million higher than the 
lowest tender at £7,521,515, which further increases the standard deviation of the tender prices. 
Therefore, for a standard deviation of overrun cost for £300,000, there will be a better chance that the 
lowest tender remains the best tender in terms of final cost. To illustrate this point further, let us take a 
project with a much lower standard deviation between tender prices like Project 8 of Dataset 3.  
Table 4.3.14: Project 8 Tender 
A B C D 
Expected 
Duration 
(days) 
£463,499 £465,301 £478,943 £484,459 120 
 
The sensitivity analysis for duration for Project 8 would be like that of Project 13. Figure 4.3.14 also 
show a close to perfect linear relationship between the correlations of tender price and delay, the delay 
time, and the amount of time the lowest tender is the best tender in terms of duration. 
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Figure 4.3.14: Project 8 Correlation, Delay, and Count 
 
Figure 4.3.15: Project 8 Correlation, Overrun Cost, and Count 
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Figure 4.3.15, shows that there is no chance of the lowest tender being the best tender when it incurs 
the highest possible overrun cost for the project, and correlation is highly negative. Due to the size of 
Project 8, the highest possible overrun cost is £30,000. But in the worst-case scenario when the 
correlation is highly negative and the lowest tender incurs the highest overrun cost possible, Project 
13’s lowest tender still had a 50% chance of being the best tender. In Project 8, however, there is no 
chance; the difference between the lowest tender and the best value tender is just over £2,000. The 
difference between the lowest tender and the highest tender is just over £20,000; the standard deviation 
here would not be as high as that of Project 13. Nevertheless, as the overrun cost decreases and the more 
positive the correlation becomes, the better the chance that the lowest tender in Project 8 turns out to be 
the best tender in terms of final cost. Having said that, what best value is for one client can be different 
to another client. It may be that the clients’ idea of best value is not incurring a delay on the project. If 
that is the case, then the client is better off selecting the best value tender seeing that they delivered the 
projects on time. Figures 4.3.12 to 4.3.15 illustrate the impact that correlation has on results. In Figures 
4.3.13 and 4.3.14 we see for example that regardless of what the standard deviation of delay is, the 
number of times the lowest tender is the overall best tender in terms of duration remains even. The 
number of times the lowest tender is the overall best tender in terms of duration only increases as the 
correlation alters. Therefore, the standard deviation has less of an impact than the correlations. This 
supports Wall (1997) finding (given in Section 3.4.2) which highlighted the importance of correlations. 
It pointed out how excluding correlations has a more profound effect than the effect of choosing which 
probability distributions to represent a data set. Appendix 5 shows the model’s flow diagram stating the 
steps undertaken to develop the model for the correlation’s Sensitivity Analysis. 
4.3.5.2 Applying model to different sector 
 
It will be misleading to apply this model on another project that is not in the Educational facilities sector. 
The research demonstrates this notion by applying the developed model of Dataset 1 on two of Dataset 
5 projects (Projects 1 and 2) which are Industrial facilities projects collected from two consultants that 
selected the lowest tender. 
Table 4.3.15: Dataset 5 Project Cases 
Tendering Methods Projects 
Single-stage Selective 3, 11, 12, and 16 
Single-stage Open 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,13,14,15,17 
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Table 4.3.16: Dataset 5 Project Cases 
 A B C D E Expected 
Duration 
(days) 
1 £2,081,375.
86. 
£2,125,741.
85 
£2,275,640 £2,465,789 2,589,650 89 
2 £6,544,768 £6,592,106.
32 
£6,679,425 £7,121,601  292 
3 £1,519,214 £1,699,619 £1,846,705.
80 
  112 
4 £2,776,622 £3,214,855 £3,364,044   202 
5 £778,369 £810,930 £863,829 £897,594 £917,290 85 
6 £2,498,520 £3,649,071 £3,694,031   225 
7 £3,439,605 £3,482,230 £3,951,477   336 
8 £1,086,416 £1,129,329 £1,152,634 £1,197,777 £1,286,19
6 
157 
9 £514,246 £605,988 £606,892 £704,540  134 
1
0 
£10,707,137 £10,762,455 £11,099,516 £11,107,000 £11,123,4
58 
314 
1
1 
£1,367,725 £1,385,448 £1,493,281 £1,603,808  270 
1
2 
£1,084,930 £1,115,852 £1,122,143   247 
1
3 
£1,692,593 £1,710,654 £1,790,321 £1,850,000 £1,902,12
5.32 
157 
1
4 
£984,633.15 £996,777 £1,050,452   157 
1
5 
£1,486,449.
49 
£1,500,060.
74 
£1,909,574.
39 
  292 
1
6 
£3,029,624 £3,067,327.
11 
£3,150,214 £3,321,154  180 
1
7 
£927,194 £1,116,930 £2,667,040   180 
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Table 4.3.17: Dataset 5 
Project Cost Duration 
1 £2,462,406 102 
2 £7,741,025 340 
3 £1,778,000 134 
4 £3,503,154 202 
5 £1,055,485 95 
6 £3,006,682 225 
7 £4,280,000 336 
8 £1,384,193 157 
9 £608,746 180 
10 £11,450,000 314 
11 £1,453,295 270 
12 £1,220,393 247 
13 £2,013,447 157 
14 £1,202,408.14 157 
15 £2,043,048 314 
16 £3,966,000 225 
17 £1,243,588  180 
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Figure 4.3.16: Project 1 Final Cost 
 
Figure 4.3.17: Project 1 Duration 
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Figure 4.3.18: Project 2 Final Cost 
 
Figure 4.3.19: Project 2 Duration 
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From Figures 4.3.16 to 4.3.19 we see that the completion time of these projects were usually well 
within the captured probability distribution generated from the model. However, even though the model 
captured the final cost of these projects, they were usually outside the 95% interval predicted thus, 
presenting these results would mislead clients. The right thing to do is to analyse historic data on 
industrial projects that have selected the lowest tender, to see how the lowest tenderers have fared. 
Therefore, a further 120 Industrial projects that selected the lowest tender was extracted from the BCIS 
database to get the appropriate mean and standard deviation of outcomes to expect in this sector. The 
same data processing method applied in Dataset 1 was also applied in Dataset 4. The developed model 
will subsequently be tested on Dataset 5.  
Out of the 120 projects in Dataset 4, 87 projects used the Traditional procurement method, however the 
tendering methods were different: 
 Single-stage Selective tendering: 28 projects 
 Single-stage Open tendering: 59 projects 
33 projects used the Design and Build procurement methods; however, the tendering methods were 
different: 
 Single-stage Selective tendering: 26 projects 
 Single-stage Open tendering: 7 projects 
 
The Figures in Appendix 4 above show a healthier capturing of results, in that the actual results were 
well within the probability distribution of outcomes predicted by the model. For educational facilities 
projects the lowest tenderer usually overran by 3% with a standard deviation of 4% while from the 
industrial facilities projects analysed the lowest tenderer overran by 17% with a standard deviation of 
6%. The lowest tenderer on average incurred a 2.23% increase on the expected duration, with a standard 
deviation of 8.27% in Dataset 1, but for Dataset 4 this was 9.23% with a standard deviation of 8.88%. 
The shortcomings of applying a model developed in Dataset 1 to Dataset 5 is clear. The developed 
model for Dataset 4 even failed to capture the actual final cost of projects 10 and 11 in Dataset 5 (see 
Appendix 4), as the lowest tenderer performed better than expected (cost overrun of 7%). The contractor 
cited an unexpected ground condition encountered midway through the project as the reason for cost 
overruns. While the client cited the contractor’s lack of effective planning and coordination between 
the contractor and its suppliers and subcontractors as the reasons for cost overruns. 
In Dataset 5 only 1 out of 17 projects incurred cost overruns that were below the price of the second 
lowest tender. 9 out of 17 (2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16) projects incurred cost overruns that were 
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higher than the price of all the tenders received. The consultants cited the unsuitability of the contractor 
and the subsequent changing of contractor midway through the project as the reasons for the overruns. 
Project 12 and 16 are particularly interesting as they both used the single-stage selective tendering 
method. The contractor in project 12 had a dispute with its workforce that led to workforce shortages. 
While the contractor in project 16 went bankrupt, and this had nothing to do with payment schedules. 
This supports the conclusion derived from Dataset 2; the regular assessment of contractors in a preferred 
contractors’ list is needed. 12 out of 17 (1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, and 17) projects used the 
single-stage open tendering method, meaning that the client had little to no experience of working with 
the contractor. Again, the consultants cited the unsuitability of the contractor as the reasons for overruns. 
This supports Griffith et al. (2003) and ICE (2016) criticism of the open tendering method (Section 
2.2.2), of attracting unsuitable contractors/suppliers that may lead to wasting time, effort, and money. 
Although this does justify the increase in the use of selective tendering, what selective tendering does 
is it limits the client to the set of tender prices it receives. There is a chance that a different set of 
contractor tender better prices than the one received for the same project. With the open tendering 
method, not only does it offer an equal opportunity to any organisation to submit a tender, it offers a 
better view of the market. The Sensitivity Analysis section (4.3.5) offers a solution to this problem, as 
the model is able to generate 20,000 different sets of tenders given a project size. This is in other to 
gauge the minimum and maximum or the spread of tenders to expect for a project. Having said that, if 
a client chooses to use the open tendering method, then the client should do their homework on the 
contractor. The likelihood is that this will be their first time working together, so the award criterion 
should be more than just price.  Therefore, from these findings 3 conclusions are drawn (2 new, no.1 
repeated): 
 
1. Selective tendering might imply that the client and contractor have a good history, or 
that the contractor has at least undergone some sort of pre-qualification that deem 
he/she qualified. However, regular assessment is needed. 
2. The Sensitivity Analysis (Section 4.3.5) offers a good solution to the limited number of 
tenders usually received in selective tendering, in that the model is able to generate 
thousands of different sets of tenders to give client a better view of the market. 
3. If a client is using the open-tendering method, then select the best value contractor, or at 
least do some homework on the contractor. A client in this case should incorporate other 
aspects in their tender analyses to determine the suitability of the contractor rather than 
just relying on solely price as there is lack of familiarity between the two parties.  
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The lowest tenderers seemed to fare better in Educational facilities projects than in Industrial facilities 
projects. This supports Yu and Wang (2012) research that developed a mathematical model which 
measures the heterogeneity of the market to determine when a best value contractor should be favoured 
against a price only contractor. Though no mathematical model was used in the testing of the different 
sector, developing a model that can predict the likely outcomes (cost and duration) of the lowest tenderer 
in two different sectors offer a more practical contribution to Yu and Wang (2012) research. The perfect 
scenario would have been to equally have several projects that selected the best value contractor, 
including the quality scores of all the contractors that tendered. There were only 3 projects that were 
gathered that offered this information, all in Education facilities, and all where the best value tender 
was the lowest tender. The next section would demonstrate how the project would have accounted for 
quality had more quality scores been provided. 
4.3.6 Quality Demonstration  
 
Cost, time, and quality are typically used in planning and assessing project performance in the 
construction industry. 
 Cost: This is the final cost of the project not the tender price. 
 Time: The actual duration of the project 
 Quality: Reliability of the contractor/project. 
The research accounted for final cost and time, but not quality due to the fact the quality/reliability 
scores of the contractor were not given. This section of the thesis will demonstrate how the model would 
have incorporated the quality score of the contractor had there been a healthy dataset. This section will 
use 3 projects from a consultant that selected the best value tender (of which the best value tender was 
also the lowest tender) in educational facilities projects to illustrate. 
All three projects used the same criteria to evaluate contractors using a weight distribution of 30% Price 
and 70% Quality. The Quality criteria are: 
 Approach 10%: A qualitative assessment of the intended approach and it's feasibility 
 Health and Safety 10%: A qualitative assessment based upon interaction with company and 
H&S criteria. 
 Experience 30%: A qualitative assessment based upon demonstrated experience. 
 Resources 10%: A qualitative assessment of company and supply chain fortitude. 
 Programme 10%: A qualitative assessment based upon the deliverability and speed of the 
programme 
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*The weights and quality criteria used for this demonstration were provided/used by the consultant on 
these 3 projects below. Also included are the contractors’ scores in these criteria. 
Table 4.3.18: Project A Tender Information 
 
Budget = 
£900,000 
A B C 
Price £548,309.00 £781,538.00 £574,737.00 
Approach 95% 75% 90% 
H&S 95% 70% 70% 
Experience 80% 70% 80% 
Resources 50% 70% 90% 
Programme 60% 90% 60% 
BV Score 
(points) 
103.24 86.05 101.98 
 
Table 4.3.19: Project B Tender Information  
Budget = 
£5,000,000 
A B C D 
Price £4,444,607.30 £4,502,940.42 £4,531,075.07 £5,111,851.66 
Approach 90% 47% 67% 80% 
H&S 85% 65% 85% 90% 
Experience 90% 37% 77% 70% 
Resources 55% 53% 90% 90% 
Programme 55% 60% 70% 54% 
BV Score 
(points) 
89.25 66.91 87.40 81.74 
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Table 4.3.20: Project C Tender Information 
Budget = 
£1,200,000 
A B C D E 
Price £830,000.00 £911,150.00 £967,150.00 £1,100,000.00 £1,105,000.00 
Approach 85% 55% 90% 72% 90% 
H&S 80% 74% 90% 80% 90% 
Experience 95% 70% 80% 70% 65% 
Resources 47% 55% 90% 80% 90% 
Programme 50% 60% 95% 75% 90% 
BV Score 
(points) 
98.07 84.91 97.72 84.43 88.08 
 
The client first transformed the tender prices to percentage by dividing the budget cost by the 
contractor’s submitted tender price. For example, in Project C, Contractor A’s percentage will be 
(£1,200,000/830,000) *100 = 146%. 
The client then calculated the contractors’ best value score as the sum of multiplying the weight of each 
criteria by the score of the contractor in that criteria. From the tender information of these 3 projects, 
correlation will be derived between the 6 criteria to form the model. Remember that the main aim of 
the thesis is to provide a model of determining the probability distributions of cost and time arising 
from choosing different contractor selection strategies: lowest price or best value. It is possible for the 
lowest tenderer to still be the best value tender. However, in situations when it is not the model 
developed for the thesis has been able to show how the lowest tenderer would have fared if he/she was 
awarded the contract instead. Therefore, the model that is described in this section would be able to 
show: 
 The lowest cost tender 
 Its best value score  
 Its final cost 
 Its overrun costs 
 Its overrun time 
 The best value tender  
 Its best value score 
 Its final cost 
 Its overrun costs 
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 Its overrun time 
Furthermore, the model would be able to spot how often the lowest tenderer turns out to be the best 
value tender. In cases where the lowest tenderer is not the best value tenderer, the model would show 
how the lowest tenderer fared compared to the best value tender selected whose price was not the lowest 
price. The model MATLAB code in its entirety will be displayed first. Then there will be a description 
of each part of the code. 
%Script to calculate the weights for selecting a best value project 
%The weights are uniformly distributed 1 to 100 and correlated to each 
%other 
% Price is log normally distributed with mean of mu and a standard 
% deviation of sigms. 
% The decision criteria are to be added at the end 
% row 1 = price 
% row 2 = approach 
% row 3 = health and safety 
% row 4 = experience 
% row 5 = resources 
% row 6 = programme 
% row 7 = overrun cost 
% row 8 = delay 
  
% Set some constants up 
num_tenders=3; %How many companies submit a tender 
num_sim=5000; 
sigma=127711.17; %Standard deviation of price 
mu=634861.33;%Mean of price 
num_crit=8; % the 8 rows above 
W_price= -0.3; %weight given to price. the minus sign is to minimise cost so 
find the highest weighted score 
W_approach= 0.1; %weight given to approach 
W_HS= 0.1; %weight given to H&S 
W_experience= 0.30; %weight given to experience 
W_resouces= 0.1; %weight given to resources 
W_programme= 0.1; %weight given to programme 
sigma_overrun_cost= 32090.25; % obvious 
mu_overrun_cost=6327; % a bit high 
mu_overrun_time=1; 
sigma_overrun_time=10; %some projects finish early 
  
tender_score(1:num_sim,1:num_tenders,1:num_crit)= 0; %set up the matrix - it 
is faster this way 1st dim = simulation number, 2nd = tender number, 3rd = 
criteria  
results(1:num_sim,1:11)=0; %set up the results matrix 
  
corr(1:8,1:8)=1; % easy to set leading diagonals 
corr(1,2) = -0.44; % price and approach 
corr(1,3) = -0.02; % price and H&S 
corr(1,4) = -0.56; % price and experience 
corr(1,5) = 0.04; % price and resources 
corr(1,6) = -0.37; % price and programme 
corr(1,7) = -0.58; % price and overrun costs 
corr(1,8) = -0.026; % price and delay 
     
136 
 
 
 
  
corr(2,3) = 0.48; % approach and H&S 
corr(2,4) = 0.66; % approach and experience 
corr(2,5) = 0.62; % approach and resources 
corr(2,6) = 0.49; % approach and programme 
corr(2,7) = 0.0; % approach and Overrun costs 
corr(2,8) = 0.0; % approach and delay 
  
corr(3,4) = 0.46; % H&S and experience 
corr(3,5) = 0.19; % H&S and resources 
corr(3,6) = 0.09; % H&S and programme 
corr(3,7) = 0.0; % H&S and overrun costs 
corr(3,8) = 0.0; % H&S and delay 
  
corr(4,5) = 0.42; % experience and resources 
corr(4,6) = 0.22; % experience and programme 
corr(4,7) = 0.0; % experience and overrun costs 
corr(4,8) = 0.0; % experience and delay 
  
corr(5,6) = 0.54; % resources and programme 
corr(5,7) = 0.0; % resources and overrun costs 
corr(5,8) = 0.0; % resources and delay 
  
corr(6,7) = 0.0; % programme and overrun costs 
corr(6,8) = 0.0; % programme and delay 
  
corr(7,8) = 0.33; % overrun cost and delay 
  
%flip the matrix to make it symmetrical 
for i =2:num_crit 
    for j=1:i-1 
        corr(i,j)=corr(j,i); 
    end 
end 
[V,D]=eig(corr); % find the eigen values and vectors 
%alter the diagonal elements to get rid of negative values - note this will 
increase 
%the overall variance of the model, but it has to be done to make the 
%correaltions consistent. 
for i = 1:num_crit 
    if D(i,i)< 0 
        D(i,i) =0.001; 
    end 
end 
newcorr=V*D*inv(V); % reconstitute the covariance matrix 
A=sqrtm(newcorr); %This matlab function finds A such that C=AA' 
%The main simulation 
for i=1:num_sim 
     
    for tender=1:num_tenders %for each realisation of tenders 
         
        for j=1:num_crit 
            neta(j)=normrnd(0,1); %generate normal random numbers 
        end 
        correlated_normal=A*transpose(neta); % a vector of correlated normal 
numbers. We need neta as a column vector 
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        % Now get the price as a log normal distribution with mean mu and 
standard 
        % deviation sigma. This is the first element of the output score 
         
         
        for j=1:num_crit-2 
            
tender_score(i,tender,j)=(cdf('Normal',correlated_normal(j),0,1)*0.6+0.4); 
%the cdf function converts the normal random numbers into uniform 0.4,1 
numbers 
        end 
        tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1)=(correlated_normal(1)*sigma+mu); 
%costs are normally distributed the last column is the tender price 
        tender_score(i,tender,num_crit-1)=(correlated_normal(num_crit-
1)*sigma_overrun_cost+mu_overrun_cost); % These are the overrun costs 
        
tender_score(i,tender,num_crit)=(correlated_normal(num_crit)*sigma_overrun_
time+mu_overrun_time); %These are the overrun days 
    end 
    % now we make our selections The results matrix contains the following 
    % columns: 
    % 1 the lowest cost tender 
    % 2 its best value score 
    % 3 Its cost  
    % 4 its overrun costs 
    % 5 its overrun time 
    % 7 the best value tender 
    % 8 its best value score 
    % 9 its cost 
    % 10 Its overrun costs 
    % 11 its overrun time 
     
    % The standard way of find a minimum and where it is 
    results(i,1)=1; % thes first tender so far is the best 
    best_price=tender_score(i,1,num_crit+1); % The cost of first tender 
    
best_score=tender_score(i,1,1)*W_price+tender_score(i,1,2)*W_approach+tende
r_score(i,1,3)*W_HS+tender_score(i,1,4)*W_experience+tender_score(i,1,5)*W_
resouces+tender_score(i,1,6)*W_programme;% The weighted scores 
    results(i,7)=1; 
    results(i,2)=best_score; 
    results(i,3)=best_price; 
    results(i,4)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit-1); 
    results(i,5)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit); 
    results(i,7)=1; 
    results(i,8)=best_score; 
    results(i,9)=best_price; 
    results(i,10)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit-1); 
    results(i,11)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit); 
  
    % now go through the rest of the tenders 
     
    for tender=2:num_tenders %  best price 
        if tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1)<best_price 
            results(i,1)=tender; 
            best_price=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1); 
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results(i,2)=tender_score(i,tender,1)*W_price+tender_score(i,tender,2)*W_ap
proach+tender_score(i,tender,3)*W_HS+tender_score(i,tender,4)*W_experience+
tender_score(i,tender,5)*W_resouces+tender_score(i,tender,6)*W_programme; 
            results(i,3)=best_price; 
            results(i,4)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit-1); 
            results(i,5)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit); 
        end 
        
score_test=tender_score(i,tender,1)*W_price+tender_score(i,tender,2)*W_appr
oach+tender_score(i,tender,3)*W_HS+tender_score(i,tender,4)*W_experience+te
nder_score(i,tender,5)*W_resouces+tender_score(i,tender,6)*W_programme;% 
The weighted scores 
         
        if score_test > best_score %  best score 
            results(i,7)=tender; 
            best_score=score_test; 
            results(i,8)=best_score; 
            results(i,9)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1); %final cost 
            results(i,10)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit-1); % overrun cost 
            results(i,11)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit); % overrun delay 
        end 
        % warning flag if any criteria less than 50% for the best selected 
        % tender then put a flag in column 6 
         
        for crit_number= 1:num_crit-2 
            if abs(tender_score(i,results(i,7),crit_number)) < 0.5 
%results(i,7,) is the number of the best tender and we are flagging i the 
absolute value is less than 0.5 
                results(i,6) = 1; 
            end 
        end 
                 
         
    end            
end 
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4.3.6.1 Model description 
 
%Script to calculate the weights for selecting a best value project 
%The weights are uniformly distributed 1 to 100 and correlated to each 
%other 
% Price is normally distributed with mean of mu and a standard 
% deviation of sigms. 
% The decision criteria are to be added at the end 
% row 1 = price 
% row 2 = approach 
% row 3 = health and safety 
% row 4 = experience 
% row 5 = resources 
% row 6 = programme 
% row 7 = overrun cost 
% row 8 = delay 
 
Above is a description of what the model does. 
% Set some constants up 
num_tenders=3; %How many companies submit a tender 
num_sim=5000; 
sigma=127711.17; %Standard deviation of price 
mu=634861.33;%Mean of price 
num_crit=8; % the 8 rows above 
W_price= -0.3; %weight given to price. the minus sign is to minimise cost so 
find the highest weighted score 
W_approach= 0.1; %weight given to approach 
W_HS= 0.1; %weight given to H&S 
W_experience= 0.30; %weight given to experience 
W_resouces= 0.1; %weight given to resources 
W_programme= 0.1; %weight given to programme 
sigma_overrun_cost= 32090.25; % obvious 
mu_overrun_cost=6327; % a bit high 
mu_overrun_time=1; 
sigma_overrun_time=10; %some projects finish early 
 
The first part of the model is to introduce the criteria and its weights. Project A, B, and C had 3, 4 and 
5 contractors that tendered for the project respectively. The model will also check to see how the results 
are affected when the number of tenders increases. The model begins with 3: num_tenders=3; %How 
many companies submit a tender 
The model is given 5000 realisations: num_sim=5000; 
 
The next stage is to put in the mean and standard deviation of tender prices. For the demonstration, 
Project A’s tender were used: 
sigma=127711.17; %Standard deviation of price 
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mu=634861.33;%Mean of price 
 
Next, the criteria and its weights are assigned: 
W_price= -0.3; %weight given to price. the minus sign is to minimise cost so 
find the highest weighted score 
W_approach= 0.1; %weight given to approach 
W_HS= 0.1; %weight given to H&S 
W_experience= 0.30; %weight given to experience 
W_resouces= 0.1; %weight given to resources 
W_programme= 0.1; %weight given to programme 
 
The idea of the model is to be able to respond to clients’ needs; these are the same weights the client 
used in evaluating the contractors for Project A, B, and C. However in the model the price weight is 
intentionally given as -0.3: W_price= -0.3; %weight given to price. The minus sign 
is to minimise cost so find the highest weighted score. 
This is because had the weight been given as a positive, the model would assume that that the higher 
the price, the higher the best value score. When in reality, it is the lower the price, the higher the best 
value score. Therefore, having the price weight as a negative would enable the model identify the lowest 
tender price as the highest best value score in the Price criteria. After the total best value score for each 
contractor is calculated, the model then adds a +0.3 to the scores to get the actual best value score of 
each of the contractors.  
The next stage is to put in the mean and standard deviation of overrun costs and delay to expect for the 
best value tenderer. Remember that in the first model the mean and standard deviation of overrun costs 
(Diff) and delay for the lowest tenderer was put instead. The first model had a reliable dataset of 120 
educational facilities project to work with. For this demonstration, the mean and standard deviation of 
overrun costs and delay was derived from the 20 best value tender projects (Dataset 3) used earlier: 
sigma_overrun_cost= 32090.25; % std obvious 
mu_overrun_cost=6327; % mean a bit high 
mu_overrun_time=1; 
sigma_overrun_time=10; %some projects finish early 
 
The next stage is to put in the correlation between the 8 (the 6 used to evaluate contractors, and the 
overrun costs and delay time) criteria. In the first part of the model (under Section 4.3) it was explained 
that missing information leads to an inconsistent correlation matrix. In this demonstration, the main 
problem was the lack of a healthy dataset of best value selected projects and tender information with 
contractors’ quality scores to work with.  
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tender_score(1:num_sim,1:num_tenders,1:num_crit)= 0; %set up the matrix - it 
is faster this way 1st dim = simulation number, 2nd = tender number, 3rd = 
criteria  
results(1:num_sim,1:11)=0; %set up the results matrix 
  
corr(1:8,1:8)=1; % easy to set leading diagonals 
corr(1,2) = -0.44; % price and approach 
corr(1,3) = -0.02; % price and H&S 
corr(1,4) = -0.56; % price and experience 
corr(1,5) = 0.04; % price and resources 
corr(1,6) = -0.37; % price and programme 
corr(1,7) = -0.58; % price and overrun costs 
corr(1,8) = -0.026; % price and delay 
  
corr(2,3) = 0.48; % approach and H&S 
corr(2,4) = 0.66; % approach and experience 
corr(2,5) = 0.62; % approach and resources 
corr(2,6) = 0.49; % approach and programme 
corr(2,7) = 0.0; % approach and Overrun costs 
corr(2,8) = 0.0; % approach and delay 
  
corr(3,4) = 0.46; % H&S and experience 
corr(3,5) = 0.19; % H&S and resources 
corr(3,6) = 0.09; % H&S and programme 
corr(3,7) = 0.0; % H&S and overrun costs 
corr(3,8) = 0.0; % H&S and delay 
  
corr(4,5) = 0.42; % experience and resources 
corr(4,6) = 0.22; % experience and programme 
corr(4,7) = 0.0; % experience and overrun costs 
corr(4,8) = 0.0; % experience and delay 
  
corr(5,6) = 0.54; % resources and programme 
corr(5,7) = 0.0; % resources and overrun costs 
corr(5,8) = 0.0; % resources and delay 
  
corr(6,7) = 0.0; % programme and overrun costs 
corr(6,8) = 0.0; % programme and delay 
  
corr(7,8) = 0.33; % overrun cost and delay 
  
%flip the matrix to make it symmetrical 
for i =2:num_crit 
    for j=1:i-1 
        corr(i,j)=corr(j,i); 
    end 
end 
[V,D]=eig(corr); % find the eigen values and vectors 
%alter the diagonal elements to get rid of negative values - note this will 
increase 
%the overall variance of the model, but it has to be done to make the 
%correaltions consistent. 
for i = 1:num_crit 
    if D(i,i)< 0 
        D(i,i) =0.001; 
    end 
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end 
newcorr=V*D*inv(V); % reconstitute the covariance matrix 
A=sqrtm(newcorr); %This matlab function finds A such that C=AA' 
%The main simulation 
for i=1:num_sim 
     
    for tender=1:num_tenders %for each realisation of tenders 
         
        for j=1:num_crit 
            neta(j)=normrnd(0,1); %generate normal random numbers 
        end 
        correlated_normal=A*transpose(neta); % a vector of correlated normal 
numbers. We need neta as a column vector 
 
Table 4.3.21: Correlation between the criteria 
 Price Approach H&S Exp. Res. Prog. OC Delay 
Price 1 -0.44 -0.02 -0.56 0.04 -0.37 -0.58 -0.026 
Approach -0.44 1 0.48 0.66 0.62 0.49 0.0 0.0 
H&S -0.02 0.48 1 0.46 0.19 0.09 0.0 0.0 
Exp. -0.56 0.66 0.46 1 0.42 0.22 0.0 0.0 
Res. 0.04 0.62 0.19 0.42 1 0.54 0.0 0.0 
Prog. -0.37 0.49 0.09 0.22 0.54 1 0.0 0.0 
OC -0.58 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.33 
Delay -0.026 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.33 1 
  
Table 4.3.21 shows the correlation between the contractor scores in the criteria used to evaluate them, 
the Overrun Cost and Delay. However, the Overrun Cost and Delay criteria is not in the equation when 
evaluating a winning contractor. This is because the overrun cost and delay are only known after a 
project is completed. The correlation between Price (the best value selected Price), Overrun Cost, and 
Delay was derived from the 20 Projects in Dataset 3. Though this may not be enough when doing an 
actual comparison between lowest tender and best value tender, it is enough for this demonstration of 
how the model would have accounted for the quality scores of the contractor. Furthermore, we see that 
the correlation between overrun cost and delay and all the other criteria are given as 0, which means 
that in the model they have no relationship. However, this is often not the case; remember that the 
Programme criteria evaluates contractors based on the deliverability and speed of their programme. 
Therefore, we would assume that there will be a negative correlation between the Programme criteria 
and Delay; the higher the Programme score the lower the Delay time. However, the Delay and Overrun 
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cost do not factor into the initial criteria of evaluating contractors, simply because they are known after 
a project has been completed and only for the contractor selected.  
When the correlations in Table 4.3.21 was inputted into the model, it initially produced an inconsistent 
matrix in Table 4.3.22.  
Table 4.3.22: Inconsistent matrix  
 Price Approach H&S Exp. Res. Prog. OC Delay 
Price 1 -0.44 -0.02 -0.56 0.04    
 0.37 0.58 0.26      
Approach -0.44 1 0.48 0.66 0.62 0.49 0.0 0.0 
H&S -0.02 0.48 1 0.46 0.19 0.09 0.0 0.0 
Exp. -0.56 0.66 0.46 1 0.42 0.22 0.0 0.0 
Res. 0.04 0.62 0.19 0.42 1 0.54 0.0 0.0 
Prog. -0.37 0.49 0.09 0.22 0.54 1 0.0 0.0 
OC -0.58 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.33 
Delay -0.026 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.33 1 
 
Instead of randomly altering values to create a consistent matrix the following method was invented. 
Using the mathematics of PCA we calculate the eigenvectors of the correlation matrix. The eigenvalues 
ሺܔሻ  correspond to the variance of principal components in the rotated space and the eigenvectors ሺܞሻ 
the direction of this rotation. The equation is:  
۱ܞ ൌ ܔܞ 
Below is the eigenvalue for this matrix 
Table 4.3.23: Diagonal elements of D 
0.001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0.251165 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0.519385 0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0.581528 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 1.019434 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 1.085098 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1.625707 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.962585 
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Traditionally we make the values a diagonal matrix and the vectors correspond to a square matrix. In 
multivariate statistics, PCA says that the variance in some transformed dimensions so small that it could 
be considered zero. In this case because of the inconsistent correlation matrix we have a negative 
variance. Clearly this is not possible in the real world and it has only happened because we have been 
doing pairwise correlations or due to the small sample size used in this demonstration. The following 
rule for making the minimum possible alteration to a correlation matrix to make it consistent was 
devised. 
1. Calculate the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the correlation matrix	࡯. In MATLAB, these 
form a diagonal matrix ࡸ of eigenvalues and a square matrix V of eigenvectors. 
2. Replace any negative eigenvalues with zero ࡸ૚. 
3. Reconstitute the correlation matrix with C=VLV-1 
It is important to note that since the mathematics is derived for covariance, the leading diagonal terms 
are no longer exactly 1.0. This does not matter. The following consistent matrix is then produced, which 
is close to the original correlations (Table 4.3.21) inputted into the model.  Table 4.3.23 shows the 
diagonal elements of D and Table 4.3.24 shows the consistent matrix. 
Table 4.3.24: Consistent matrix 
Price Approach H&S Exp. Res. Prog. OC Delay 
Price 1.02 -0.43 -0.03 -0.55 0.03 -0.36 -0.57 -0.03 
Approach -0.43 1.00 0.48 0.66 0.62 0.49 0.00 0.00 
H&S -0.03 0.48 1.00 0.46 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.00 
Exp. -0.55 0.66 0.46 1.01 0.41 0.22 0.01 0.00 
Res. 0.03 0.62 0.19 0.41 1.01 0.54 -0.01 0.00 
Prog. -0.36 0.49 0.09 0.22 0.54 1.00 0.00 0.00 
OC -0.57 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 1.01 0.33 
Delay -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 1.00 
 
The next stage was to instruct the model to reproduce 5000 realisations of tender information given the 
correlation inputted.  
         
        % Now get the price as a log normal distribution with mean mu and 
standard 
        % deviation sigma. This is the first element of the output score 
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        for j=1:num_crit-2 
            
tender_score(i,tender,j)=(cdf('Normal',correlated_normal(j),0,1)*0.6+0.4); 
%the cdf function converts the normal random numbers into uniform 0.4,1 
numbers 
        end 
        tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1)=(correlated_normal(1)*sigma+mu); 
%costs are normally distributed the last column is the tender price 
        tender_score(i,tender,num_crit-1)=(correlated_normal(num_crit-
1)*sigma_overrun_cost+mu_overrun_cost); % These are the overrun costs 
        
tender_score(i,tender,num_crit)=(correlated_normal(num_crit)*sigma_overrun_
time+mu_overrun_time); %These are the overrun days 
    end 
 
The model is specifically instructed to initially expect contractors’ quality score for individual criterion 
to be between 0.4 and 1; meaning 40% to 100%: 
 tender_score(i,tender,j)=(cdf('Normal',correlated_normal(j),0,1)*0.6+0.4); 
%the cdf function converts the normal random numbers into uniform 0.4,1 
numbers 
The reason for this is because the client that provided the 3 projects used for this demonstration, stated 
that a contractor with a score below 50% (from 40% to 49%) for one of its criterion is treated with 
caution. Although this does not necessarily mean that the client cannot work with the contractor. By 
looking at the weights assigned to the criteria, we see that Price and Experience carries the most weight 
with 30% each; the other 40% is shared equally between the other 4 criteria. This means that a contractor 
would likely get away with having a low score in any criteria other than Price and Experience. 
As the model moves along, it produces standardised indices of price (tender prices), overrun costs and 
delay time. These are correctly formatted by multiplying the indices by the mean and standard deviation 
of price, overrun costs and delay that has been given to it:     
    tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1)=(correlated_normal(1)*sigma+mu); 
%costs are normally distributed the last column is the tender price 
        tender_score(i,tender,num_crit-1)=(correlated_normal(num_crit-
1)*sigma_overrun_cost+mu_overrun_cost); % These are the overrun costs 
        
tender_score(i,tender,num_crit)=(correlated_normal(num_crit)*sigma_overrun_
time+mu_overrun_time); %These are the overrun days 
    end 
 
The next stage is then to apply the weights to the standardised indices of all the criteria used to evaluate 
contractors generated by the model. By this time in the model the tender prices have been formatted to 
produce different sets of contractor tenders. All the other criteria will produce scores between 0.4 to 1 
or 40% to 100% for each contractor that submits a tender price.  
     
146 
 
 
 
% now we make our selections The results matrix contains the following 
    % columns: 
    % 1 the lowest cost tender 
    % 2 its best value score 
    % 3 Its cost  
    % 4 its overrun costs 
    % 5 its overrun time 
    % 7 the best value tender 
    % 8 its best value score 
    % 9 its cost 
    % 10 Its overrun costs 
    % 11 its overrun time 
     
    % The standard way of find a minimum and where it is 
    results(i,1)=1; % the first tender so far is the best 
    best_price=tender_score(i,1,num_crit+1); % The cost of first tender 
    
best_score=tender_score(i,1,1)*W_price+tender_score(i,1,2)*W_approach+tende
r_score(i,1,3)*W_HS+tender_score(i,1,4)*W_experience+tender_score(i,1,5)*W_
resouces+tender_score(i,1,6)*W_programme;% The weighted scores 
    results(i,7)=1; 
    results(i,2)=best_score; 
    results(i,3)=best_price; 
    results(i,4)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit-1); 
    results(i,5)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit); 
    results(i,7)=1; 
    results(i,8)=best_score; 
    results(i,9)=best_price; 
    results(i,10)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit-1); 
    results(i,11)=tender_score(i,1,num_crit); 
  
The code above shows that the model is instructed to identify the contractor with the lowest 
tender price first. Then multiply the lowest tenderers’ score by the weights assigned to each of 
the criteria to get the lowest tenderers’ overall best value score.   
for tender=2:num_tenders %  best price 
        if tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1)<best_price 
            results(i,1)=tender; 
            best_price=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1); 
            
results(i,2)=tender_score(i,tender,1)*W_price+tender_score(i,tender,2)*W_ap
proach+tender_score(i,tender,3)*W_HS+tender_score(i,tender,4)*W_experience+
tender_score(i,tender,5)*W_resouces+tender_score(i,tender,6)*W_programme; 
            results(i,3)=best_price; 
            results(i,4)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit-1); 
            results(i,5)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit); 
        end 
        
score_test=tender_score(i,tender,1)*W_price+tender_score(i,tender,2)*W_appr
oach+tender_score(i,tender,3)*W_HS+tender_score(i,tender,4)*W_experience+te
nder_score(i,tender,5)*W_resouces+tender_score(i,tender,6)*W_programme;% 
The weighted scores 
         
        if score_test > best_score %  best score 
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            results(i,7)=tender; 
            best_score=score_test; 
            results(i,8)=best_score; 
            results(i,9)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit+1); %final cost 
            results(i,10)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit-1); % overrun cost 
            results(i,11)=tender_score(i,tender,num_crit); % overrun delay 
        end 
        % warning flag if any criteria less than 50% for the best selected 
        % tender then put a flag in column 6 
 
The model is then instructed to go through the rest of the contractors that submitted a tender and find 
its best value score. By doing so we can then find who the lowest tenderer is, and who the best value 
tenderer is (or if the lowest tenderer is the best value tender) for each realisation.  
for crit_number= 1:num_crit-2 
            if abs(tender_score(i,results(i,7),crit_number)) < 0.5 
%results(i,7,) is the number of the best tender and we are flagging i the 
absolute value is less than 0.5 
                results(i,6) = 1; 
            end 
        end 
                 
         
    end            
end 
 
Finally, the model is instructed to signal a warning if the winning contractor scores less than 50% in 
any of the criteria. However, the client that provided the tender information stated that a less than 50% 
score in any criteria does not necessarily result in an automatic disqualification of the contractor in 
question. Therefore, the last part of the model would help clients know how likely a less than 50% score 
in any criteria is for the winning contractor.  
It is important to note that the results generated from the model are from only 3 projects where the 
tender prices and quality scores of all the contractors were provided. As well as the projects in Dataset 
3 (20) to get the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost and delay of the best value selected 
tenderer.  
In the 3 projects provided, each had a different number of submitted tenders (3, 4, and 5). One thing to 
investigate is what happens when there is a change to the number of tenderers, and of course to the 
weights. So, let us begin with looking at the results for 3 contractors; with the initial weight ratio of 
30% Price and 70% Quality: 
 The percentage of Warning (a criterion score of less than 50%) of all selected tenders: 56%. 
 The percentage of time the lowest tender turns out to be the best tender: 68%. 
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 The percentage of Warning (a criterion score of less than 50%) when the Best Value tender 
selected is not the lowest tender: 39%. 
 The average best value score of the best value contractor who is also the lowest tenderer: 70%. 
 The average best value score of the lowest tendered contractor who is not the best value 
contractor: 58%. 
 The average best value score of the best value contractor who is not the lowest tenderer: 66%. 
The tender information provided in Table 4.3.20 shows that the lowest tenderer still ended up being the 
best value tender despite it having a less than 50% score in one of its criteria. As the sample size is just 
3 projects, this increases the probability of having the winning contractor score less than 50% in one of 
its criteria in the model (56%). Although this decreases to 39% when the best value tenderer is not the 
contractor with the lowest price. Furthermore, the probability of the lowest tenderer being the best value 
contractor is high at 68%. This is attributed to the weights given to the criteria. The two criteria that 
seem to work in the lowest tenderers’ favour are Price and Experience. From the tender information 
given from Table 4.3.18 to Table 4.3.20, the lowest tender seems to have the most experience (or at 
least an adequate score of 80%). This results in a negative correlation between the 2 criteria of -0.55; 
meaning the lower the price, the higher the experience. From the tender information provided it seems 
that the lowest tender does well in Experience due to its history of winning more projects. The model 
shows that the lowest tenderer would have to average an overall best value score of 58%, while another 
contractor must average an overall score of 66% to win the project off of the lowest tenderer. Now let 
us see what happens when the number of contractors is increased to 4: 
 The percentage of Warning (a criterion score of less than 50%) of all selected tenders: 62%. 
 The percentage of time the lowest tender turns out to be the best tender: 61%. 
 The percentage of Warning (a criterion score of less than 50%) when the Best Value tender 
selected is not the lowest tender: 45%. 
 The average best value score of the best value contractor who is also the lowest tenderer: 73%. 
 The average best value score of the lowest tendered contractor who is not the best value 
contractor: 61%. 
 The average best value score of the best value contractor who is not the lowest tenderer: 69%. 
The probability of getting a red flag (a criterion score of less than 50%) from all selected tenders 
increases slightly. This is simply because there are more tenders to consider. We also find a slight 
increase in the probability of getting a red flag when the Best Value tender selected is not the lowest 
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tender. While the probability that the lowest tender turns out to be the best value contractor decreases. 
The remaining results each yielded a 3% increase when the number of tenderers increased to 4. Now 
let us see what happens when the number of contractors is increased to 5: 
 The percentage of Warning (a criterion score of less than 50%) of all selected tenders: 66%. 
 The percentage of time the lowest tender turns out to be the best tender: 56%. 
 The percentage of Warning (a criterion score of less than 50%) when the Best Value tender 
selected is not the lowest tender: 51%. 
 The average best value score of the best value contractor who is also the lowest tenderer: 74%. 
 The average best value score of the lowest tendered contractor who is not the best value 
contractor: 63%. 
 The average best value score of the best value contractor who is not the lowest tenderer: 71%. 
The model shows a similar pattern; the probability of getting a red flag (a criterion score of less than 
50%) from all selected tenders increases slightly. We also find a slight increase in the probability of 
getting a red flag when the Best Value tender selected is not the lowest tender. While the probability 
that the lowest tender turns out to be the best value contractor decreases. We also see a slight increase 
in the remaining results when the number of tenderers increases from 4 to 5. Therefore, with a weight 
of 30% for Price, 30% for Experience, and 10% each for the remaining 4 criteria. The lowest tender has 
a more than 50% chance of being the best value winning contractor when there is a total of 5 contractors 
in contention. This probability increases as the number of tenderers reduces from 5 to 4 to 3. Another 
thing to investigate is how this probability is affected when the price weight is increased to 50%. To do 
this we add 20% to the price and subtract 4% from the other 5 criteria, given us a weight of: 
 Price 50% 
 Approach 6% 
 Health & Safety 6% 
 Experience 26% 
 Resources 6% 
 Programme 6% 
This resulted in a higher probability of the lowest tenderer turning out to be the best value winning 
contractor. When there are 3 tenders the probability stands at 79%; 4, 74%, and 5, 71%. Therefore, the 
weight criteria were then reduced to 20%, given us a weight of: 
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 Price 20% 
 Approach 12% 
 Health & Safety 12% 
 Experience 32% 
 Resources 12% 
 Programme 12% 
This resulted in there being a better than average chance of the lowest tenderer turning out to be the 
best value winning contractor. When there are 3 tenders the probability stands at 61%; 4, 55%, and 5, 
51%. Therefore, Price would have to be reduced to below 20%, for the lowest tender not to have a more 
than 50% chance of winning the contractor. The other results followed the same pattern, so from the 
model we draw the following conclusions from the demonstration: 
 The higher the number of tenderers the higher the percentage of Warning (a criterion 
score of less than 50%) of all selected tenders. 
 The higher the number of tenderers the lower the percentage of time the lowest tender 
turns out to be the best tender. 
 The higher the number of tenderers the higher the percentage of Warning (a criterion 
score of less than 50%) when the Best Value tender selected is not the lowest tender. 
 The higher the number of tenderers the higher the average best value score of the best 
value contractor who is also the lowest tenderer. 
 The higher the number of tenderers the higher the average best value score of the lowest 
tendered contractor who is not the best value contractor. 
 The higher the number of tenderers the higher the average best value score of the best 
value contractor who is not the lowest tenderer. 
 Given the weight distribution, the weight of Price would have to be less than 20% for the 
lowest tenderer not to have a more than 50% chance of being the best value winning 
contractor.  
Table 4.3.25 shows the percentage of time the lowest tender turns out to be the best value tender 
per weight of Price 
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Table4.3.25: The percentage of time the lowest tender turns out to be the best value tender per 
weight of Price 
 
 
 
Still after drawing these conclusions, the main question of the research has not yet been answered. 
Which is, how will the lowest tenderer fare in a project that has awarded the contract to the best value 
tender whose price is not the lowest price? The above results allow us to also look at the quality score 
of the contractor, as well as the final costs and time of the project. The model results for this 
demonstration shows that the lowest tendered contractor would on average incur a lesser cost of 
£80,867.28 to deliver the project with a standard deviation of £66,552.04 had it been awarded the 
contract instead; this equates to a 12.5% decrease in final cost. Furthermore, the lowest tenderer would 
likely complete the project marginally slower (average of less than a day with a standard deviation of 
just under 15 days) than the best value contractor with a higher price; which equates to a less than 1% 
increase.  
Figure 4.3.20: Lowest Tenderers’ Overrun Cost 
 
Weight 
given to 
price % 
No. of Tenders % 
 
3 4 5 
20 61% 55% 51%
30 68% 61% 56%
50 79% 74% 71%
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Figure 4.3.21: Best Value Tenderers’ Overrun Cost 
 
From the 3 projects used to demonstrate in this section, we find that the lowest tenderer usually had an 
average score in the programme criteria. The programme criteria evaluate the contractor based on their 
speed and deliverability of its programme. However, this criterion had a weight 10% compared to Price 
and Experience that was 30%. Therefore, this signifies that the client will accept the project finishing 
slightly later than anticipated if it is completed with know-how and low cost. 
     
153 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3.22: Lowest Tenderers’ Delay 
 
Figure 4.3.23: Best Value Tenderers’ Delay 
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Finally, when the lowest tender is not the best value winning contractor, the lowest tenders’ quality 
averages between 52% and 65%. While the best value contractor whose price is not the lowest price 
has an average score between 58% an 75%. Again, the purpose of the research is not to help select the 
best value contractor; rather to provide quantifiable information to help clients select a strategy to with. 
For example, the model recorded that lowest tendered contractor would on average incur a higher 
overrun cost of £27,985.02 than the best value contractor if it was given the contract instead. The tender 
information in Table 4.3.18 shows us that if the overrun cost was £27,985.02, then this is just over the 
price of the second lowest tender (by £1,557.02). If the second highest tender is the best value 
contractor, the client could risk going with the lowest tender if it does not mind losing £1,557.02 more 
of what it could have paid the best value contractor for the project. It ultimately boils down to how risk 
averse the clients are. If for example this mean of £27,985.02 was applied to the 2 other projects that 
were used for this demonstration the client could easily have selected the lowest tender despite it not 
being the best value tender. This is because even if it had incurred the whole £27,985.02, it would still 
below what it was going to pay the second lowest tender, if the second lowest tender is the best value 
tender. Furthermore, the model shows that there is a 68% chance that the lowest tender would be the 
best value tender. So, in Dataset 2 that awarded every project to the lowest tenderer, 12 out of the 20 
projects would still be awarded to the lowest tender if the client decided to use the best value strategy. 
The likelihood of Contractor B or C (in Table 4.3.18) being selected as the best value tender is small 
compared to Contractor A. 
Therefore, the demonstration section has shown the model would have incorporated contractors’ quality 
scores had they been provided using 3 projects of the same client. The dataset used for this 
demonstration is far from adequate to extract meaningful results. However, the aim of this section was 
to use the dataset to produce the type of results shown in this section.  Having said that, when we look 
at the tender information provided for this demonstration it is easy to see why the lowest tenderer often 
end up winning contracts in Educational facilities projects in the UK. And why it was difficult to find 
a healthy dataset of projects that awarded to the best value contractor whose price is not the lowest 
price. If this is the standard weighting of criteria in these sector, then the lowest tenderer would usually 
be the best value tender unless the weights of price falls to below 20%. Yu and Wang (2012) mentions 
how the market should dictate whether to adopt the best value or the lowest tender strategy. The model 
done on Educational facilities projects in the UK points to the fact that, the lowest tenderer fares well 
in this sector; especially when they are in their clients’ preferred contractors’ lists.  Appendix 7 shows 
the model’s flow diagram stating the steps undertaken to develop the model for the Quality 
Demonstration. 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
 
Project outcomes (cost and duration) information are usually generated on any construction project. 
When information is extracted in a meaningful and clear way for a number projects, this ultimately 
results to a valuable database. Using data processing techniques, the database can be converted into an 
important decision support system that could help industry practitioners make better decision at the 
early stage of the project; in this case, on what strategy to select.  
The research began by examining the sources of overruns on construction projects; mainly to gauge the 
effect a contractor has on the outcome of a project. It was found that there were many reasons as to why 
a project may incur an overrun that is not limited to the contractor. However, a contractor still has an 
important role to play in a successful completion of a project. One reason for overruns given in the 
literature is strategic misrepresentation or the underestimation of project works; which can be done by 
a contractor to win a project. This has led to more recommendation of the best value strategy in selecting 
contractors.  
Picking the lowest tender is a clear and straightforward strategy, picking the best value strategy is not. 
Therefore, the research examined the existing studies that have developed models to aid in picking 
contractors on best value. The aim of the research was to subsequently provide a method of seeing the 
effect that the strategies had on the outcomes of the project: Final Cost and Duration.  
This was executed by developing a Monte-Carlo simulation model using 120 completed educational 
facilities projects in the UK, all of which selected the lowest tender. The model went through an initial 
testing phase, where it was tested on a further 10 projects that selected the lowest tender from the same 
database. Before, it was validated on a further 20 projects provided by a consultant that selected the 
lowest tender where facts could be double checked. As the model could capture the probability 
distribution of outcomes in both the testing and validation phase, it was then fit to be applied in projects 
that selected the best value tender whose price is not the lowest price. This were done to see the 
probability distribution of outcomes on how the lowest tender would likely fare in a similar project that 
selects the best value contractor with a higher price. 
It is acknowledged that in the best value projects (Dataset 3), contractors’ quality scores were not 
provided, thus in some cases this could have meant that the lowest tender was not even fit enough to 
carry out the works. However, the basis of the research is to show that the method is capable of 
investigating the effect of a contractor selection strategy on the outcomes of a project. Thus, moving 
forward with more reliable information, the model will produce more reliable results. The model was 
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developed using the BCIS database, however the model can also be tailored to an individual client’s 
database. 
Therefore, the model will particularly be useful in helping a client decide on what strategy to select: 
lowest or best value tender. The idea of the model is not to advocate a strategy, rather to see the effect 
the strategy has on outcomes. The method and approach adopted to develop the models can be extended 
to incorporate clients’ needs as long as relevant data can be acquired.  
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Chapter 5: CONCLUSION 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter would therefore make sense of the key findings and results by linking the arguments and 
the results in the body of the thesis to the main aim, objectives and research questions set out in the 
introductory chapter. Finally, suggestions will be put forward for further research.  
 
5.1 REVIEW OF MAIN AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
 
Aim: To provide a model of determining the probability distributions of cost and time arising 
from choosing different contractor selection strategies. 
This was achieved by developing a model that shows how the lowest tenderer would have likely 
fared in a project that has been awarded to the best value tenderer whose price is not the lowest 
price. Below are the key points that describe the model: 
1. It considered the strategy used to select a contractor. Therefore, it did not analyse past 
projects alone, it considered the contractor selection strategy used in a project.  
2. It is not aiming to predict the final cost of a project, rather to predict the probability 
distribution of final outcomes (final cost and final duration when the quality criteria and 
scores of contractors are not given) given a contractor selection strategy.   
3. When quality criteria, weights of criteria and contractors scores are provided; the model 
would be able to show: 
• The lowest price tender 
• Its best value score  
• Its final cost 
• Its overrun costs 
• Its overrun time 
• The best value tender  
• Its best value score 
• Its final cost 
• Its overrun costs 
• Its overrun time 
4. By providing (3), the model would also be able identify when the lowest tenderer is the 
best value tender and how often that is the case.  
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The objectives represent the steps taken to develop the model. 
 
Objective a): Identify and collect a reliable dataset of past projects. 
 
The dataset used to develop the model was from the BCIS database. In this database, data from 120 UK 
educational facilities projects were extracted to develop the model; all of which selected the lowest 
tender. Data processing techniques were then utilised to clean the data derived from projects. See 
Section 4.2. The BCIS database is the leading provider of cost and price information to the construction 
industry. Section 3.3 mentioned how the BCIS database is considered a traditional method of estimating 
costs; and it is used by clients, contractors, and consultants. Their historic data goes back 50 years. 
Furthermore, it has also been used to conduct research; “Wall (1997) collected 216 office building from 
the BCIS database of RICS to outline the issues that should be recognised when using Monte Carlo 
methods (Section 3.4.2.1).”  
 
Objective b): Investigate the probability distribution of final costs and duration for construction 
projects: by modelling the tenders to determine the total outcome cost and duration arising from 
selecting contractors on the lowest tender strategy 
After the model was developed in Objective a), a further 10 similar projects from the BCIS database 
that selected the lowest tender was then used to test the model. In Appendix 1 we see that the model 
actual project results were within the probability distribution of outcomes that the model predicted.  
 
Objective c): Validate the model on recent project cases. 
The model was developed with Dataset 1, and after it was tested in Objective b), a further 20 projects 
that selected the lowest tender (Dataset 2) were used to validate the model. The projects were received 
from industry partners, and the outcomes were verified and double checked to subsequently validate 
the model. Appendix 2 shows that the model captures the actual results of this project in its probability 
distribution of outcomes. Cost overruns are usually presented in percentages, for example, Project A 
overran by 20%. However, the findings show that even though the lowest tenderer will likely overrun 
in cost, the final cost is usually below the starting price of the second or third lowest tender. On the 
other hand, the discussion in Section 4.3.4 suggests that even though clients select contractors from a 
preferred list, regular assessment is needed.   
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Objective d): Apply the model on best value selected tender projects 
The model was now fit enough to be applied on projects that selected the best value tender with a higher 
price. Appendix 3 and the Sensitivity Analysis conducted in Section 4.3.5 showed that in terms of final 
cost, the likelihood of the lowest tender resulting in the overall best tender, even if they incur cost 
overruns is good. However, there is more risk of project delay, though this had no obvious effect on the 
final cost. So, what does the client value the most? Delivering projects cheaper or on time? Assaf and 
Al-Heij (2006) study of projects in Saudi Arabia attributed project delay to clients using the lowest 
tender strategy. Olaniran (2015) also listed project delay as the most important problem triggered by 
using the lowest tender strategy. Cost overrun was listed as the fourth ranked performance problem; 
behind non-compliance with construction standards, and reduced quality. The findings from using 
educational facilities projects show that clients should be more concerned with project delays than cost 
when awarding to the lowest tender. In Chapter 1, it was mentioned that only 56% of project delivered 
on cost estimates in 2015, and only 48% delivered on time estimates. But the Glenigan Report (2016) 
reported that that percentage of clients that scored their projects 8/10 or better in 2015 for product, 
service, and value for money were over 70%. On one hand, this can be interpreted that cost and duration 
are not key performance indicators. Section 3.2.2.4 has however shown that in the literature this is not 
the case. On the other hand, this can also be interpreted as even though only 56% and 48% of projects 
met cost and time estimates, the final outcomes (especially in regards to cost) were still acceptable. The 
conventional way of presenting cost and time overruns in percentages is fine, but it may not tell the full 
story.  
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5.2 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS THAT WILL GUIDE THE RESEARCH IN 
ACHIEVING ITS AIM 
 
As the aim and objectives of the research was achieved, a response is now provided for the research 
questions formulated in the introductory chapter. The objectives stated above where the steps taken to 
achieve the aim of the research. The research questions however are questions that needs to be answered 
to establish the basis of carrying out the main aim of the research in the first place. The main aim of the 
research is to provide a model of determining the probability distributions of cost and time arising from 
choosing different contractor selection strategies. Therefore, the research is looking at the impact of a 
contractor selection strategy on the outcome of a construction projects. The first step was to know the 
sources that can affect the outcome of a project. Once it was established that contractor selection 
strategy was one of the factors that affected the outcome of a project, the basis of investigating the 
relationship between them were established. However, in construction, the term procurement is to do 
with the structure by which a project will be delivered and not just the selecting of contractors/supplier. 
The contractor selection strategy is part of a structure; therefore, it was important to know what these 
procurement and tendering methods are and to what extent it influenced the strategy used to select a 
contractor. Once this was established, it was important to know whether MCS was a suitable tool to 
develop a model able to investigate the relationship between contractor selection strategy and project 
outcome. 
1. What are the sources of overruns stated in the existing literature? 
In Section 2.2 we see a plethora of reasons as to why a project may incur cost overruns or delay in 
project duration. The reasons include wrong contractor selection, strategic misrepresentation 
(deception), optimism bias (delusion), scope/design changes, changes in the exchange rate, force 
majeure, etc. (see Crantelli et al., 2010 and Flyvbjerg, 2008). Strategic misrepresentation for one, is 
directly linked to wrong contractor selection. This is when a contractor would deliberately 
underestimate estimates to win the project. Optimism bias is another which goes hand-in-hand with 
strategic misrepresentation. This refers to clients that are overly optimistic about the implementation of 
projects. Thus, they would usually select the lowest tenderer believing that the lowest tenderer would 
deliver the project at their stated price. 
2. Is there a relationship between contractor selection strategy and project outcomes? 
Yes, there is, the answer is directly linked to that of Question 1. Furthermore, the answer to Objective 
d), and Section 2.3.1 have pointed out various other research that have attributed project performance 
problems such as reduced quality and project delays to awarding to lowest tender. However, from the 
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answer to the previous question it is clear that contractor selection is not the only reason to a successful 
project. There are other reasons, sometimes unforeseen that can have a negative impact on project 
outcomes, such as design changes and force majeure.  
3. What are the current procurement and tendering methods in the UK construction 
industry? 
Section 2.3 give us the different procurement and tendering methods in the UK construction industry. 
The Traditional Method is still the most used method and in these methods the lowest tender is usually 
selected. There is an increase in the use of selective tendering, whereby a client has a list of preferred 
contractors and subsequently pick the contractor that offers the lowest price when there is a project. 
4. To what extent do these methods affect the contractor selection strategy? 
This is answered in Research Question 3; the procurement and tendering method dictates the strategy 
that will be used. A project using the Traditional Procurement method will usually award to the lowest 
tender. If it is a selective tendering method, it makes little sense to select anything other than the lowest 
tendered contractor, especially when there is a good working history between the client and the 
contractors. The question now becomes, how often do clients evaluate contractors on those lists? This 
should be done regularly to ensure that contractors are able to deliver on future projects. In Section 2.3 
we see that more procurement methods have been introduced recently that aim to encourage clients not 
just to award contract to the lowest tender.  
5. Is Monte Carlo simulation the appropriate method of investigating the relationship 
between contractor selection and project outcomes? 
The results achieved at the development phase of the research (Chapter 4) demonstrate that a MCS 
model can appropriately predict the probability distributions of outcomes given the selection criteria. 
Section 3.4 show us that the concept of MCS is not new, that it has indeed been applied in construction 
before. The advantage of the model is that it does not aim to predict an outcome, but rather to show the 
probability distribution of outcomes. Furthermore, its ease of use, power, and the ability to handle 
complex information, made it an appropriate tool for this research.  
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5.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTION 
 
The aim and objectives of the research has been achieved; the research question has also been answered. 
It is now important to place the research within the wider context of construction management research 
and practice; in other words, stating what difference the research makes.  
5.3.1 Theoretical Contribution 
 
 Providing a new understanding of construction cost overruns. 
In Section 1.4 one of the research’s main contribution stated was a new way of understanding cost 
overruns. Chapter 1 cited several research that found projects overrunning their initial estimates. Love 
et al. (2014) in their research of Australian projects found that construction projects overran by up to 
70% more than their initial estimates. The Glenigan UK Industry Performance Report (2016) show that 
only 56% construction project met or bettered the cost figure agreed at the start of the phase in 2015. 
Furthermore, only 48% of construction projects in 2015 met or bettered the length of time agreed at the 
start of the phase.  These figures at face value are unimpressive; however, the model developed in this 
thesis compared the contractors’ cost overrun to the price of the next highest tender. This gives us a 
better picture of how bad the cost overrun really is. In the projects used to validate the model in Section 
4.3.2 it is shown that even though the lowest tenderer will likely exceed cost estimates, the final cost 
will likely be below the price of the next highest tender. In a perfect circumstance, a client would want 
a contractor to deliver on the agreed estimates. However, a cost overrun that is below the starting price 
of the next highest tender should be acceptable. Furthermore, the model results show that the there are 
situations where the market shows that selecting the best value tender is not necessary. This supports 
Yu and Wang (2012) study which states that clients should use the market to dictate what strategy to 
select. In the educational facilities sector, the results show that it is okay to select the lowest tender as 
they can deliver projects in terms of final costs. This is because even though the lowest tenderer may 
overrun, the cost is usually less than what the client would have paid the best value tenderer whose price 
is not the lowest price. However, on the other hand the lowest tenderer would take longer to deliver the 
project. So, if a client is looking to execute the project on a strict deadline, awarding to the best value 
tender is advised. 
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 A novel model of determining the probability distributions of cost and time involved with 
the different contractor selection strategies. 
The key theoretical contribution however is that the research has provided a novel model of determining 
the probability distributions of cost and time arising from the different contractor selection strategies 
(lowest tender or best value tender) by focussing on educational facilities projects. The research 
examined the existing studies that developed models to aid in selecting the best value tender seeing that 
selecting the lowest tender is relatively straightforward. There are many models that have been 
developed, however there are hardly any that aim to empirically show the effect that the strategy has on 
project outcomes. This research contributes to existing knowledge on modelling approaches, by not just 
aiming to predict final cost or final duration, but to rather show the probability distribution possible. It 
demonstrates the use of MCS by seeing how the lowest tender would have fared in a project awarded 
to the best value tender whose price is not the lowest price.  
5.3.2 Practical Contribution 
 
Appendix 4, 5, and 7, highlight the steps taken to build the model developed in this research. The 
developed model for this research will benefit client bodies or organisations, or an institution that 
regularly procure goods or services either from a vast pool of contractors/suppliers or from a selected 
pool of contractors/suppliers. Basically, any institution that procures large quantities of raw materials, 
resources, and any finished product, will frequently award similar contracts where both price and quality 
criteria are important evaluators that are weighted. The model will guide companies in determining the 
effects of these weighted criteria on contractor/supplier ranking and subsequently on contractor/supplier 
performance. The developed model for analysing the effect a strategy has on the outcomes of a project 
has been demonstrated as a tool capable for converting existing project data within organisation into 
decision support tools to help in deciding the strategy to select. The model can subsequently help clients 
to: 
 Decide on which strategy to adopt: lowest tender or best value tender; 
 Know the probability distribution of final cost and project time to expect and how likely 
they are to occur, especially when it can go wrong; 
 Spot and eliminate extremely low or high tender prices. 
 Ultimately increase stakeholders’ satisfaction. 
The model can also be tailored to individual companies’ needs. Furthermore, the model can be extended 
to other types of projects from different sectors, not just educational facilities. The results here are 
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particularly beneficial to companies that deal in the educational facilities sector of construction. 
However, the straightforward approach to data collection, data pre-processing and eventual model 
development using MCS can allow the extension to any relevant dataset or type of project.  
5.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
1.  More detailed best value tender selected projects. 
The developed model would have benefited greatly from knowing the contractors’ quality scores in 
these projects. Section 4.4 gives a demonstration on what the model can do when the quality criteria, 
weights to the criteria, price to weight ratio, and contractors’ quality scores are known. However, the 
model would have also benefitted more from knowing the quantitative implications the quality scores 
have on project outcomes. Indeed, the parameters for outcome in this research is limited to: Final Cost 
and Duration. There is difficulty in quantifying quality, clients would have their own way of doing so. 
The model could be further improved by partnering with a client to develop the model that can also 
incorporate a quantified quality to its parameters. Furthermore, the developed model could have also 
benefited had it been tailored to a company’s needs. The dataset used to develop the model is from the 
BCIS, however the results of the model may not be applicable to every company. The results would be 
useful to companies that work in the Educational facility sector. However, the blueprint given in this 
thesis can be mirrored to any company that is looking to conduct this analysis.  
2. Limited to Educational Facilities sector. 
The model focused on Educational facilities projects, the projects used to validate the model were from 
an industry client. Therefore, these projects were double-checked to make sure the facts were correct. 
The thesis briefly used Industrial facilities projects to prove that applying a model that has been based 
on Educational facilities project to the Industrial facilities sector or any other sector will produce 
misleading results.  
3. Too reliant on data? 
When awarding a contract, the real world only awards one contract to the winner. So, for example if 
one had a contract to build a new classroom, we cannot build two identical classrooms; with one using 
the lowest tenderer and the other using the best value tenderer whose price is not the lowest price. And 
simultaneously build multiple classrooms to get an overall probability distributions of project outcomes. 
Therefore, it is not possible to truly verify the models developed. The only way to continually verify 
the model is if there is a healthy dataset of projects that have used the two strategies. The model is 
heavily reliant on data. Section 3.4.3 mentions the difficulties in collecting historic data as a barrier in 
applying probabilistic models.  
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5.5 RECOMMENDATION  
 
First it is important to understand that even when the best possible contractor is selected, a project can 
still go wrong. Project problems are not just the sole responsibility of the contractor; more collaborative 
efforts are needed to solve issues in a project. Adversarial relationship and blame culture makes project 
issues more difficult to solve.  
Data should be considered an asset, not just an information that is stored and never to be looked at 
again. Thus, the construction industry need to use the data available to them on past projects to support 
the decisions they make; in this case the strategy in which to select a contractor. The model developed 
in the research should be used as an aid when selecting a strategy not the basis of selecting a strategy. 
The model here does not advocate a strategy but shows the probability distribution of outcomes for a 
contractor selection strategy. Thus, it is important for clients to award contracts based on realistic 
tenders submitted and not just the lowest tender offered. More collaborative effort and early contractor 
involvement can potentially incentivise a contractor to be more honest when estimating prices early-on.  
Only an arrogant modeller assumes that its model is complete. It has been noted that selecting on the 
lowest tender is relatively straightforward, best value on the other hand can be selected in different 
ways. Particularly, in ways that weights tender price to quality when analysing tenders: 60/40, 50/50 
etc. The model indeed has the capability of incorporating the different selection criteria and 
subsequently analysing the effect it has on project outcomes. This would result in analysing the history 
of past project on how projects in the different selection criteria have fared. The notion is that each 
client will have a different method on selecting contractors on best value, therefore understanding the 
client’s requirement is crucial to the model achieving the results needed.  
Furthermore, to determine the likely outcomes, it may prove useful to take the detailed bill of quantities, 
critical path network, and the probabilities associated with them and model them independently to sum 
the results. This goes beyond just analysing the outcomes associated with each strategy. For example, 
consider a wall is to be built which consists of excavating a foundation, constructing a foundation, and 
erecting the superstructure. The excavation may be delayed by poor ground conditions, unexpected 
braced services. Constructing the foundations may cost more due to heavy rain, and deeper excavation 
because of a different soil; which would then result to more materials used. The superstructure may also 
cost more and be delayed due to poor weather (sub-zero temperatures), delays to foundations, staff not 
available, etc. Each of this clearly has an associated probability which could possibly be evaluated. 
However, it is likely that there is a correlation between each of these events that will make the 
probabilities difficult to evaluate. 
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It may also be possible for a client to use a probabilistic bill of quantities and costs to produce a 
probabilistic distribution of the likely outcome costs. Remember as the number of items in the bill of 
quantities increases then the standard deviation of outcome costs is proportional to 	
૚
√ࡺ 
5.6 FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
The model can be applied to other sectors of the industry, the research only looked at educational 
facilities projects. However, applying it to other sector increases the chances of the model produced 
being accepted by industry practitioners. There is a high chance of encountering clients involved in 
different types of projects and in different sectors of construction. Therefore, applying the model in a 
different sector will give clients the opportunity to know what strategy works best in a sector, and in 
their own company. This would also eliminate the possibility of a client believing that one strategy fits 
all.  
In Section 4.3.3 the model showed that the lowest tenderer in Educational facilities projects will likely 
fail to meet the client’s expected duration. Why? This is possibly linked to the fact that clients do not 
place enough weight on meeting deadlines. Section 4.3.6 showed the tender information of three 
projects; the criteria used to select the contractor and what each contractor scored in each criterion. The 
winning contractor in all three cases scored 60% or below for the Programme criteria which evaluates 
contractors on the speed and deliverability of executing the project. This is because the Programme 
criteria was weighted 10% as supposed to Price and Experience that were weighted 30%. However, 
using three project information to make any conclusion is unwise as the dataset is not enough. 
Therefore, a bigger dataset is needed to investigate why the lowest tenderer in educational facilities 
projects is more likely to miss an agreed time schedule. 
In Section 4.3.5 it was concluded that if a client should decide to use the open tendering method, it is 
best to award on best value rather than solely on price. This is because it is more than likely that the 
client and the contractor are working together for the first time. However, the aim of the research was 
to compare the contractor selection strategies and not the tendering method. Therefore, a future model 
that incorporates the tendering method and the level of familiarity that comes with using selective or 
open tendering method is needed. As this would allow for a better comparison of tendering methods 
across different types of projects and in different sectors      
Chapter 4 details the process undergone to develop the model, this was long and could subsequently 
put off prospective users; these steps included extracting the projects, eliminating repeated projects etc. 
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using Excel. The process time will be shortened by using an individual client’s database as supposed to 
a nationwide database like the BCIS database. However, developing a tool that can sync project 
information directly to the model will eliminate these lead time.  
 
5.7 FINAL REMARKS 
 
The thesis has provided a model of determining the probability distributions of cost and time arising 
from choosing different contractor selection strategies in construction projects. This was executed by 
developing a MCS model that shows the probability distribution of likely outcomes for the lowest 
tenderer in a project that has selected the best value tender whose price is not the lowest price. In doing 
so, the model can justify to the client whether it is worth paying more initially for the best value 
contractor. El-Abbasy et al. (2013) recommended a further study that analyses what if scenarios to show 
how the lowest tenderer would have handled the project if he/she was not awarded the contract. The 
model developed in this thesis has been able to show this. The thesis does not advocate one strategy 
over another. However, the results derived from the research show that, at least in terms of final cost, 
going with the best value tender is not always worth it in the Educational facilities sector. Although, the 
best value tender will usually meet clients’ expected duration. It boils down to what best value is to a 
client: lesser cost or meeting project deadline. Yu and Wang (2012) noted how the market should dictate 
whether a client should select the lowest tender strategy or the best value strategy. Just as clients should 
be encouraged to not always select the lowest price, it should also not be mandatory to use the best 
value strategy. 
However, deciding on the strategy and subsequently the contractor to select may not alleviate all the 
problems that may go wrong in a project. Construction projects, by nature, can be volatile suffering 
from unforeseen issues. More collaborative effort is needed; especially between the client and the main 
contractor if problems are to be resolved.   
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1. Data Pre-processing; see section 4.2.1. 
2. Derive correlations between Tender price, Overrun cost, and delay time from 
Dataset 1.
3. Calculate the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost (y1 and y2) and 
delay time (n1 and n2) to expect of the lowest tenderer from Dataset 1; see 
section 4.3.1 pg. 90. 
4. Load the proposed tender of the project: identify all the bid prices, the lowest 
tender price, and the expected duration of the project. 
5. Calculate the mean (o) and standard deviation (p) of the proposed tender prices 
identified in Step 4.  
6. Input the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost and delay time to expect 
of the lowest tenderer calculated in Step 3. 
7. Multiply the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost (y1 and y2) by the 
mean of the proposed tender prices (o). This creates y3, and y4; see pg. 92. 
8. Multiply the mean and standard deviation of delay time (n1 and n2) by the 
client’s expected duration of the project identified in Step 4. This creates n3, and 
n4; see pg. 93. 
9. Input the correlations calculated in Step 2. Then instruct the model to generate 
20,000 random lognormally distributed numbers given the correlation inputted  
ܠ ൌ ۯિ ; see section 4.3 pg. 81. 
10. The 1st variable are tender prices. Instruct it to always select the lowest tender 
identified in Step 4. The 2nd variable are overrun costs to expect for the project. 
Scale by multiplying the variable by y4 and adding y3; see Step 7. The 3rd variable 
are delay times to expect for the project; Scale by multiplying the variable by n4 
and adding n3; see Step 8.
11. Calculate the total cost to expect of the lowest tenderer by adding the 1st and 
2nd variable. Calculate the duration time to expect of the lowest tenderer by adding 
the client’s expected duration identified in Step 4, to the 3rd variable. 
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1. Calculate the ratio between every contractors’ tender prices received for a 
project to the final cost of that project from Dataset 1. Then calculate the mean 
and standard deviation of the ratio; see pg. 110-111.
2. Calculate the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost (y1 and y2) and 
delay time (n1 and n2) to expect of the lowest tenderer from Dataset 1; see 
section 4.3.1 pg. 90. 
3. Calculate the mean of tender prices to expect (o) by multiplying the mean of 
the ratio in Step 2 by the budget of the project. 
4. Calculate the standard deviation of tender prices to expect (p) by multiplying 
the standard deviation of the ratio in Step 2 by the budget of the project. 
5. Multiply the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost (y1 and y2) by the 
mean of the proposed tender prices (o). This creates y3, and y4; see pg. 92. 
6. Multiply the mean and standard deviation of delay time (n1 and n2) by the 
client’s expected duration of the project identified in Step 4. This creates n3, and 
n4; see pg. 93.
7. y4 and n4 in Step 7 and 8 are overwritten to deviate from the minimum to 
maximum possible standard deviation.
8. Allow the correlations to deviate from -0.8 to 0.8. Then instruct the model to 
generate 5,000 random lognormally distributed numbers given the correlation 
inputted  ܠ ൌ ۯિ ; see section 4.3 pg. 81. 
9. The 1st variable are tender prices to expect for the project. Scale by multiplying 
the variable by p in Step 4 and adding o in Step 3. The 2nd variable are overrun 
costs to expect for the project. Scale by multiplying the variable by y4 and adding 
y3; see Step 5 and 7. The 3rd variable are delay times to expect for the project; 
Scale by multiplying the variable by n4 and adding n3; see Step 6 and 7. 
10. Calculate the total cost to expect by adding the 1st and 2nd variable. Calculate 
the duration time to expect by adding the client’s expected duration identified in 
Step 4, to the 3rd variable.
11. The model is instructed to always select the lowest tenderer. Then counts how 
many times the lowest tenderer turns out to best tender in terms of cost and 
duration.
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APPENDIX 7 
 
 1. Derive correlations between the criteria in Table 4.3.18 to 4.3.20; see pg. 133-
134. 
2. Calculate the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost and delay time to 
expect from the best value tenderer from Dataset 3. 
3. Load the proposed tender of the project: identify all the bid prices, the lowest 
tender price, and the expected duration of the project. 
4. Calculate the mean and standard deviation of the proposed tender prices 
identified in Step 3 and input.  
5. Calculate the mean and standard deviation of overrun cost and delay time to 
expect of the best value tenderer by multiplying the mean and standard deviation 
in Step 3 to the mean of tender prices in Step 4; input. 
6. Input the weights of the criteria.
7. Input the correlations calculated in Step 1. Then instruct the model to generate 
5,000 random distributed numbers given the correlation inputted  ܠ ൌ ۯિ ; see 
section 4.3 pg. 81. Make sure correlations are consistent; see pg. 143-144. 
8. The 1st variable are tender prices. Scale by multiplying the variable by the 
standard deviation of tender prices and adding it to the mean of tender prices; see 
Step 4. The 2nd variable are overrun costs to expect for the project. Scale by 
multiplying the variable by the standard deviation of overrun costs and adding it to 
the mean of overrun costs; see Step 5. The 3rd variable are delay times to expect 
for the project. Scale by multiplying the variable by the standard deviation of delay 
times and adding it to the mean of delay times; see Step 5. 
10. Contractors are not allowed to score less than 40%. Flag when contractor 
scores less than 50%; see pg. 148. Identify the lowest tenderer and calculate best 
value score. Then calculate the best value score of all the other contractors.  
9. Calculate the total cost to expect by adding the 1st and 2nd variable. Calculate the 
duration time to expect by adding the client’s expected duration identified in Step 
4, to the 3rd variable. 
11. By doing Step 10, the model finds who the lowest tenderer is, and who the best 
value tenderer is (or if the lowest tenderer is the best value tender) for each 
realisation. 
